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Abstract
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC”), warranties of goods required reliance on the affirmation or promise relating to the goods for liability to attach.
The UCC changed this standard from a reliance standard to
a “basis of the bargain” standard. This shift has caused much
confusion as to whether the new standard was meant to
completely eliminate reliance as a relevant factor, or if reliance still plays a primary role in warranty analysis. Adding
to this area of law is the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
(“MMWA” or “the Act”), which was enacted to address
concerns that sellers’ warranties were becoming too confusing
for the average consumer. To address these concerns, the Act
requires a number of explicit disclosure requirements associated with “warranties” as defined under the Act as well as
substantive limitations on disclaimers and remedies. Given
the consequences under the Act of making a warranty, how
that term is defined under the Act is of the utmost importance.
Though the Act defines a warranty more narrowly than the
UCC does, it utilizes the same “basis of the bargain” language
as U.C.C. § 2-313. This issue raises interesting questions
concerning MMWA warranties and extended service plans of*Ernest W. Clemens Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University School
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fered by retailers. While warranty liability might seem to attach under UCC standards, the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”), which is authorized under the Act to provide guidance and standards has thrown a wrench in this analysis in
the form of 16 C.F.R § 700.11 which provides that if any additional consideration is paid “beyond the purchase price of
the consumer product,” then the basis of the bargain test is
not satisfied and the plan would instead be a “service
contract” for purposes of the Act.
This provision was at the center of the recent case of Ware
v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. The Wares purchased a
plasma-screen Samsung television from Best Buy and the
five-year Geek Squad Protection Plan (“GSPP”), with a
bundled discount for both. When the television was incapable
of being repaired, the Wares sued for violations of the MMWA,
alleging that the GSPP qualified as a warranty under the
Act. Citing to the Regulation, the district court dismissed
holding that, because additional consideration was paid, the
GSPP was a “service contract.” The case is of interest as it is
one of the few reported decisions to explore, albeit briefly, the
issue of what role the “basis of the bargain” language plays
when additional consideration is paid. If the Regulation is
taken at face value, then any additional consideration, even
nominal, would disqualify an otherwise valid warranty under
the Act from warranty status. This presents a loophole for
manufacturers and retailers alike, which calls into question
the rationale of the regulation. This article explores the definition of “warranty” under the Act with reference to the UCC
in an attempt to discover where the “additional consideration”
language in the Regulation comes from, and whether it is
well-founded.
I. Introduction
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC”), warranty law for goods was governed by § 12 of the
Uniform Sales Act. This Act provided that for liability to attach, the affirmation or promise relating to the goods had to
be relied upon by the buyer. U.C.C. § 2-313 shifted the focus
of this standard from “reliance” to the “basis of the bargain.”
This shift caused much confusion as to whether the new
standard eliminated reliance as a relevant factor, or if reliance still plays a primary role in warranty analysis. From
204
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this confusion, it appears that three primary approaches
have emerged.
The first approach maintains that little changed from the
old reliance standard to the new “basis of the bargain”
standard. A second approach holds that the reliance standard has been completely eliminated, to the point that even
post-sale promises can become the “basis of the bargain.”
The third approach does not treat reliance as eliminated
completely, but instead views the “basis of the bargain” standard as creating a burden shifting construct. Under this theory, the buyer initially must show at least awareness of the
warranty, at which point it is presumed to become a part of
the “basis of the bargain.” The seller then has the opportunity to rebut this presumption, such as by showing the
buyer did not in fact rely. As explained below, this third approach is the one most in line with how leading scholars
believe section 2-313 should work.
Adding to this area of law is the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA” or “the Act”), which was enacted to address concerns that sellers’ warranties were becoming too
confusing for the average consumer. There was an articulated
fear that “[t]he bold print giveth and the fine print taketh
away.”1 To address these concerns, the Act requires a number
of explicit disclosure requirements associated with “warranties” as defined under the Act. For instance, warranties must
be labeled either “FULL” or “LIMITED”2 and such warranties “may not exclude or limit consequential damages . . .
unless such exclusion or limitation conspicuously appears on
the face of the warranty.”3 One important consequence of
making a warranty under the MMWA is that “if the product
(or a component part thereof) contains a defect or malfunction after a reasonable number of attempts by the warrantor
to remedy defects or malfunctions in such product, such warrantor must permit the consumer to elect either a refund for,
1

H.R. Rep. No. 93-1107, at 22–29 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.
A.N. 7702, 7706.
2

15 U.S.C.A. § 2303(a)(1), (2). Though the section does not use all
caps, it does state that the warranty must be “conspicuously designated.”
15 U.S.C.A. § 2303(a)(1).
3

15 U.S.C.A. § 2304(a)(3).
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or replacement without charge of, such product or part (as
the case may be).”4
Given the consequences of making a warranty under the
Act, how that term is defined is of the utmost importance.
Though the Act defines a warranty more narrowly than the
UCC, it utilizes the same “basis of the bargain” language as
§ 2-313.5 Given the pro-consumer animus that prompted the
MMWA to be enacted, one would think that a strict showing
by the buyer of reliance would not be the favored approach.
However, the issue has been scarcely litigated, with many
cases turning instead on the narrower definition of “warranty” found prior to the “basis of the bargain” language.6
4

15 U.S.C.A. § 2304(a)(4) (emphasis added).

5

Compare 15 U.S.C.A. § 2301(6) (stating that warranty status
requires that the “written affirmation, promise, or undertaking becomes
part of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer for
purposes other than resale of such product.”), with U.C.C. § 2-313(a) to (c)
(all requiring that the warranty become a “part of the basis of the
bargain”).
6

See, e.g. Carpenter v. Alberto Culver Co., 28 Mich. App. 399, 184
N.W.2d 547, 548–49, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1234 (1970) (holding that
language regarding a hair dye would result in “very nice” and “very natural” hair was not an express warranty); Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v.
Moushon, 93 Ill. App. 2d 280, 235 N.E.2d 263, 264, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
363 (4th Dist. 1968) (agreeing with trial court’s finding that explosives
were of “good quality, [and] that good results would be obtained” was
“sales talk” rather than an express warranty); Performance Motors, Inc. v.
Allen, 280 N.C. 385, 186 S.E.2d 161, 166, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 568 (1972)
(holding statements “that ‘the trailer was supposed to last a lifetime and
be in perfect condition’ ’’ were just puffing and did not create an express
warranty); Ruffin v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 149 F.3d 294, 302, Prod. Liab.
Rep. (CCH) P 15289, 49 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1193, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
341, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. 21473 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that statements that
carpet “was a higher quality carpet than what [plaintiff] brought in [to the
store]” and that plaintiff “was getting ‘a very good grade of material’ ’’
were just puffery); Boud v. SDNCO, Inc., 2002 UT 83, 54 P.3d 1131,
1135–36, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) P 16406, 48 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 532
(Utah 2002) (finding statement that a luxury yacht was “best in class” was
a mere statement of opinion rather than an assertion of fact); In re Scotts
EZ Seed Litigation, 80 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 935 (S.D. N.Y. 2013)
(“defendants’ alleged representations concerning EZ Seed are merely the
seller’s opinion or commendation of the goods and thus cannot create a
warranty”); Hume v. Lines, 2016 WL 1031320 (W.D. N.Y. 2016) (stating
that “purported statements that the bus would provide ‘safe and luxurious
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This issue raises interesting questions concerning extended
service plans offered by retailers.
For example, assume that at the height of the plasma television craze, you purchased a 50” plasma screen television
from Best Buy. You were aware that there were reported
problems with plasma-screen technology and so you decided
to purchase from Best Buy so that you could take advantage
of their much-advertised Geek Squad Protection Plan
(“GSPP”). Though the plan cost extra money, it was described
to you as a warranty by the salesperson, and incorporated by
reference the manufacturer’s warranty, and promised to fix
defects in materials or workmanship.
Under the above circumstances, a warranty could be found
under the UCC,7 because there was a promise which relates
to the goods. The only remaining question under U.C.C. § 2313 would be whether the promise became a “part of the
basis of the bargain.”8 It would seem that regardless of the
approach adopted by the court, the buyer could meet this
test because of their reliance on the GSPP when deciding to
purchase the plasma-screen television. If the MMWA followed this same approach, then the GSPP should similarly
qualify as a warranty under the “basis of the bargain”
language of the Act. However, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), which is authorized under the Act to provide
guidance and standards, has thrown a wrench in this
analysis: 16 C.F.R § 700.11 provides that if any additional
consideration is paid “beyond the purchase price of the
consumer product,” then the basis of the bargain test is not
satisfied and the plan would instead be a “service contract”
for purposes of the Act.9
This situation played out in the factually similar case of
comfort’ for many miles strikes the Court as simply a commendation of
the bus amounting to puffery.”).
7

See, e.g. Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 171 F.3d
818, 824–25, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 11 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that under
U.C.C. § 2-313, an extended service plan could qualify as a warranty so
long as it became part of the basis of the bargain).
8

U.C.C. § 2-313(a) (2011).

9

16 C.F.R. § 700.11(b), (c) (2018).
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Ware v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.10 The Wares
purchased a plasma-screen Samsung television from Best
Buy and the five-year GSPP, with a bundled discount for
both.11 When the television was incapable of being repaired,
the Wares sued for violations of the MMWA, alleging that
the GSPP qualified as a warranty under the Act.12 Citing 16
C.F.R § 700.11, the district court dismissed holding that,
because additional consideration was paid, the GSPP was a
“service contract.”13
The case is of interest as it is one of the few reported decisions to explore, albeit briefly, the issue of what role the
“basis of the bargain” language plays when additional
consideration is paid. If 16 C.F.R § 700.11 is taken at face
value, then any additional consideration, even nominal,
would disqualify an otherwise valid warranty under the Act
from warranty status. This presents a loophole for manufacturers and retailers alike, which calls into question the rationale of the regulation.
This article explores the definition of “warranty” under the
Act with reference to the UCC in an attempt to discover
where the “additional consideration” language in 16 C.F.R
§ 700.11 comes from, and whether it is well-founded. Part II
explains the history and development of the UCC definition
of an express warranty under U.C.C. § 2-313, as well as various jurisdictional approaches to the “basis of the bargain”
language. Part III provides an overview of the scope and
purpose of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, paying special
attention to the definitions of a “warranty” and a “service
contract” under the Act. It concludes with an analysis of the
FTC’s “additional consideration” provision found in 16 C.F.R
§ 700.11, using the Ware decision as an example of how the
Regulation can easily transform a valid warranty into a service contract. Part IV examines the Regulation in light of
the jurisdictional approaches to the “basis of the bargain”
standard, as well as the potential for abuse by manufactur10

Ware v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 2019 WL 398845 (N.D.
Ill. 2019).
11

Ware, 2019 WL 398845, at *1–2.

12

Ware, 2019 WL 398845, at *1–2.

13

Ware, 2019 WL 398845, at *2–3.
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ers and retailers. The article concludes by arguing the “additional consideration” standard has no basis in law as a
bright line rule, and should be changed or interpreted as a
mere consideration in a “basis of the bargain” analysis.
II. Warranty Law Under the UCC
Though the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act exists independent of state law, as will be explored below, its definition of
warranty uses the same “basis of the bargain” standard
found in U.C.C. § 2-313. Indeed, the Act’s drafters undoubtedly drew upon the UCC.14 Therefore, a review of how warranties arise under the UCC, and jurisdictional approaches
to the “basis of the bargain” language is (pardon the pun)
warranted.
A. Types of Warranties Under the Uniform Sales
Act and U.C.C. 2-313
Prior to the adoption of Article 2 of the UCC, there was
the Uniform Sales Act. The Uniform Sales Act, which was
based on the British Sales of Goods Act of 1894, was drafted
in 1906 and adopted by 34 states. Notably with regard to
warranties, this Act required that a plaintiff prove reliance
on a warranty in a suit for breach of an express warranty.
Section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act provided:
Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to
the goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of
such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase
the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon
. . .15

This focus on reliance was softened with the adoption of
U.C.C. § 2-313 and the scope of what could form the basis of
a warranty explicitly expanded.
Article 2 provides for the enforcement of express warranties made by sellers of goods under § 2-313 in one of three
ways.
14

White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 10:47 (5th ed.)
(noting that it is obvious that the drafter of the MMWA warranty definition was aware of § 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code, but it is also
obvious that the definition is not co-extensive with the § 2-313 definition
of express warranties).
15

White & Summers, supra, at 618 (quoting the Uniform Sales Act

§ 12).
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(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the
seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and
becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of
the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that
the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or
model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such as “warrant” or
“guarantee” or that he have a specific intention to make a
warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods
or a statement purporting to be merely the seller’s opinion
or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.16
Subsection (a) is merely a restatement of the standard from
the Uniform Sales Act, addressing “[a]ny affirmation of fact
or promise made by the seller . . .”17 Subsections (b) and (c)
recognize two other ways in which an express warranty may
arise. Subsection (b), like subsection (a), relates to words
used by the seller, either oral or written, and will be addressed together below. Subsection (c) permits a warranty to
arise by sample or model, is addressed next. Note one major
change from the Uniform Sales Code: rather than focusing
on reliance, in all three methods, the standard is that the
warranty must become “part of the basis of the bargain”
before liability attaches. This has been the subject of various
jurisdictional approaches and is addressed in section II.B.
1. Affirmations of Fact, Promises, and Descriptions
The most straight-forward example of a warranty under
subsection (a) would be statements, written or oral, that use
the word “warranty” or “guarantee.” However, subsection (2)
makes clear that use of such words is not required to create
16

U.C.C. § 2-313.

17

U.C.C. § 2-313.
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a warranty under this section.18 Further, this subsection
does not require that the seller intended to make a warranty, only that an affirmation of fact or promise become a
basis of the bargain.19 The “affirmation of fact” provision
permits warranties to be created by a seller’s affirmative response to a buyer’s inquiry. Thus if a buyer were to ask a
grocer if a particular food was gluten-free, and the grocer
replied in the affirmative, a warranty has been created.20
Subsection (b) of § 2-313 covers warranties created by description—a method of warranty creation that was not
explicitly recognized under the Uniform Sales Act.21 Descriptions of goods can be quite detailed, including color, dimensions, materials, etc., but they are also made simply by
describing the goods being sold. The comments describe the
purpose of this type of warranty as follows:
In view of the principle that the whole purpose of the law of
warranty is to determine what it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell, the policy is adopted of those cases which
refuse except in unusual circumstances to recognize a material deletion of the seller’s obligation. Thus, a contract is
normally a contract for a sale of something describable and
described. A clause generally disclaiming “all warranties,
express or implied” cannot reduce the seller’s obligation with
respect to such description and therefore cannot be given literal effect under Section 2-316.
This is not intended to mean that the parties, if they con18

U.C.C. § 2-313(2) (“[i]t is not necessary to the creation of an express
warranty that the seller use formal words such as ‘warrant’ or ‘guarantee’
or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty.”).
19

U.C.C. § 2-313(2).

20

U.C.C. § 2-313, cmt. 3.

In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the description of those goods; hence no
particular reliance on such statements need be shown in order to weave them
into the fabric of the agreement. Rather, any fact which is to take such affirmations, once made, out of the agreement requires clear affirmative proof. The issue normally is one of fact. U.C.C. § 2-313, cmt. 3.

See also Colin P. Marks and Jeremy Kidd, Mastering Sales 76 (Carolina
Academic Press 2018) (posting that “if a buyer asks a car dealer, ‘This
model jeep has four-wheel drive, right?’ and the dealer responds ‘Yes,’ the
dealer is just as liable in warranty as had the dealer proactively told the
buyer it had four-wheel drive.”).
21

U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(b).
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sciously desire, cannot make their own bargain as they wish.
But in determining what they have agreed upon good faith is
a factor and consideration should be given to the fact that the
probability is small that a real price is intended to be
exchanged for a pseudo-obligation.22

The basic principle at the heart of descriptions is that the
seller must sell the good promised and cannot substitute a
different kind of type of good. For instance, the “substitution
of a bicycle for an automobile would quite clearly run afoul
of this principle, but other cases are less clear.” 23 For
example, does a seller’s description of the good as a car mean
that the car is capable of independent locomotion, and what
if the seller sells the goods “as is” so as to disclaim implied
warranties? This was the case in Murray v. D & J Motor
Co.,24 though the facts involved more than a simple description of what the goods were. In that case, the plaintiff, Murray, purchased a van from D & J, in part to transport his
“ailing and disabled daughter,” who was present during the
contract negotiations.25 Murray conveyed that she needed a
reliable vehicle, and though she noticed rattling during a
test drive, she was assured by the salesmen that there was
nothing wrong with the van and that it would provide reliable transportation.26 The closing documents provided that
“the vehicle was being sold ‘as is’ and ‘with all faults’ and
that express and implied warranties were disclaimed.”27 Soon
after the purchase, the van developed problems and broke
down requiring between $1,700 to $2,000 to repair (the car
was purchased for $3,995).28
Murray sued, claiming revocation of the goods under
U.C.C. § 2-608 and fraud, but her case was dismissed by the
trial court, apparently based upon the “as is” and “with all
22

U.C.C. § 2-313, cmt. 4.

23

Marks & Kidd, supra, at 78.

24

Murray v. D & J Motor Co., Inc., 1998 OK CIV APP 69, 958 P.2d
823, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1177 (Div. 4 1998).
25

Murray, 958 P.2d at 827.

26

Murray, 958 P.2d at 827.

27

Murray, 958 P.2d at 827.

28

Murray, 958 P.2d at 826–27.
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faults” clauses.29 On appeal, the court disagreed that the
presence of such clauses precluded Murray from claiming revocation, but also addressed the express description
warranty.30 Relying on the comments to § 2-313, the court
held that the disclaimers did not preclude a claim for breach
of a description warranty.31 Comment 4 states:
[A] contract is normally . . . for something describable and
described. A clause generally disclaiming ‘all warranties,
express or implied’ cannot reduce the seller’s obligation with
respect to such description and therefore cannot be given literal effect under Section 2-316.
This is not intended to mean that the parties, if they consciously desire, cannot make their own bargain as they wish.
But in determining what they have agreed upon in good faith
is a factor and consideration should be given to the fact that
the probability is small that a real price is intended to be
exchanged for a pseudo-obligation.32

Focusing on the last sentence of the above quoted comment,
the court held that the disclaimers were no bar to Murray’s
claims and that, for purpose of dismissal “the facts . . . support Murray’s assertion that the vehicle did not meet the
warranty of description.”33
Based on the commentary, the Code appears to prohibit a
seller from avoiding liability based on disclaimers of all warranties when a description warranty is the basis of the suit.
However, too broad an application of this principle would
seem to overlap with the concept of the implied warranty of
merchantability, which normally could be excluded. Courts
and commentators have reached varying results on the question of how far the description warranty can extend beyond
the class of goods described.34
29

Murray, 958 P.2d at 826, 828.

30

Murray, 958 P.2d at 829.

31

Murray, 958 P.2d at 829.

32

U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 4.

33

Murray, 958 P.2d at 829.

34

See Frisch, Buyer’s Remedies and Warranty Disclaimers: The Case
for Mistake and the Indeterminacy of U.C.C. Section 1-103, 43 Ark. L.
Rev. 291, 309–10 (1990) (“Put another way, what quality of performance is
promised by a description warranty? At least one court and several com-
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2. Samples and Models
Subsection (1)(c) adds samples and models to the list of
ways a warranty can be created.35 These concepts are a
departure from the previous two mentioned in that they do
not involve verbal or written representations. However, a
sample or model can just as easily convey representations
about the product being sold. Though the concepts may appear similar, samples and models are significantly distinct. A
sample is a drawn from the bulk or inventory of goods that
are to be sold; whereas a model is meant to act as a representation of the good to be sold but is not drawn from the
actually inventory to be sold.36
Whether a sample or model qualifies as a warranty
depends on the surrounding circumstances. Comment 5 to
U.C.C. § 2-313 provides a caveat that though a warranty
does not need to be made orally, “all descriptions by
merchants must be read against the applicable trade usages
with the general rules as to merchantability resolving any
mentators have suggested something akin to merchantability. If this is
the correct quality of performance promised, then despite an otherwise effective disclaimer of implied warranties, the warranty of merchantability
lives on in the guise of an express warranty of description.”); White, Retail
Sellers and the Enforcement of Manufacturer Warranties: An Application
of the Uniform Commercial Code To Consumer Product Distribution
Systems, 32 Wayne L. Rev. 1049, 1087–88 (1984) (“Finding an express
warranty based on a generic description of a product has been criticized as
contradicting the UCC’s warranty scheme by nullifying sections 2-316(2)
and 2-316(3). . . . According to the critics, the express representation
made during the sale of an ‘automobile’ is that what is being sold is a
machine designed to function as an automobile, but which might have a
defect characteristic of automobiles. Buyers want a product that fulfills its
purpose and a representation to this effect is implicit in most sales
situations. This representation, however, is the province of the implied
warranty of merchantability, not the section 2-313 express warranty.”);
Bicknell v. B & S Enterprises, 160 Ga. App. 307, 287 S.E.2d 310, 33 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 263 (1981) (upholding sale of car “as is” despite numerous serious defects when there was “no question that the automobile was in fact a
1974 Pontiac Firebird with two doors” and the buyer had ample opportunity to inspect the car).
35

U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(c).

36

Marks & Kidd, supra, at 79.
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doubts.”37 The following illustration is useful in distinguishing when a warranty might not arise:
For instance, if a seller of coal offers up a lump of coal for
inspection, but expressly caveats that the actual coal to be
sold will be of inferior quality, the coal offered would not be a
sample, and its use as a model would be subject to the caveat.
Similarly, if the same seller had piles of coal on its lot, and the
buyer, while on site, inspected the coal, it would not necessarily follow that the coal so inspected was intended to be a
sample or model by the seller, unless words or circumstances
indicated otherwise.38

B. The “basis of the bargain” and Jurisdictional
Approaches
Section 2-313 of the UCC has arguably expanded the scope
of warranty creation beyond those methods listed in the
statute. By shifting from a reliance standard to a “basis of
the bargain” standard, the drafters thoroughly muddied the
waters regarding what reliance, if any, need be shown before
liability under a warranty arises. Courts have adopted a variety of jurisdictional approaches in response to this ambiguous term.
1. Section 2-313’s “basis of the bargain” Standard
In addition to adding to the types of warranties that were
described in the Uniform Sales Act, the UCC also departed
in its approach to reliance. While the Uniform Sales Act
required reliance, Article 2 does not. Instead, the promise,
affirmation of fact, description, sample or model must form
“part of the basis of the bargain.”39 Unfortunately, the Code
gives little guidance as to what “basis of the bargain”
means.40 The Comments provide some guidance stating:
No specific intention to make a warranty is necessary if any of
these factors is made part of the basis of the bargain. In actual
practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods
during a bargain are regarded as part of the description of
37

U.C.C. § 2-313, cmt. 5.

38

Marks & Kidd, supra, at 79.

39

U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) to (c).

40

White & Summers, supra, at 619 (noting “[t]he extent to which the
law has so been changed is thoroughly unclear.”); Marks & Kidd, supra, at
79.
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those goods; hence no particular reliance on such statements
need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric of the
agreement. Rather, any fact which is to take such affirmations, once made, out of the agreement requires clear affirmative proof. The issue normally is one of fact.41

Comment 7 to U.C.C. § 2-313 further notes, “[t]he precise
time when words of description or affirmation are made or
samples are shown is not material. The sole question is
whether the language or samples or models are fairly to be
regarded as part of the contract.”42
From the comments it appears that in adopting a “basis of
the bargain” standard, the drafters were rejecting the old
reliance standard.43 But this is not to say reliance is irrelevant, only that the burden may have shifted away from the
buyer and onto the seller. White and Summers summarize
the “basis of the bargain” standard as follows:
[The Comments] to 2-313 arguably mean[] that any affirmation is presumed to be a part of the basis of the bargain and
that the plaintiff need put in no evidence unless the defendant
offers evidence of the buyer’s nonreliance . . . If a plaintiff is
suing on a seller’s statement made orally during the negotiations or in writing as part of the contract, a lazy lawyer can
likely pass the basis-of-bargain test at least initially without
any proof of buyer’s reliance. We would so define the “presumption” here; even though plaintiff has not put on proof of reliance, defendant’s motion for a directed verdict will be denied.
A careful lawyer, however, will allege some reliance and offer
some proof.44

White and Summers go on to note that a seller can rebut
this presumption by showing nonreliance.45 Of course, this
still leaves us with little guidance as to what it means for
something to become the “basis” of the bargain, if reliance is
41

U.C.C. § 2-313, cmt. 3.

42

U.C.C. § 2-313, cmt. 7.

43

Keith v. Buchanan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392, 397–98,
42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 386 (2d Dist. 1985); Winston Industries, Inc. v.
Stuyvesant Ins. Co., Inc., 55 Ala. App. 525, 317 So. 2d 493, 497, 17 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 924 (Civ. App. 1975); Robert A. Hillman, Principles of Contract
Law 120–21 (West Academic Publ., 3d ed. 2014).
44

White & Summers, supra, at 62-22 (internal notes omitted).

45

White & Summers, supra, at 622, n. 4.
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truly no longer the standard.46 Professor Robert Hill suggests that perhaps the best approach is to accept a “mixed
motives” idea, under which “a statement is a basis of the
bargain so long as the seller’s utterance is at least ‘one of the
inducements for the purchase of the product.’ ’’47 However, as
explored below, perhaps due to the lack of clarity in the term
“basis of the bargain,” some courts continue to utilize a reliance standard.48
2. Jurisdictional Approaches to the “basis of the
bargain” Standard
Three broad approaches to the “basis of the bargain”
language appear to have emerged. The first approach
continues to require that a plaintiff show reliance as part of
its prima facie case.49 Such courts appear to equate the “basis
of the bargain” language to the old reliance standard, despite the UCC’s commentary to the contrary.50 Accordingly,
such courts have required that a buyer show reliance on a
seller’s statement, even in instances where the statement is
itself labelled a warranty.51
46

White & Summers, supra, at 619 (quoting 1 N.Y. State Law Revision
Comm’n 392–93 (1955) which notes “that the word ‘basis’ has no generally
understood legal or psychological meaning.”).
47

Hillman, supra, at 121 (quoting Keith, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 397–98).

48

Hillman, supra, at 121 (“In fact, because of the lack of clear direction from comment 3 and the inherent ambiguity of the term ‘basis of the
bargain,’ courts have not been consistent in deciding whether the seller
must show that the buyer has not relied on the statement.”).
49

See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 675, 53
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 483 (Tex. 2004) (cataloging the courts that continue
to require reliance).
50

Compaq, 135 S.W.3d at 675 (stating that 2-313 “incorporates a reliance element, providing that a seller’s statement that is ‘part of the basis
of the bargain’ creates an express warrant,” and that, despite the comments contrary suggestion that reliance is not necessary, that this “suggestion is not uniformly followed.”).
51

Compaq, 135 S.W.3d at 675–76. See also Speed Fastners, Inc. v.
Newsom, 382 F.2d 395, 397, 399–400, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 681 (10th Cir.
1967) (requiring evidence that plaintiff’s employer relied on statements in
seller’s pamphlet before purchase); DiIenno v. Libbey Glass Div., OwensIllinois, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 373, 376, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 706 (D. Del.
1987); Global Truck & Equipment Co., Inc. v. Palmer Mach. Works, Inc.,
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In contrast to the reliance jurisdictions are those that hold
that the UCC has done away with the reliance requirement
altogether, even to the point that a buyer need not be aware
of a warranty when being made.52 A good example of this approach is the case of Autzen v. John C. Taylor Lumber Sales,
Inc.53 Autzen involved the sale of a 50’ wooden boat to Autzen
for $100,000.54 One day after the purchase price was agreed
upon and the contract was formed, seller’s agent offered to
628 F. Supp. 641, 651–52, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1250 (N.D. Miss. 1986)
(holding that buyer could not recover for breach of express warranty unless buyer could show it relied on statements prior to or contemporaneously with sale); Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676,
680, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1005 (D.N.H. 1972) (disapproved of on other
grounds by, Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843
(1978)); Stamm v. Wilder Travel Trailers, 44 Ill. App. 3d 530, 3 Ill. Dec.
215, 358 N.E.2d 382, 385, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1142 (5th Dist. 1976) (noting that “cases under the [Illinois] Commercial Code require a reliance by
the buyer upon the promise, affirmation or description.”); Scaringe v.
Holstein, 103 A.D.2d 880, 477 N.Y.S.2d 903, 904, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
1595 (3d Dep’t 1984); Thomas v. Amway Corp., 488 A.2d 716, 720, 40
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 836, 54 A.L.R.4th 561 (R.I. 1985) (stating that a plaintiff
must prove reliance in an express warranty action).
52

Compaq, 135 S.W.3d at 676. See also Lutz Farms v. Asgrow Seed
Co., 948 F.2d 638, 645, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) P 12965, 34 Fed. R. Evid.
Serv. 813, 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1167 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that reliance is not required under Colorado law); Winston Industries, Inc. v.
Stuyvesant Ins. Co., Inc., 55 Ala. App. 525, 317 So. 2d 493, 497, 17 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 924 (Civ. App. 1975) (holding in the sale of a sale of mobile
home that is was unnecessary to show “any particular reliance” by the
buyer even though the buyer never received a written copy of the warranty and was unaware of its existence); Torres v. Northwest Engineering
Co., 86 Haw. 383, 949 P.2d 1004, 1013, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 378 (Ct.
App. 1997) (“reliance is not an essential element of a breach of express
warranty claim under the UCC”); Hawkins Const. Co. v. Matthews Co.,
Inc., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643, 654–55, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1013
(1973) (disapproved of on other grounds by, National Crane Corp. v. Ohio
Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 779
(1983)) and (disapproved of on other grounds by, Nerud v. Haybuster Mfg.,
Inc., 215 Neb. 604, 340 N.W.2d 369, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 703 (1983))
(same); Daughtrey v. Ashe, 243 Va. 73, 413 S.E.2d 336, 338–39, 16 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 2d 294 (1992) (holding that the “basis of the bargain” language
does not establish “a buyer’s reliance requirement”).
53

Autzen v. John C. Taylor Lumber Sales, Inc., 280 Or. 783, 572 P.2d
1322, 1978 A.M.C. 2263, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 304 (1977).
54

Autzen, 572 P.2d at 1323–4.

218

© 2020 Thomson Reuters E UCC Law Journal E Vol. 49May 2020

WHEN IS A WARRANTY NOT A WARRANTY?
do a survey of the boat’s condition, which the buyer initially
declined.55 However, the seller insisted, the survey did go
forward and the results were that the boat was in good
shape.56 After the sale, dry rot and serious defects to the boat
were found and confirmed on reexamination by the first
surveyor.57 Autzen filed suit for breach of express warranty
regarding the condition of the boat and the jury found for
him, which the Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed.58
On appeal, the seller claimed that the survey that was
conducted could not be a warranty under the basis of the
bargain language as the sale had already taken place before
the offer to conduct a survey.59 The Oregon Supreme Court
disagreed, distinguishing between contract formation and a
“bargain.” The court explained:
“A ‘bargain’ is not something that occurs at a particular moment in time, and is forever fixed as to its content; instead, it
describes the commercial relationship between the parties in
regard to this product. The word ‘bargain’ is not encrusted
with pre-Code concepts which had attached themselves to
contract formation notions that a contract came into existence
at some specific point in time * * *. The Code’s word is ‘bargain’
a process which can extend beyond the moment in time that
the offeree utters the magic words, ‘I accept’.” Nordstrom, Law
of Sales, s 67, 206 (1971).
At the time Buyer was first informed of the [boat] survey
results, he had not yet taken possession of the boat. While this
description did not induce the actual formation of the contract,
the jury might have found that it did induce and was intended
by the Seller to induce Buyer’s satisfaction with the agreement just made, as well as to lessen Buyer’s degree of vigilance in inspecting the boat prior to acceptance.60

The seller additionally attempted to argue that the survey
could not qualify as a basis of the bargain as it was not
bargained for but was volunteered (and initially declined) by
55

Autzen, 572 P.2d at 1324.

56

Autzen, 572 P.2d at 1324.

57

Autzen, 572 P.2d at 1324.

58

Autzen, 572 P.2d at 1323.

59

Autzen, 572 P.2d at 1325–26.

60

Autzen, 572 P.2d at 1325–26.
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the buyer.61 The Court again, disagreed holding that “[t]he
basis of the bargain requirement . . . does not mean that a
description by the Seller must have been bargained for.
Instead the description must go to the essence of the
contract.”62
The third intermediate approach views U.C.C. § 2-313 as
not necessarily eliminating reliance altogether, but rather as
creating a shift in the burdens of proof.63 Kelleher v. Marvin
Lumber & Cedar Co.64 is useful in not just illustrating this
approach, but also for its explanation of why this approach
is more in-line with the comments to and purpose of section
2-313. In Kelleher, the plaintiff purchased and installed
windows manufactured by the defendant, Marvin Lumber
61

Autzen, 572 P.2d at 1326.

62

Autzen, 572 P.2d at 1326. This distinction between a bargain and
what is essentially consideration is notable as the C.F.R. has stated that
under Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, if additional any additional
consideration is paid, then the resulting warranty is in fact a service plan.
16 C.F.R. § 701.11(b), (c) (“A written warranty must be ‘part of the basis of
the bargain.’ This means that it must be conveyed at the time of sale of
the consumer product and the consumer must not give any consideration
beyond the purchase price of the consumer product in order to benefit
from the agreement.”). This will be discussed in section III.C. and IV.
infra.
63

See Keith, 220 Cal.Rptr. at 398 (“The representation need only be
part of the basis of the bargain, or merely a factor or consideration inducing the buyer to enter into the bargain. A warranty statement made by a
seller is presumptively part of the basis of the bargain, and the burden is
on the seller to prove that the resulting bargain does not rest at all on the
representation.”); Bysom Enterprises, Ltd. v. Peter Carlton Enterprises,
Ltd., 267 Ill. App. 3d 1, 204 Ill. Dec. 408, 641 N.E.2d 838, 843 (1st Dist.
1994) (“the fact that the warranties are in the Purchase Agreement is
prima facie evidence that they are part of the bargain. The burden of
disproving this is upon [the seller].”); Torres v. Northwest Engineering
Co., 86 Haw. 383, 949 P.2d 1004, 1015, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 378 (Ct.
App. 1997) (“[W]e conclude, as other jurisdictions have, that under the
UCC, a seller’s statements to a buyer regarding goods sold, made during
the bargaining process, are presumptively part of the basis of the bargain
between the seller and buyer. Therefore, the burden is on the seller to
prove that the resulting bargain did not rest at all on the seller’s
statements.”).
64

Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 891 A.2d
477, 2006-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 75085, 58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 401 (2005).
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and Cedar Company in 1986.65 Though the windows were
initially treated with a wood preservative, the windows
leaked and the surrounding wood rotted.66 Over the next several years the plaintiff noticed other windows were also
experiencing wood rot and reported this to the defendant.67
In 1998, plaintiff filed a formal complaint regarding the wood
rot, and it was discovered that 17 windows suffered rot
damage.68 The plaintiff ultimately filed suit for breach of
warranty under state law and the MMWA, seeking damages
for the replacement of the defective windows, loss of value of
the house and costs related to repairing other water damage
caused by the defective windows.69 The plaintiff won at trial
and defendant appealed.70
On appeal, at issue was whether a statement made in the
defendant’s catalog “that the windows were deep treated to
permanently protect against rot and decay” qualified as an
express warranty under both state law and the MMWA.71
The court first held that the statement was indeed an affirmation of fact relating to the windows before determining
whether the affirmation was a part of the basis of the
bargain.72 In reviewing the statements made in the catalog,
the court reviewed the various approaches outlined above to
the “basis of the bargain” language and rejected both stating:
Both of these positions are inconsistent with the official comments to section 2-313 of the UCC. Official Comment 3 states
in pertinent part:
In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller
about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the
description of those goods; hence no particular reliance on
such statements need be shown in order to weave them into
the fabric of the agreement. Rather, any fact which is to take
such affirmations, once made, out of the agreement requires
clear affirmative proof. The issue normally is one of fact.
65

Kelleher, 891 A.2d at 484.

66

Kelleher, 891 A.2d at 484.

67

Kelleher, 891 A.2d at 484.

68

Kelleher, 891 A.2d at 484.

69

Kelleher, 891 A.2d at 484.

70

Kelleher, 891 A.2d at 486.

71

Kelleher, 891 A.2d at 499–500.

72

Kelleher, 891 A.2d at 500.
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(Emphasis added.) Furthermore, comment 8 states that “all of
the statements of the seller [become part of the basis of the
bargain] unless good reason is shown to the contrary.”
(Emphasis added.) Comment 7 states that “the precise time
when words of description or affirmation are made . . . is not
material. The sole question is whether the language . . . [is]
fairly to be regarded as part of the contract.” Thus, the majority position that reliance is an essential element under section
2-313 is clearly contrary to the plain language of section 2-313
and comment 3. Likewise, the minority position eliminating
any reliance requirement is also contrary in that it nullifies
the phrase “part of the basis of the bargain,” thereby allowing
a buyer to recover on a breach of warranty claim without being aware of the existence of the statements when the bargain
was being negotiated.73

The court proceeded to adopt an intermediate approach.74
Under this approach, once buyers show they were aware of
the “affirmation of fact or promise, the statements are
presumptively part of the basis of the bargain [and] the
burden then shifts to the seller to prove, by clear affirmative
proof, that the resulting bargain did not rest at all on the
seller’s statements.”75 Based on this approach the court
concluded that there were really two dispositive issues with
regard to the “basis of the bargain”: “whether the statements
were of the type that would naturally induce the purchase of
the product; and whether the buyer was aware of the statements during the negotiating process.”76 Despite this conclusion, the court found that there were credibility issues
regarding whether the plaintiff was aware of the catalog affirmations when purchasing the window that needed to be
resolved by the trier of fact, and so vacated the verdict and
remanded.77
This intermediate approach is consistent with the approach articulated by Professors White and Summers as
73

Kelleher, 891 A.2d at 501 (emphasis in original).

74

Kelleher, 891 A.2d at 501.

75

Kelleher, 891 A.2d at 501 (emphasis in original).

76

Kelleher, 891 A.2d at 502.

77

Kelleher, 891 A.2d at 502–03.
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well as Professor Hillman.78 It also appears to be the most
consistent with the comments to § 2-313 in that reliance
ceases to be the sine qua non of warranty liability, but still
permits a showing of non-reliance as a defense. This third
approach appropriately respects the modifier “part of” that
precedes “basis of the bargain,” recognizing that any number
of affirmations or promises could be “part of” the purchasing
decision, and leaving it the burden of the seller who makes
such affirmations or promises to rebut them by showing no
reliance. Though the MMWA does not explicitly articulate
what approach to adopt with regard to its “basis of the
bargain” language, because the Act also uses the modifier
“part of” and has a pro-consumer purpose, the intermediate
approach is the most appropriate to adopt as well. Unfortunately, the FTC has given little guidance on this issue, and
as explored below, what guidance it has given is not consistent with any of the approaches outlined above.
III. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act’s Definition of
Warranty
The MMWA is a pro-consumer act meant to de-mystify the
language of warranties and offer certain protections to
consumers. The Act attaches disclosure requirements to
those making “warranties” as defined under the Act, and
imposes specific limitations on what can be disclaimed. The
Act also has a residual category labeled “service contracts”
for promises that may not quite meet the definition of a “warranty” under the Act. This category, however, does not impose
the same sort of requirements that come with a warranty.
Though not often litigated, the distinction can make a big
difference for consumers, especially with regard to remedies.
Unfortunately, the FTC’s guidance on this issue, as articulated through the Code of Federal Regulations, are neither
especially enlightening nor consistent with the Act itself or
the UCC.
A. The History and Purpose of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act
The MMWA was created to address the belief that consumer product warranties under state law often were too
78

See supra notes 42 & 46, and accompanying text.
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complex and varied to be easily understood or to allow
meaningful comparisons, and that restrictions buried in the
text hindered meaningful warranty protection.79 As was
noted in the House Report on the legislation:
Another growing source of resentment has been the inability
to get many of those products properly repaired and the
developing awareness that the paper with the filigree border
bearing the bold caption ‘Warranty’ or ‘Guarantee’ was often
of no greater worth than the paper it was printed on. Indeed,
in many cases where a warranty or guarantee was ostensibly
given the old saying applied ‘The bold print giveth and the
fine print taketh away.’ For the paper operated to take away
from the consumer the implied warranties of merchantability
and fitness arising by operation of law leaving little in its
stead.80

The MMWA addresses these concerns in two ways. First, by
setting out minimum informational standards associated
with warranties. Second, by providing substantive limitations on certain disclaimers when a warranty is given.
The MMWA is limited to sales of consumer products,
defined as “any tangible personal property which is distributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal,
family, or household purposes.”81 The MMWA applies to
consumer product warrantors.82 defining a warrantor broadly
as “any supplier or other person who gives or offers to give a
written warranty or who is or may be obligated under an
implied warranty.”83 The Act broadly defines a supplier as
“any person engaged in the business of making a consumer
79

See S. Rep. No. 93-151, at 6–8 (1973); H.R. Rep. No. 93-1107, at
22–29 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7705–11. See also
Devience, Magnuson-Moss Act: Substitution for UCC Warranty Protection,
95 Com. L.J. 323 (1990).
80

H.R. Rep. No. 93-1107, at 22–29, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7702, 7706.
81

15 U.S.C.A. § 2301(1).

82

Section 2310(d) of the MMWA provides that “a consumer who is
damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to
comply with any obligation under this chapter, or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract, may bring suit for damages
and other legal and equitable relief.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 2310(d)(1).
83

15 U.S.C.A. § 2301(5).
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product directly or indirectly available to consumers.”84 This
definition is broad enough to reach manufacturers and retailers alike, thereby loosening vertical privity requirements
that might normally be an obstacle for downstream purchasers of goods under the UCC. Thus, once a retailer or
manufacturer makes an express warranty, as defined under
the Act, the MMWA applies.85
84

15 U.S.C.A. § 2301(4).

85

There exists authority that the Act applies not only to those making
express written warranties, but even where no express warranties have
been made and a suit is brought simply for a breach of an implied warranty, such as merchantability. See McCurdy v. Texar, Inc., 575 So. 2d 299,
300, 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 69359 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) see also Milicevic
v. Fletcher Jones Imports, Ltd., 402 F.3d 912, 918, 2005-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 74736, 66 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1059 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The Act’s
consumer-suit provision . . . supplies a federal remedy for breach of written and implied warranties . . .” (quoting Richardson v. Palm Harbor
Homes, Inc., 254 F.3d 1321, 1325, 2001-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 73334, 45
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 56 (11th Cir. 2001))); Rentas v. DaimlerChrysler
Corp., 936 So. 2d 747, 750 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (MMWA “provide[s] an independent federal cause of action for breach of warranty”); Hyler v. Garner,
548 N.W.2d 864, 874 (Iowa 1996), as amended on denial of reh’g, (June 18,
1996) (“The Magnuson-Moss Act created a federal remedy for breach of
written and implied warranties falling within the statute”); Carolyn L.
Carter et al., Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., Consumer Warranty Law: Lemon
Law, Magnuson-Moss, UCC, Manufactured Home, and Other Warranty
Statutes § 2.3.1.3 (5th ed. 2015); Christopher Smith, Private Rights of
Action Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, in Practicing Law Inst.,
Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series 223, 225 (1985)
(stating the MMWA allows consumers to bring a federal action for breach
of an implied warranty of merchantability or fitness even if a written warranty has not been given); Annotation, Consumer Product Warranty Suits
in Federal Court Under Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal—Trade
Commission Improvement Act (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2301 et seq.), 59 A.L.R. Fed.
461, 470 n.10 (1982) (“This provision has not only provided a means of
enforcing the substantive requirements of the Act, but also has established
a federal cause of action for breach of an implied warranty which has
arisen under state law even if no written warranty was involved.”). “This
could arise in a case where a seller makes no written warranties but fails
to disclaim implied warranties, such as the warranty of merchantability,
which, under state law, accompany all sales by merchants unless properly
disclaimed.” Marks, Online Terms as In Terrorem Devices, 78 Md. L. Rev.
247, 279 (2019). But see Anderson v. Newmar Corp., 319 F. Supp. 2d 943,
948, 2004-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 74471 (D. Minn. 2004) (limiting application of MMWA to warrantors who make express warranties); Gross v.
Shep Brown’s Boat Basin, 2000 DNH 49, 2000 WL 1480373 (D.N.H. 2000);
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While the scope of liability as to who can be sued is
enlarged by § 2310(d) of the MMWA, retailers are not liable
for simply selling consumer goods that come with a manufacturer’s warranty, unless the retailer itself also warrants the
goods.86 The Regulation makes this clear, stating:
Section [2310(f)] of the Act . . . provides that only the supplier “actually making” a written warranty is liable for
purposes of F.T.C. and private enforcement of the Act. A supplier who does no more than distribute or sell a consumer
product covered by a written warranty offered by another
person or business and which identifies that person or business as the warrantor is not liable for failure of the written
warranty to comply with the Act or rules thereunder.87

Notably the retailer should identify the manufacturer as the
warrantor, and though the retailer may not be liable under
the Act for an express warranty, unless it properly disclaims
the implied warranties, other provisions of the Act might
still apply.88
The MMWA applies when a written warranty is made, and
McNamara v. Nomeco Bldg. Specialties, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1175 (D.
Minn. 1998); Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 500 F. Supp. 1181, 30 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 846 (N.D. Ill. 1980), order rev’d on other grounds, 660 F.2d 311,
1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 64333, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1118 (7th Cir.
1981).
86

15 U.S.C.A. § 2310(f) (“Warrantors subject to enforcement of
remedies. For purposes of this [S]ection, only the warrantor actually making a written affirmation of fact, promise, or undertaking shall be deemed
to have created a written warranty, and any rights arising thereunder
may be enforced under this [S]ection only against such warrantor and no
other person.”).
87

16 C.F.R. § 700.4.

88

See, e.g., Voelker v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc., 353 F.3d 516,
526, 52 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 450 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding a lessor’s written,
conspicuous disclaimer specifically mentioning merchantability sufficient
to safeguard against a lessee’s MMWA claim for breach of implied warranty and improperly pled breach of express warranty claim); Hemmings
v. Camping Time RV Centers, LLC, 93 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1230 (N.D.
Ga. 2017) (dismissing a consumer’s claims under MMWA § 2310 against a
seller after the consumer’s breach of express and implied warranties
claims failed because the seller had not “adopted the manufacturer’s warranty or assumed the performance of [that] warranty” and had conspicuously disclaimed all warranties in its sales agreement); Semitekol v.
Monaco Coach Corp., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1027–30, 2008-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 76350 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (upholding a motorhome dealer’s
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in some jurisdictions, even if no warranty is made, the
MMWA will apply if implied warranties are not properly
disclaimed.89 For most retailers, avoiding liability under the
Act will simply be a matter of properly disclaiming all
express and implied warranties, and making clear, when applicable, that manufacturer warranties are not their
warranties. However, retailers (and manufacturers) may
also be subject to the Act if they offer service warranties or
extended warranties with their products, as the Act specifically applies to service contracts.90 Drawing upon the hypothetical in the introduction, Best Buy offers on its website a
“Geek Squad® Protect & Support Plus” service contract that
includes “Hardware Protection” and 24/7 technical support.91
In such a situation, even if Best Buy makes no express written warranties and disclaims all implied warranties, it will
disclaimer of implied warranties, which “specifically state[d] ‘dealer’ in the
[S]ection identifying who was disclaiming the warranty,” after concluding
that two purported promises by the dealer were not written warranties for
MMWA § 2308 purposes and thus could not bar the dealer from disclaiming implied warranties); Rokicsak v. Colony Marine Sales and Service,
Inc., 219 F. Supp. 2d 810, 815, 48 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 573 (E.D. Mich.
2002) (protecting a retailer from liability for an alleged breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability where the applicable purchase agreement “disclaimed all warranties using clear and conspicuous language”
that “ma[de] plain there were no warranties except ‘those written warranties provided by the manufacturer’ ’’ that “specifically incorporat[ed] the
term ‘merchantability’ into the waiver language and expressly disclaim[ed]
any implied warranty of fitness.”).
89

See Marks, supra, at 279.

90

See Anderson v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 662 F.3d 775, 780, 2011-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 77690, 76 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 12 (7th Cir. 2011) (“It
provides a federal private cause of action for a warrantor’s failure to
comply with the terms of a ‘written warranty, implied warranty or service
contract.’ ’’ (quoting Voelker v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc., 353 F.3d
516, 522, 52 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 450 (7th Cir. 2003))); Mesa v. BMW of
North America, LLC, 904 So. 2d 450, 455 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (“[T]he
MMWA allows a ‘consumer’ to sue a supplier, warrantor, or manufacturer
who fails to comply with any obligation under the MMWA, a written warranty, an implied warranty, or a service contract.” (citing 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 2310(d) (2001))).
91

See Best Buy, Inc., http://www.bestbuy.com/site/geek-squad-protecti
on/geek-squad-protect-support-plus/pcmcat748300491884.c?id=pcmcat
748300491884 (last visited Jan. 3, 2019) (stating “If something breaks,
we’ll repair it. It’s that simple.”).
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be subject to the MMWA, and its attempts to disclaim
implied warranties on the products sold will be invalidated.92
B. The Consequences of Making a “warranty”
Under the MMWA
If the Act applies to a transaction, it sets minimum standards for express warranties that are made,93 provides for a
limitation on the ability to disclaim implied warranties, and
makes remedies for breach of such warranties easier to
access.94 The Act permits consumers to bring suit in state or
federal court95 and provides that a prevailing plaintiff can
recover attorneys’ fees.96
If a written warranty is made, then a warrantor must
conspicuously designate the warranty as either a “full warranty” or a “limited warranty.”97 The Act mandates that a
warrantor must “fully and conspicuously disclose in simple
92

15 U.S.C.A. § 2310(d)(1) (attaching liability to a “supplier, warrantor, or service contractor” who damages a consumer through its failures to
comply with the Act); Lysek v. Elmhurst Dodge, Inc., 325 Ill. App. 3d 536,
259 Ill. Dec. 454, 758 N.E.2d 862, 867, 2001-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 73442
(2d Dist. 2001), as modified on denial of reh’g, (Oct. 25, 2001) (holding
that “that obligations under written or implied warranties or service
contracts can serve as independent bases for private lawsuits under the
Magnuson-Moss Act.”). Retailers may also be subject to the Act if they do
not make clear that the warranties offered on a product come from a
manufacturer rather than from them. Such a retailer, through sloppy
advertising, may inadvertently make an express written warranty subjecting it to the Act. Colin P. Marks, Online Terms as In Terrorem Devices, 78
Maryland L. Rev. 247, 283 (2019). Cf. Freeman v. Hubco Leasing, Inc., 253
Ga. 698, 324 S.E.2d 462, 465–67, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 408 (1985) (holding
that a lessee of a DeLorean automobile was the third-party beneficiary of
a contract between the manufacturer and original dealer in which the
dealer undertook to address warranty claims, despite the fact that the lessor (who bought the car from the dealer) had disclaimed warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose).
93

15 U.S.C.A. § 2304(a), (e).

94

Eddy, Effects of the Magnuson-Moss Act Upon Consumer Product
Warranties, 55 N.C. L. Rev. 835, 851–52, 862, 869–72 (1977).
95

15 U.S.C.A. § 2310(d)(1). For federal jurisdiction there are threshold requirements, such as the amount in controversy must be at least
$50,000. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2310(d)(3)(B).
96

15 U.S.C.A § 2310(d)(2).

97

15 U.S.C.A. § 2303. The Act defines a “written warranty” as:
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and readily understood language the terms and conditions of
such warranty.”98 The Act then provides a laundry list of
items that the FTC may require including:
(1) The clear identification of the names and addresses of
the warrantors.
(2) The identity of the party or parties to whom the warranty is extended.
(3) The products or parts covered.
(4) A statement of what the warrantor will do in the event
of a defect, malfunction, or failure to conform with such written warranty—at whose expense—and for what period of
time.
(5) A statement of what the consumer must do and expenses he must bear.
(6) Exceptions and exclusions from the terms of the
warranty.
(7) The step-by-step procedure which the consumer
should take in order to obtain performance of any obligation
under the warranty, including the identification of any
person or class of persons authorized to perform the obligations set forth in the warranty.
(8) Information respecting the availability of any informal
dispute settlement procedure offered by the warrantor and a
recital, where the warranty so provides, that the purchaser
may be required to resort to such procedure before pursuing
any legal remedies in the courts.
(9) A brief, general description of the legal remedies available to the consumer.
(10) The time at which the warrantor will perform any
obligations under the warranty.
(11) The period of time within which, after notice of a
defect, malfunction, or failure to conform with the warranty,
[A]ny undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a supplier of a
consumer product to refund, repair, replace, or take other remedial action with
respect to such product in the event that such product fails to meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking, which written affirmation, promise, or
undertaking becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a
buyer for purposes other than resale of such product.

15 U.S.C.A. § 2301(6)(B).
98

15 U.S.C.A. § 2302(a).
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the warrantor will perform any obligations under the
warranty.
(12) The characteristics or properties of the products, or
parts thereof, that are not covered by the warranty.
(13) The elements of the warranty in words or phrases
which would not mislead a reasonable, average consumer as
to the nature or scope of the warranty.99
The FTC codified a nearly identical version of this list in 16
C.F.R. § 701.3.100 Thus, meeting a definition of a “warrantor”
under the Act comes with a number of additional informa99

15 U.S.C.A. § 2302(a).

100

16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a). This section provides:
(a) Any warrantor warranting to a consumer by means of a written
warranty a consumer product actually costing the consumer more than
$15.00 shall clearly and conspicuously disclose in a single document in
simple and readily understood language, the following items of
information:
(1) The identity of the party or parties to whom the written warranty is extended, if the enforceability of the written warranty is
limited to the original consumer purchaser or is otherwise limited to
persons other than every consumer owner during the term of the warranty;
(2) A clear description and identification of products, or parts, or
characteristics, or components or properties covered by and where
necessary for clarification, excluded from the warranty;
(3) A statement of what the warrantor will do in the event of a
defect, malfunction or failure to conform with the written warranty,
including the items or services the warrantor will pay for or provide,
and, where necessary for clarification, those which the warrantor will
not pay for or provide;
(4) The point in time or event on which the warranty term commences, if different from the purchase date, and the time period or
other measurement of warranty duration;
(5) A step-by-step explanation of the procedure which the consumer
should follow in order to obtain performance of any warranty obligation, including the persons or class of persons authorized to perform
warranty obligations. This includes the name(s) of the warrantor(s),
together with: The mailing address(es) of the warrantor(s), and/or the
name or title and the address of any employee or department of the
warrantor responsible for the performance of warranty obligations,
and/or a telephone number which consumers may use without charge
to obtain information on warranty performance;
(6) Information respecting the availability of any informal dispute
settlement mechanism elected by the warrantor in compliance with
part 703 of this subchapter;
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tional disclosure requirements. A failure to meet these
minimal disclosure requirements can make a warrantor
subject to suit by a “consumer who is damaged by [such]
failure.”101
Warranty status also comes with substantive limitations
on what a warrantor can disclaim.102 For instance, a warrantor making a “full warranty” cannot disclaim implied warranties103 and warrantors making a “limited warranty” can
only limit the duration of such implied warranties to the
same length as the limited warranty.104 The Act also provides
that warrantors must remedy breaches of express warranties “within a reasonable time and without charge” and
requires the warrantor to refund or replace the product, at
the consumer’s election and without charge, if the warrantor
is unable to remedy any alleged defect after a reasonable
(7) Any limitations on the duration of implied warranties, disclosed
on the face of the warranty as provided in section 108 of the Act, 15
U.S.C. 2308, accompanied by the following statement: Some States
do not allow limitations on how long an implied warranty lasts, so the
above limitation may not apply to you.
(8) Any exclusions of or limitations on relief such as incidental or
consequential damages, accompanied by the following statement,
which may be combined with the statement required in paragraph
(a)(7) of this section: Some States do not allow the exclusion or limitation of incidental or consequential damages, so the above limitation or
exclusion may not apply to you.
(9) A statement in the following language: This warranty gives you
specific legal rights, and you may also have other rights which vary
from State to State.
101
15 U.S.C.A. § 2310(d)(1).
102

Michael D. Scott, Scott on Computer Info. L. § 7.23 (Aspen Pub. 3d
ed. 2019) (“The Act takes a two-prong approach to consumer warranties.
The first prong is concerned with ensuring that consumers receive adequate information about any warranties and service contracts covering
consumer products . . . The second prong pf the Act’s regulatory scheme
is more substantive.”).
103

15 U.S.C.A. § 2304(a)(2) (prohibiting limiting the duration of
implied warranties), § 2308(a) (prohibiting suppliers who make warranties or who enter into service contracts within 90 days of the sale from
disclaiming or modifying implied warranties).
104

15 U.S.C.A. § 2308(b).
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number of attempts.105 The Act further requires exclusions or
limitations on consequential damages for breach of any warranties to conspicuously appear on the face of the warranty.106
As noted above, there is a second category that comes
under the purview of the Act: the service contract.107 Service
contracts are not subject to the same rigorous disclosure
requirements as warranties, as the Act only provides that
service contracts may be entered into by a supplier or warrantor so long as they “fully, clearly, and conspicuously” disclose their terms “in simple and readily understood language,” and also empowers the FTC to “prescribe by rule the
manner and form in which the terms and conditions or service contracts shall be fully, clearly, and conspicuously
disclosed.”108 In stark contrast to written warranties, the
FTC has provided little guidance on what exactly must be
disclosed, simply offering that terms which do not qualify as
written warranties “should not be offered or described in a
manner that may deceive consumers as to their enforceability under the Act.”109 Therefore, the only clear guidance
is that a service contract should not identify itself as a
warranty. Though service contracts do not have the same informational burdens as warranties, they do share one major
limitation in that a supplier who makes a service contract
with 90 days of the sale may not disclaim or modify any
implied warranty.110 However, one key limitation that does
not apply to service, but does to warranties, is the provision
that “if the product . . . contains a defect or malfunction after a reasonable number of attempts by the warrantor to
remedy defects or malfunctions in such product, such war105

15 U.S.C.A. § 2304 (a)(1), (4).

106

15 U.S.C.A. § 2304(a)(3).

107

16 C.F.R. § 700.11 (“The Act recognizes two types of agreements
which may provide similar coverage of consumer products, the written
warranty, and the service contract.”).
108

15 U.S.C.A. § 2306(a), (b).

109

16 C.F.R. § 700.3. See also Lysek v. Elmhurst Dodge, Inc., 325 Ill.
App. 3d 536, 259 Ill. Dec. 454, 758 N.E.2d 862, 864, 2001-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 73442 (2d Dist. 2001), as modified on denial of reh’g, (Oct. 25,
2001) (“At present, the Federal Trade Commission has not issued any
rules governing service contracts.”).
110

15 U.S.C.A. § 2308(a).
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rantor must permit the consumer to elect either a refund for,
or replacement without charge of, such product or part.”111
Given this last exemption for service contracts, in addition
to the lesser informational burden, many suppliers probably
prefer their warranties be labelled service contracts for
purposes of the Act. The next section delineates the boundaries of these two categories.
C. Magnuson-Moss’ Narrower “warranty” Definition and the Related “service contract” Concept
Given the different treatment of warranties versus service
contracts under the Act, how a court labels written promises
by a supplier can become quite important. Both terms are
defined under the Act, but the definitions themselves leave
gaps that are not fully clarified by the FTC. Further, though
courts may borrow from the UCC to aid in delineating the
metes and bounds of the definitions, particularly with regard
to the “basis of the bargain” language, § 2-313 is much
broader in the ways in which warranties may be made.
The most obvious way in which the MMWA’s definition is
narrower than the UCC’s is that the MMWA only applies to
consumer goods, consistent with its purpose, while the UCC
applies to all sales of goods. Beyond the scope of the respective provisions, the definitions themselves are different. The
Act defines a “written warranty” as:
(6) The term “written warranty” means—
(A) any written affirmation of fact or written promise
made in connection with the sale of a consumer product by a
supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature of the material or workmanship and affirms or promises that such material or workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified
level of performance over a specified period of time, or
(B) any undertaking in writing in connection with the
sale by a supplier of a consumer product to refund, repair,
replace, or take other remedial action with respect to such
product in the event that such product fails to meet the
specifications set forth in the undertaking,
111

15 U.S.C.A. § 2304(a)(4).

© 2020 Thomson Reuters E UCC Law Journal E Vol. 49May 2020

233

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 49 #2]
which written affirmation, promise, or undertaking becomes
part of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer
for purposes other than resale of such product.112

The first limitation not found in the UCC is the addition of
the word “written” to warranty. Under the UCC, oral warranties are actionable, though they may be subject to the
parol evidence rule.113 The Act, however, limits itself to “written warranties.”114
A second way in which the MMWA is narrower than § 2313 is in the types of warranties it covers. Recall that § 2313 covers three types of warranties: affirmations of fact or
promises, descriptions, and samples or models.115 Subpart (a)
of the MMWA’s warranty definition appears at first to mirror the affirmations of fact or promises language, but then
goes on to qualify that the affirmations or promises must
“relate[] to the nature of the material or workmanship and
affirm[] or promise[] that such material or workmanship is
defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over
a specified period of time.” Drawing upon this language, the
FTC has specified that “[c]ertain representations, such as
energy efficiency ratings for electrical appliances, care labeling of wearing apparel, and other product information
disclosures may be express warranties under the Uniform
Commercial Code,” and further that such “disclosures alone
are not written warranties under this Act.”116 A failure in a
labelling or advertisement to list both a specified level of
112

15 U.S.C.A. § 2301(6). As noted supra, the Act defines a warrantor
as “any supplier or other person who gives or offers to give a written warranty or who is or may be obligated under an implied warranty,” 15
U.S.C.A. § 101(5), and defines a supplier as “any person engaged in the
business of making a consumer product directly or indirectly available to
consumers.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 2301(4).
113

U.C.C. § 2-316, cmt. 2 (“The seller is protected under this Article
against false allegations of oral warranties by its provisions on parol and
extrinsic evidence and against unauthorized representations by the customary ‘lack of authority’ clauses.”).
114

15 U.S.C.A. § 2306(a); 16 C.F.R. § 700.3(a) (“The Act imposes specific
duties and liabilities on suppliers who offer written warranties on
consumer products.” (emphasis added)).
115

U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) to (c).

116

16 C.F.R. § 700.3(a).
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performance and specified time period will therefore fail to
meet the definition of “warranty” under the Act, even if the
same would meet the definition under § 2-313.117
For instance, in Skelton v. General Motors, Corp. 118
purchasers of cars manufactured by General Motors Corporation (“GM”), brought a nationwide class action on behalf of
all purchasers of GM cars manufactured from 1976 through
1979.119 The plaintiffs claimed that through its “brochures,
manuals, consumer advertising and other forms of communications to the public generally and to members of
plaintiffs’ class specifically,” GM warranted that its cars’
transmissions were of a certain quality and would meet a
specified level of performance.120 Plaintiffs claimed that, contrary to these warranties, GM substituted inferior transmissions, and that this undisclosed substitution constituted a
violation of the MMWA.121 The district court held that the alleged warranty did not fall within the Act’s definition of
“written warranty” as “it did not affirm that the transmission would ‘meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of time.’ ’’122 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed that a product information disclosure was not a written warranty as it lacked a specified time period, concluding
that such a reading is consistent with the FTC’s interpreta117

Compare 15 U.S.C.A. § 2301(6)(A) (requiring that affirmations and
promises as to material or workmanship be “defect free or will meet a
specified level of performance over a specified period of time”) with U.C.C.
§ 2-313(1), cmt. 3 (“The present section deals with affirmations of fact by
the seller, descriptions of the goods or exhibitions of samples, exactly as
any other part of a negotiation which ends in a contract is dealt with. No
specific intention to make a warranty is necessary if any of these factors is
made part of the basis of the bargain.”).
118

Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 660 F.2d 311, 1981-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 64333, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1118 (7th Cir. 1981).
119

Skelton, 660 F.2d at 312.

120

Skelton, 660 F.2d at 312.

121

Skelton, 660 F.2d at 312–313. The district court also found, however,
that “whenever a manufacturer elects to extend a ‘written warranty’ to a
consumer, ‘(o)ther written promises presented in connection with the same
transaction’ should also be enforceable as part of the ‘written warranty,’ ’’—a conclusion with which the circuit court disagreed. Skelton, 660
F.2d at 320.
122

Skelton, 660 F.2d at 316, n.7.
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tion under the 16 C.F.R. 700.3.123 In passing, the court noted
that “it is quite plausible that the Act’s draftsmen defined
‘written warranty’ . . . so as to exclude general descriptions
of consumer products or their components from the reach of
the Act, since it would be excessively cumbersome to impose
the Act’s disclosure rules on every advertisement containing
a description of a product or its components.”124
Other courts have agreed with this conclusion, holding
that the Act’s definition does not apply to mere descriptions.
This is another way in which the scope of warranties is narrower under the Act than under the UCC Descriptions such
as “All Natural” or “all natural flavors” would normally
qualify as descriptive warranties § 2-313(1)(b).125 However,
many courts have held that such descriptions fail to meet
the definition under the Act.126 The reasoning of these cases
draws upon the requirement under § 2301(6) that the sup123

Skelton, 660 F.2d at 316, n.7. The court also seemingly agreed with
the district court’s observation that had the alleged warranty read that a
“transmission would perform like a THM 350 transmission for the life of
the transmission” it would constitute a “written warranty,” but because
the representation was that a “transmission would perform like a THM
350 transmission” it did not not. Skelton, 660 F.2d at 316, n.7. “The
arbitrariness of this distinction is apparent, but a certain amount of
arbitrariness is inevitable whenever a bright line must be drawn.” Skelton,
660 F.2d at 316, n.7.
124

Skelton, 660 F.2d at 316, n.7.

125

See U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(b); Anderson v. Jamba Juice Co., 888 F. Supp.
2d 1000, 1003–04 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (distinguishing between description
warranties under the U.C.C. and the definition of “warranty” under the
MMWA, and holding that the term “All Natural” did not constitute a written warranty under the MMWA); In re Frito-Lay North America, Inc. All
Natural Litigation, 2013 WL 4647512 (E.D. N.Y. 2013) (holding “All Natural” label was not a warranty within the meaning of the MMWA); Thurston
v. Bear Naked, Inc., 2012 WL 12845621 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (holding descriptive phrases such as “100% Natural” and “100% Pure & Natural” are more
similar to product information disclosures than action warranties under
the MMWA).
126

See Anderson v. Jamba Juice Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d at 1004; Viggiano
v. Hansen Natural Corp., 944 F. Supp. 2d 877, 898, 80 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
2d 798 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (finding that Hansen’s assertion that its diet soda
was “premium” and contained “all natural favors” was merely a description of the product and not a written warranty under the MMWA); Bowling
v. Johnson & Johnson, 65 F. Supp. 3d 371, 378 (S.D. N.Y. 2014) (holding
that the claim “restores enamel” in relation to the sale of mouthwash was
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plier warrants that the product is “defect free or will meet a
specified level of performance over a specified period of
time.”127 This exclusion of descriptive warranties is supported
by the FTC’s interpretation that “Certain representations,
such as energy efficiency ratings for electrical appliances,
care labeling of wearing apparel, and other product information disclosures may be express warranties under the
Uniform Commercial Code. However, these disclosures alone
are not written warranties under this Act.”128
Another, perhaps obvious way in which the MMWA definition is narrower than the UCC’s is with regard to samples or
models. These are specifically recognized under § 2-313(1)(c)
as possible ways in which a warranty can be made, but are
excluded from the scope of the MMWA by virtue of the
requirement that the warranty be written before being
actionable. However, if a supplier were in writing to confirm
that a product will conform to the specifications in a model
or sample, then such an assertion could qualify as a “written
warranty” under § 2301(6)(A)—not by virtue of the sample
or model standing alone, but due to the additional writing.129
So far, only the implications of § 2301(6)(A) of the MMWA
have been discussed, but subsection (B) also deserves attention, if for no other reason than it contains language not
found in U.C.C. § 2-313. Subsection (B) covers assertions
that the supplier will “refund, repair, replace, or take other
remedial action with respect to such product in the event
that such product fails to meet the specifications set forth in
not a written affirmation that the product would be defect free over a
specified period of time as required by the Act).
127

15 U.S.C.A. § 2301(6); Anderson v. Jamba Juice Co., 888 F. Supp.2d
at 1004 (“The statement ‘All Natural’ is a general product description
rather than a promise that the product is defect free.”); Viggiano v. Hansen
Natural Corp., 944 F. Supp.2d at 898 (reasoning that descriptions such as
“premium” and “all natural flavors” are not assertions that “the product is
defect free or that it will meet a specific level of performance over a specified period of time.”); Bowling v. Johnson & Johnson, 65 F. Supp.3d at 378.
128

16 C.F.R. § 700.3(a).

129

15 U.S.C.A. § 2301(6)(A) (including in the definition of “written warranty” affirmations and promises that materials or workmanship be “will
meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of time”).
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the undertaking.”130 Thus, while subsection (A) requires a
promise regarding the quality of the product, such as that it
be “defect free,” subsection (B) reaches promises to remediate defects, even if no promise regarding quality is made.
For instance, in Milicevic v. Fletcher Jones Imports, Ltd.,131
Milicevic sued Mercedes-Benz under both state breach of
warranty and the MMWA when her car required service
multiple times for factory defects.132 Eventually, Milicevic
requested a replacement car or a refund, and ultimately
sued.133 The district court found for Milicevic on both state
MMWA warranty claims, and Mercedes-Benz appealed.
Though the warranty at issue did not promise that the car
would be defect free or meet a certain level of performance
over a given time period, it did warrant to the owner “that
any authorized Mercedes-Benz Center will make any repairs
or replacements necessary to correct defects in material or
workmanship at no charge for parts or labor.”134 Thus, the
court found that the warranty fell within the definition of
the MMWA.135
It is worth noting that the Milicevic court also treated the
repair or replace provision as a warranty under state law.136
Other courts have similarly found that a repair or replace
provision is a warranty under U.C.C. § 2-313,137 but this is
not always the case. A provision that makes no assertion as
130

15 U.S.C.A. § 2301(6)(B).

131

Milicevic v. Fletcher Jones Imports, Ltd., 402 F.3d 912, 2005-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 74736, 66 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1059 (9th Cir. 2005).
132

Milicevic, 402 F.3d at 913–14.

133

Milicevic, 402 F.3d at 914.

134

Milicevic, 402 F.3d at 919.

135

Milicevic, 402 F.3d at 919.

136

Milicevic, 402 F.3d at 915–16.

137

See, e.g., Duffy v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 62 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 2d 206 (D.N.J. 2007) (treating a repair or replace provision as
an express warranty); Tomassini v. FCA U.S. LLC, 2015 WL 3868343
(N.D. N.Y. 2015) (deciding repair or replace warranty on “bargain of the
basis” grounds); Standard Alliance Industries, Inc. v. Black Clawson Co.,
587 F.2d 813, 818 n.10, 12 Ohio Op. 3d 246, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 65 (6th
Cir. 1978) (rejected on other grounds by, Chemtrol Adhesives, Inc. v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 42 Ohio St. 3d 40, 537 N.E.2d 624, Prod. Liab.
Rep. (CCH) P 12112, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 88 (1989)) (“Both parties,
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to the quality of the goods, but only states that the seller
will repair or replace defects may more appropriately be
labelled a limited remedy provision.138 Indeed, some courts
have seized upon the last line of § 2-313(1)(a), and held that
the failure to warrant that “the goods shall conform to the
affirmation or promise” removes such promises from the
express warranty provisions. In Miler v. General Motors,
LLC139 the court explained:
A “repair-or-replace” provision in a vehicle sales contract that
does not “explicitly state that [the] plaintiff’s vehicle will be
free from defects, but rather states that the manufacturer will
repair or replace any defects that arise during the specified
period,” does not constitute an “express warranty” within the
meaning of the Michigan UCC, MCL § 440.2313. Although the
repair-or-replace provision is a “promise made by the seller to
the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes a part of the
basis of the bargain,” it does not create an express warranty
“that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.”140

In such jurisdictions, the MMWA definition of warranty may
actually be broader that U.C.C. § 2-313.141 However, the
importance of this distinction under state law is relevant
throughout trial and on appeal, have referred to defendant’s agreement to
repair or replace defective parts as an express warranty. This provision
does appear to meet UCC s 2-313’s definition of express warranties in that
it is a ‘promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods
and becomes part of the basis of the bargain . . .’ ’’).
138

Grosse Pointe Law Firm, PC v. Jaguar Land Rover North America,
LLC, 317 Mich. App. 395, 894 N.W.2d 700, 705 (2016) (“A promise to
repair or replace instead provides nothing more than a remedy for a product that breaks”); Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d
at 818 n. 10 (“It is perhaps more accurate to term defendant’s promise to
repair or replace defective parts as the Remedy to be invoked if the
mechanical performance warranties are breached. This is apparently the
view taken in UCC [section] 2-316 which distinguishes between excluding
or modifying warranties and limiting remedies for breach of warranty.”).
139

Miller v. General Motors, LLC, 95 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1282 (E.D.
Mich. 2018).
140

Miller, 2018 WL 2740240, *4 (quoting Grosse Pointe Law Firm, PC
v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, 317 Mich. App. 395, 404, 894
N.W.2d 700 (2016)).
141

Grosse Point Law Firm, PC v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 894
N.W.2d at 709 (Beckering, P.J., concurring) (noting that though the repair
or replace provision did not fit under the definition of U.C.C. 2-313, it did
meet the definition of warranty under the MMWA).
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more to statute of limitation issues than with whether an
enforceable promise is made, and the distinction does not
always meet the general expectations of consumers, especially when the provision at issue is labelled a “warranty.”
This was noted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Nationwide Insurance Co. v. General Motors Corp.,142 which
held that, despite “repair or replace” provisions not fitting
neatly into section 2-313, nonetheless such provisions were
best treated as warranties.
We recognize that the document does not create a classic warranty that fits neatly within the UCC view of warranties . . .
However, even if “repair or replace” warranties are viewed as
remedies rather than as warranties, they do not fit strictly
into the conceptual framework established by the provisions of
the UCC, and a conceptually satisfactory resolution cannot be
achieved. We also note that, although “repair or replace” warranties are not traditional warranties, they do fit within the
modern concept of warranty. [The court then quotes 15 U.S.C.
§ 2301(6)(B).] Furthermore, we will not permit Appellee and
other sellers who draft similar documents to escape the consequences of presenting them to the consumer as “extended
warranties.”143

1. Magnuson-Moss’s “service contract” Definition
Based on the Act’s definition of a “written warranty,” it
would appear that this definition requires: 1) a writing, 2)
from a supplier to a buyer, 3) that either a) promises that
the goods are defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of time or b) undertakes to
refund, repair, replace, or take other remedial action if the
goods are defective, and 4) such writing is a “basis of the
bargain.” So, what of promises that do not meet this definition, but that are also related to the sale of the goods? The
MMWA has created a residual category for “service contracts”
that captures some additional representations. As noted
earlier, the consequences of a provision being labelled a “service contract” rather than a “written warranty” impacts the
maker’s obligations to ultimately refund or replace the
products, and so this distinction can become important.
142

Nationwide Ins. Co. v. General Motors Corp./Chevrolet Motor Div.,
533 Pa. 423, 625 A.2d 1172, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 277 (1993).
143

Nationwide Ins. Co., 625 A.2d at 1177–78.
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The MMWA defines a “service contract” as “a contract in
writing to perform, over a fixed period of time or for a specified duration, services relating to the maintenance or repair
(or both) of a consumer product.”144 Unlike the “written warranty” definition, there is no requirement that the writing
come from a supplier, nor a requirement that the writing
promise the goods will meet a specified standard, or to repair
if they fail to meet certain specifications.145 Furthermore,
service contracts need not become a basis of the bargain to
be recognized under the Act.
Comparing this definition with the “written warranty” definition found in the Act, it would appear that a service
contract could arise in at least one of three ways. The first
would be when a supplier makes a promise that does not fit
into the definitions of § 2301(6)(A) or (B). For instance, if a
car dealership held a Memorial Day weekend sale and offered that all cars bought during the weekend would get free
oil changes every six months for two years. Such a promise
could be in writing and could definitely be argued as a basis
of the bargain, but would not be a promise or affirmation as
to the product being defect free or guaranteeing a specified
level of performance, nor would it be a promise to “refund,
repair, replace, or take other remedial action.”146
The second way the service contract could be invoked is
when someone other than a supplier makes a promise that
might otherwise fall under § 2301(6)(A) or (B). For instance,
if a consumer purchased a used car “as is” from a dealership,
and a third-party warrantor sold the purchaser a three-year
warranty to cover repair and replacement of defective parts,
this would be a service contract. Though the warranty would
meet the substantive part of § 2301(6)(B), because it would
144

15 U.S.C.A. § 2301(8).

145

Compare 15.U.S.C.A. § 2301(6) with § 2301(8).

146

16 C.F.R. § 700.11(c) (“An agreement which relates only to the performance of maintenance and/or inspection services and which is not an
undertaking, promise, or affirmation with respect to a specified level of
performance, or that the product is free of defects in materials or
workmanship, is a service contract. An agreement to perform periodic
cleaning and inspection of a product over a specified period of time, even
when offered at the time of sale and without charge to the consumer, is an
example of such a service contract.”).
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not be from a supplier, as that term is defined under the Act,
the three-year warranty would not really be a “written warranty” for the purposes of the Act (and the FTC admonishes
that the third-party should avoid using the word warranty).147
The final way that a service contract may be created is
when a supplier offers a warranty that does qualify under
§ 2301(6)(A) or (B), but the promise or undertaking failed
the “basis of the bargain” provision.148 In this regard, “written warranties” under the Act are subject to the same
defense that sellers under the UCC can raise. If a court were
to follow the state court interpretations of the “basis of the
bargain” language, one would expect a court to adopt one of
the three approaches outlined in part II.B.2., i.e. a “reliance”
approach, a “no-reliance” approach, or an “intermediate”
approach.
Returning to the example in the introduction, assume that
a consumer wants to purchase a television. Faced with
numerous retailers to choose from, the buyer decides to
purchase from Best Buy, because the consumer also wishes
to take advantage of the extended Geek Squad plan, which,
for an additional cost, will cover repair of defects for five
years after the purchase. As Best Buy would qualify as a
“supplier” under the Act, and the promise to remedy defects
would be a writing to “refund, repair, replace, or take other
remedial action with respect to such product in the event
that such product fails to meet the specifications set forth in
the undertaking,” the only remaining question would be if
the writing is part of the “basis of the bargain.” Even under
the strictest “reliance” approach to this question, the
consumer would have the opportunity to show that the
extended Geek Squad coverage was relied upon as part of
the purchasing decision, and in a “no-reliance” jurisdiction,
it would presumptively be a part of the basis of the bargain.
However, the FTC’s guidance in the Regulation has worked
mischief with these jurisdictional approaches.
147

16 C.F.R. § 700.3 (stating that terms which do not qualify as written warranties “should not be offered or described in a manner that may
deceive consumers as to their enforceability under the Act.”).
148

16 C.F.R. § 700.11(c).
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D. The FTC’s “additional consideration” Guidance
Rather than adopt one of the three jurisdictional approaches to the “basis of the bargain” question, the FTC has
opted to articulate a standard with little basis in the Act or
in the law interpreting U.C.C. § 2-313. The Regulation distinguishes “written warranty” and “service contract” as
follows:
A written warranty must be “part of the basis of the bargain.”
This means that it must be conveyed at the time of sale of the
consumer product and the consumer must not give any
consideration beyond the purchase price of the consumer product in order to benefit from the agreement. It is not a requirement of the Act that an agreement obligate a supplier of the
consumer product to a written warranty, but merely that it be
part of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a
consumer. This contemplates written warranties by thirdparty non-suppliers.149

Thus the FTC approaches additional consideration as somehow taking a promise out of the “basis of the bargain.” The
Regulation reiterates this in the next section, stating:
An agreement which would meet the definition of written warranty in section 101(6)(A) or (B), 15 U.S.C. 2301(6)(A) or (B),
but for its failure to satisfy the basis of the bargain test is a
service contract. For example, an agreement which calls for
some consideration in addition to the purchase price of the
consumer product, or which is entered into at some date after
the purchase of the consumer product to which it applies, is a
service contract.150

This second provision is notable in that it doesn’t just take
contracts for which some additional consideration was paid
out of the “written warranty” definition, but it also rejects,
in part, the “no reliance” approach to “basis of the bargain.”
The Regulation provides that an agreement “which is entered
into at some date after the purchase of the consumer product” is not a warranty under the “basis of the bargain” standard, in direct contravention to cases such as Autzen v. John
149

16 C.F.R. § 700.11(b). The last line is somewhat confusing and may
simply be a reference to situations in which a supplier offers a third-party
warranty.
150

16 C.F.R. § 700.11(c).
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C. Taylor Lumber Sales, Inc.151 discussed supra. But if the
FTC was attempting to adopt one of the other standards, it
is not clear from the language as, even under the strictest
“reliance” standards, a consumer would be given an opportunity to show reliance. The quoted provision affords no
such opportunity.
The effect on consumers and the mischief created by the
Regulation was demonstrated in the case of Ware v. Samsung
Electronics America, Inc.152 In that case, the Wares purchased
a plasma-screen Samsung television from Best Buy for
$3,119.00, as well as a five-year Geek Squad Protection Plan
(“GSPP”) for $519.00, with a bundled discount for both.153
When the television was incapable of being repaired, the
Wares sued for violations of the MMWA, alleging that the
GSPP qualified as a warranty under the Act.154 The application of the “written warranty” provision was important
because the Wares were seeking to elect a refund, but the
GSPP allowed Best Buy to elect the consumer’s remedy.155
Citing to the Regulation, the district court dismissed holding
that, because additional consideration was paid, the GSPP
was a “service contract.”156 The court reasoned:
The fact that the Wares were offered a discounted price for a
consolidated purchase, however, is not indicative of whether
their television purchase and their purchase of the Geek Squad
Protection Plan were part of the same bargain. 16 C.F.R.
§ 700.11(b). To the contrary, the Wares’ repeated allegations
that they paid separate amounts for the “bundled” television
and Geek Squad Protection Plan purchases clearly indicate
that the Geek Squad Protection Plan was not a part of the
151

Autzen v. John C. Taylor Lumber Sales, Inc., 280 Or. 783, 572 P.2d
1322, 1978 A.M.C. 2263, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 304 (1977).
152

Ware v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 2019 WL 398845 (N.D.
Ill. 2019).
153

Ware, 2019 WL 398845, at *1–2.

154

Ware, 2019 WL 398845, at *1–2.

155

See Ware v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 2019 WL 398845
(N.D. Ill. 2019).
156

Ware, 2019 WL 398845, at *2–3.
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“bargain” for the television’s purchase, even if an overall
discount was offered.157

The facts and the conclusion of the case should give every
consumer pause. The Wares alleged that part of the purchasing decision was the discount they received if they also
purchased the GSPP. The GSPP was a written undertaking
to repair defects in materials and workmanship,158 and also
incorporated and extended the manufacturer’s warranties.159
The GSPP would therefore certainly seem to qualify as a
“written warranty” under § 2301(6)(B) so long as the plaintiff
could prove that it formed the “basis of the bargain.” Under
any of the jurisdictional approaches to “basis of the bargain”
under the UCC, the Wares would have been afforded an opportunity to show reliance, yet, due to the language of the
Regulation, and not the Act itself, the Wares were dismissed
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
IV. The Potential for Abuse Under the FTC’s Regulatory Guidance
The Ware case and the distinction between a “written warranty” and a “service contract” may seem to be of little
157

Ware, 2019 WL 398845, at *3. The court went on to hold that
because the GSPP was “not limited to matters of materials or workmanship, but instead covers failures caused by wear and tear, dust and other
environmental conditions, power fluctuations, or failed pixels, addresses a
wide variety of potentially covered products, and provides for limited
preventative maintenance,” that the plan was “best characterized as
requiring the performance of maintenance and repair services rather than
guaranteeing the material and workmanship of the Wares’ television.”
This part of the holding is dicta, but is also without a basis in the Act. The
Act does not eliminate qualifying warranties that also make promises relating to maintenance. In fact, the Act specifically provides that a warrantor may also enter into a “service contract,” meaning the two are not
mutually exclusive. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2106(b) (“Nothing in this [Act] shall be
construed to prevent a supplier or warrantor from entering into a service
contract with the consumer in addition to or in lieu of a written warranty . . .” (emphasis added)).
158

See Ware v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., Plaintiff’s First
Amended Class Action Complaint, ¶ 53 Exhibit A at 2, Case No.: 1:18-CV886, 572 P.2d 1322 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2019).
159

Ware v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., Plaintiff’s First
Amended Class Action Complaint, ¶ 53 Exhibit A at 3, Case No.: 1:18-CV886, 572 P.2d 1322 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2019).
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impact. After all, even if labelled a “service contract” the
MMWA still applies and the make of the service contract
cannot disclaim implied warranties.160 However, the provision that “if the product . . . contains a defect or malfunction after a reasonable number of attempts by the warrantor
to remedy defects or malfunctions in such product, such warrantor must permit the consumer to elect either a refund for,
or replacement without charge of, such product or part”161
does not apply to service contracts. Given this, and that service contracts are not governed by as stringent a disclosure
regime as warranties, suppliers would be smart to find a
way to transform their written warranties into service
contracts. The Regulation provides just such a way.
Just as in Ware, in which a promise that could normally
be construed as a written warranty was deemed a service
contract by the presence of additional consideration, other
suppliers could use this caveat to circumvent many of the
provisions of the MMWA. For instance, a retailer, in response
to a customer’s concerns over a product’s lack of warranties,
could offer, for a small additional fee, a standard warranty
including that the product will be defect-free. If a consumer
chose to pay this additional fee, it would have paid additional
consideration for the warranty, transforming it into a service
contract. Manufacturers could also take advantage of this
loophole by offering warranty rebates, whereby consumers
can mail-in to get a rebate, but which would opt the
consumer out of the standard warranty. By not opting out,
the consumer would have paid additional consideration,
again transforming the warranty into a service contract. Of
course, suppliers in both examples would have to be careful
not to call the promises “warranties,” but artful drafting
could address this, perhaps by simply calling them product
expectations.
Though a typical § 2301(6)(A) warranty could be transformed in this way, this result would seem particularly ridiculous if the warranty said nothing of repair and replacement
of defects and only spoke to the quality of the goods, as such
a promise would not fit under the Act’s definition of a “ser160

15 U.S.C.A. § 2308(a).

161

15 U.S.C.A. § 2304(a)(4).
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vice contract.” But the Regulation makes no such distinction,
lumping § 2301(6)(A) and (B) together stating, “An agreement which would meet the definition of written warranty in
section 101(6)(A) or (B), . . . but for its failure to satisfy the
basis of the bargain test is a service contract.” Perhaps worst
of all, this loophole encourages suppliers to do what the Act
was specifically designed to prohibit, i.e. making promises
only to take them away through clever drafting—or to quote
from earlier “The bold print giveth and the fine print taketh
away.”162
One would hope that a judge would see through such an
artifice, but counsel for suppliers need not look much further
than the C.F.R. to find ample support for avoiding the warranty definition. A more logical approach to the FTC’s guidance on the “basis of the bargain,” however, would be to treat
additional consideration as simply being relevant to a reliance analysis. In other words, perhaps additional consideration should simply present a rebuttable presumption
against reliance—one that the consumer could then rebut by
showing that the consumer did in fact rely. Though such an
approach is not entirely consistent with the UCC, it would
at least have some basis in case law. Or, alternatively, once
the writing is shown to fall under § 2301(6)(A) or (B), the
burden should shift to the supplier to show a lack of reliance, such as in the intermediate approach, and additional
consideration can be used as evidence to rebut the
presumption. Either of these alternatives would be preferable to a per se approach, and the FTC should offer additional guidance on this issue.
V. Conclusion
One of warranty law’s most elusive terms is the “basis of
the bargain” language found in U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) through
(c). Though the Code’s commentary indicates that reliance is
no longer the standard, courts have developed a variety of
approaches, most falling into one or three categories: those
that still require reliance, those that view reliance as
completely eliminated such that a warranty can even arise
after the sale, and those that adopt an intermediate ap162

H.R. Rep. No. 93-1107, at 22–29 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.
A.N. 7702, 7706.
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proach, under which the warranty must be shown to have
been seen by the buyer, and then a rebuttable presumption
arises that it was a part of the basis of the bargain.
The MMWA raises the stakes of warranty status by creating a statutory disclosure framework with substantive limitations on disclaimers and elections of remedies. The definition of a written warranty is in many ways narrower under
the MMWA than under the UCC, but it imports the troublesome phrase “basis of the bargain.” A promise that is does
not become the “basis of the bargain” may be relegated to
“service contract” status, which has fewer disclosure requirements, and does provide an election of remedies for the
consumer. Given that the term “basis of the bargain” has
been a difficult concept since its introduction into Article 2,
it is understandable that the term could also present
problems under the MMWA. The Act, however, gives the
FTC the authority to clarify how to approach this term.
Instead of adopting one of the three dominant approaches,
however, the FTC has provided scant guidance that seemingly has little basis in the law developed under its UCC
analogue. Instead, the FTC has made additional consideration a per se test for whether a promise that would
otherwise qualify as a written warranty under the Act, is, in
fact, a service warranty, and gives little more guidance than
that. Therefore, a written promise by a supplier, warranting
that goods will be defect free, but which was purchased for
additional consideration, is to be treated as a “service
contract” despite the fact that such a promise would not fit
under the definition provided in the Act for a “service
contract.”
This guidance is an invitation for suppliers of all sorts to
game the MMWA statutory framework. By manufacturing
additional consideration, a retailer or manufacturer can
transform a promise that seemingly has all of the hallmarks
of a MMWA written warranty into a service contract.
However, this sort of behavior is what led to the passage of
the Act in the first place—i.e. giving with the bold print only
to take away later in the document, and at the consumer’s
expense. Courts should therefore treat the guidance found in
the Regulation as just that and adopt a presumption system
that at least gives consumers the chance to show that a
248
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promise, that otherwise looks like a written warranty under
the Act, was a part of the basis of the bargain.
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Sense, Sensibility and Smart
Contracts: A View from a Contract
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Abstract
In Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility, two sisters are
plunged into genteel poverty upon their father’s death. Their
conflicting responses reflect their contrasting personalities.
Elinor is sense incarnate; ruled by her head she rationally
assesses her family’s reduced prospects. Marianne is pure
sensibility; ruled by her heart she heedlessly follows her
romantic infatuations. Although Austen is more inclined to
sense, she illustrates the flaws of both extremes, showing
how each must be tempered by the other.
Responses to the blockchain—the technology underlying
bitcoin and other cybercurrencies—tend to fall into the
extremes of sense and sensibility. Sensible critics dismiss it
as a fad, a hysterical bubble. Romantic proponents tout it as
life changing, radically upending existing economic, legal
and perhaps political institutions. This dynamic can be seen
in the reaction to the phenomenon that is the subject of this
paper: Smart contracts i.e. economic or legal arrangements
embodied in code in such a way as to be supposedly selfenforceable. Proponents give in to sensibility and declare
that they may eventually virtually eliminate the role of
lawyers and courts in contracting. Sensible critics point out
that smart contracts are, in fact, neither smart nor contracts.
In this paper I, like Austen, prefer a sensible approach,
while occasionally allowing myself a little sensibility. I agree
with proponents that blockchain technology holds the pos*Prof. of Law, The Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva
University, New York City. I’d like to thank Aaron Wright, David Gray
Carlson and the participants in the New York City Bar, A Practical
Introduction to Smart Contracts and Their Technology workshop (Oct.
2018) for comments.
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sibility of making certain legal and economic transactions—
such as payments, clearance of trades, and the recording of
certain property claims such as security interests—more
efficient. Nevertheless, I argue that their utility for contracting will be limited for a number of practical and logical
reasons. That is, very few, if any, contracts could be made
completely autonomous in the way many proponents hope.
Contracts will continue to require external intervention at
crucial points because of fundamental limitations of reality—namely time and space—as well as the very nature of
human relationships and the logical limitations of all languages, including computer code. The time value of money
will make the posting of cybercurrency to smart contracts
uneconomic. Particularly with respect to the sale of goods,
the necessity not only that title to goods, but physical possession of conforming goods means that breach of contract
will always be possible.
Moreover, proposals for the use of smart security agreements are flawed for both legal and practical reasons. For
example, suggestions that a smart contract could automatically repossess collateral (by, for example, remotely disabling
equipment) upon default of the secured obligation ignores
the fact that strict foreclosure is a disfavored remedy under
Article 9 of the UCC that can only be proposed post-default.
Consequently, such a contractual provision would be
unlawful.
Contracts are relationships between legal actors that can
never be completely to algorithms. Businesspeople will rarely
want performance and enforcement of contracts to be
automatic because circumstances change in unpredictable
ways. Indeed, deciding whether or not to invoke enforcement
mechanisms, even in such “simple” transactions as loans, is
one of the hardest decisions that a contract party can make.
In my experience as a transactional attorney, counterparties
only resort to the literal language in their contracts after the
relationship between the parties has broken down.
I. Introduction
A. Sense and Sensibility
In Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility, two sisters are
plunged into genteel poverty upon their father’s death. Their
conflicting responses reflect their contrasting personalities.
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Elinor is sense incarnate; ruled by her head she rationally
assesses her family’s reduced prospects. Marianne is pure
sensibility; ruled by her heart she heedlessly follows her
romantic infatuations. Although Austen is more inclined to
sense, she illustrates the flaws of both extremes, showing
how each must be tempered by the other.
Responses to the blockchain—the technology underlying
bitcoin and other cybercurrencies—tend to fall into the
extremes of sense and sensibility. Sensible critics dismiss it
as a fad, a hysterical bubble. Romantic proponents tout it as
life changing, radically upending existing economic, legal
and perhaps political institutions. This dynamic can be seen
in the reaction to the phenomenon that is the subject of this
paper: Smart contracts1 i.e. economic or legal arrangements
embodied in code in such a way as to be supposedly selfenforceable.2 Proponents give in to sensibility and declare
that they may eventually virtually eliminate the role of
1

As Max Raskin notes:

Like many technologies, the creators and early adopters of smart contracts are
ideologically driven and believe that the invention can radically alter the nature
of society and its relationship with the traditional centralized state. Many
believe that private enforcement of contracts can reduce the need and extent of
monopolized police and legal services provided by the state.

Raskin, The Law and the Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 Geo. L. Tech.
Rev. 305, 309 (2017).
2

“Where traditional legal agreements and smart contracts begin to
differ is in the ability of smart contracts to enforce obligations by using
autonomous code.” Primavera De Filippi & Aaron Wright, Blockchain and
the Law: The Rule of Code 70 (2018).
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lawyers and courts in contracting.3 Sensible critics point out
that smart contracts are, in fact, neither smart nor contracts.4
In this paper I, like Austen, prefer sense, while occasionally indulging in a little sensibility. I agree with proponents
that blockchain technology holds the possibility of making
certain legal and economic transactions—such as payments,
clearance of trades, and the recording of certain property
claims such as security interests—more efficient.5 Neverthe3

Kevin Werbach and Nicholas Cornell quote one commentator to the
effect that “smart contracts don’t [need] a legal system to exist: they may
operate without any overarching legal framework. De facto, they represent a technological alternative to the whole legal system.” Werbach &
Cornell, Contract ex Machina, 67 Duke L. Rev. 313, 316 (2917) (quoting
Alexander Savelyev, Contract Law 2.0, “Smart” Contracts as the Beginning of the End of Classic Contract Law 21 (Nat’l Research Univ. Higher
Sch. of Econ., Working Paper No. BRP 71/LAW/2016, 2016), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2885241 (https://perma.cc/HS7F-PF
3W).
4

See e.g. Blockchain: Taxation and Regulatory Challenges and
Opportunities, Report of the First Multi-Stakeholder Meeting, March
15–16, 2017 (“A ‘Smart Contract’ is a misnomer, as it is neither a ‘contract’
in a conventional legal sense, nor is it particularly ‘smart.’ ’’ It is rather a
piece of code, programmed to self-execute if certain conditions are met.”).
See also, Jeffrey Lipshaw, The Persistence of “Dumb” Contracts, abstract
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=3202484 (‘‘ ‘Smart contract’ is an
ironic and unfortunate misnomer. As . . . Steve McJohn, has suggested,
bitcoin transactions by way of blockchain aren’t that smart and probably
aren’t contracts.”); O’Shields, Smart Contracts: Legal Agreements for the
Blockchain, 21 N.C. Banking Inst. 177, 178 (2017); James Grimmelmann,
All Smart Contracts are Ambiguous (Jan.14 2018) Penn Journal of Law
and Innovation (Forthcoming), abstract available at SSRN: https://ssrn.co
m/abstract=3315703.
5

Oddly, one commentator makes the opposite point, touting the relative inefficiency of blockchain transactions as a positive feature.
Some major issues with [high frequency tracing] could be solved by using
cryptosecurities . . . [E]xperiences like the flash crash would be avoided
because it takes time to verify the transactions — even the fastest cryptotechnologies require several seconds before transactions are completed.

Lee, New Kids on the Blockchain: How Bitcoin’s Technology Could
Reinvent the Stock Market, 12 Hastings Bus. L.J. 81, 118 (2016). She
continues:
Because it takes an average of ten minutes for a new block to be added to the
Blockchain, it allows enough time to verify each transaction before it is added
to the ledger as a verified transaction for everyone to see. Likewise, a
cryptosecurities market would require several minutes for a transaction to pro-
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less, in this paper I argue that their utility for contracting
will be limited for a number of practical and logical reasons.
That is, very few, if any, contracts could be made completely
autonomous in the way many proponents hope. Contracts
will continue to require external intervention at crucial
points because of fundamental limitations of reality—namely
time and space—as well as the very nature of human
relationships and the logical limitations of all languages,
including computer code. The time-value of money will make
the posting of cybercurrency to smart contracts uneconomic.
Particularly with respect to the sale of goods, the necessity
not only that title to goods, but physical possession of conforming goods means that breach of contract will always be
possible.
Contracts are relationships between legal actors that can
never be completely reduced to algorithms. Business people
will rarely want performance and enforcement of contracts
to be automatic because circumstances change in unpredictable ways. Indeed, deciding whether or not to invoke enforcement mechanisms, even in such “simple” transactions as
loans, is one of the hardest decisions that a contract party
can make. In my experience as a transactional attorney,
counterparties only resort to the literal language in their
contracts after the relationship between the parties has
broken down.
Moreover, it is hard to understand who else but fraudsters
would want contracts to be anonymous, final and irreversible in the way the most extreme proponents of smart
contracts imagine. Even the law of wire transfers—where
there is a very strong policy for finality of payments—is modified by traditional rules of restitution and subrogation.
If I had been writing this article even a year ago, it might
cess, which would help smooth out the issues caused by computer algorithms
responding to imaginary signals that the market is starting to drop.

12 Hastings Bus. L.J. at 120. These comments are odd for two reasons.
First, most blockchain enthusiasts assume that the technology will eventually be improved (for example, by replacing the current proof-of-work with
another confirmation system) so that it can be scaled up to enable almost
real time transactions. Second, even if regulators would like to slow down
transactions, it is hard to understand why traders would agree to this.
Presumably, market pressure will promote the adoption of whatever
system is most efficient in the sense of balancing costs and benefits (speed).
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be more optimistic. We have passed the 10th anniversary of
the original bitcoin and there is yet to be a “killer app.” In
the last two years a number of highly touted early uses of
blockchain have not—or at least not yet—panned out. 6
Bitcoin, the original blockchain, does not function as a currency partly because of its extreme volatility.7 In early 2018
it plunged in value 80% since its high in late 2017, only to
6

This last year has also seen a re-evaluation of other internet businesses. For example, one article trumpeting the potential of smart
contracts argue that lessons can be taken from
the success of Amazon, Facebook, Netflix, etc. All of these companies are
disrupting and “decentralizing” existing business models by eliminating and
replacing traditional intermediaries. These companies facilitate more direct
“peer-to-peer” transactions between service providers/ creators/producers, on
the one hand, and the consumers, on the other.

Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Why “Blockchain”
Will Disrupt Corporate Organizations What Can be Learned from the
“Digital Transformation,” at 9. See abstract at https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3227933.
Technologies [like those of Facebook, Twitter, Uber, Airbnb, and Spotify] have
the potential to create real level playing fields, transparency and applications
that run exactly as programmed without any possibility of downtime, censorship, or third-party interference.

Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Why “Blockchain”
Will Disrupt Corporate Organizations What Can be Learned from the
“Digital Transformation,” at 9, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3227933. Even ignoring that all of these companies are, in fact, intermediaries, the publicity surrounding the FAANG giants’ use of personal information and, particularly in the case of Facebook, their use by third parties
to manipulate public opinion suggests that their “disruption” may be more
troubling than liberating.
7

Today, virtually no legitimate business accepts bitcoin as payment
for goods and services. Steven Russolillo, Paul Vigna & Akane Otani,
Cryptocurrency Market Plumbs New Depths in 2018, The Wall Street
Journal (Aug. 15, 2018), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/cryptocu
rrency-market-plumbs-new-depths-in-2018-1534241274?mod=searchresult
s&page=1&po. Chainalysis estimates that trends point to $1 billion dollars equivalent of illegal transactions using cybercurrency (primarily the
original bitcoin) in 2019 with “[d]rugs being most prominent category of
goods sold, but child porn and stolen credit-card information are also in
demand.” However, illegal activity is declining as a percentage of transactions—down to approximately 1%. Bitcoin Criminals Set to Spend $1 billion on Dark Web This Year, Bloomberg Law, (July 1, 2019), available at
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-01/bitcoin-criminals-setto-spend-1-billion-on-dark-web-this-year.
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recover to 40% of its high in June 2019.8 The DAO (the
“distributed autonomous organization”), an investment vehicle designed to be controlled through smart contracts, crowdfunded approximately $150 million, but was hacked immediately when it went on-line.9 The promoters eventually
created a so-called “hard fork” to take back the value from
the fraudsters and return it to the investors before disbanding, disproving the proposition that blockchain transactions
are immutable and irreversible.10 A number of high-profile
projects in the finance industry, including the Depositary
Trust and Clearing Corporation’s (“DTCC”) proposed blockchain platform for credit default swap reporting, have yet to
have become operative.11 Although so-called “initial coin offerings” or “ICO’s” became a popular means of raising funds
in 2017, the Securities and Exchange Commission has
8

Steven Russolillo, Bitcoin’s Surge Leaves Smaller Digital Currencies in the Dust, The Wall Street Journal, (June 30, 2019), available at ht
tps://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoins-surge-leaves-smaller-digital-currenciesin-the-dust-11561903203?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=7.
Michael F. Davis & Alistair Marsh JPMorgan to Use Digital Coin to
Speed Up Corporate Payments, Bloomberg Law (Feb. 14, 2019), available
at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-14/jpmorgan-to-use-c
ryptocurrency-for-payments-business-cnbc-says. Reportedly, as of February 2019, bitcoin was trading at a price less than the cost of mining it. JP
Morgan to Use Digital Coin, Bloomberg Law (Feb. 14, 2019).
9

Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of Investigation
Pursuant to Section 21(a) off the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The
DAO, Release No. 81207 (July 25, 2017), available at https://www.sec.gov/
litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf [[hereafter, the SEC DAO Report].
10

See infra text at notes 270–76.

11

Anna Orrera & John McCrank, Wall Street Rethinks Blockchain
Projects as Euphoria Meets Reality, Reuters (March 27, 2018), available
at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-banks-fintech-blockchain/wall-streetrethinks-blockchain-projects-as-euphoria-meets-reality-idUSKBN1H
32GO. Although DTCC hopes to begin clearing over the-counter derivatives on a blockchain in 2019, it does not anticipate a broader rollout of
the technology any time soon. As its CEO, Michael Bodson notes, DTCC
processes 60 trillion trades every day (and as many as 90 trillion during
peak times) “It would be impossible to do this today using a distributed
ledger.” Michael del Castillo, Enterprises Building Blockchain Confront
Early Tech Limitations, Coindesk (March 23, 2018), available at https:/ww
w.coindesk.com/enterprises-building-blockchain-confront-tech-limitations.
Bodson noted that the limitations of distributed ledger utility is illustrated
by a report by Deloitte that only 8% of the 26,000 blockchain projects that
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warned that many of them might be unlawful securities offerings and has appointed Valerie Szczepanik as a “cyberczar”
to “coordinate efforts . . . regarding the application of U.S.
securities laws to emerging digital asset technologies and innovations
including
initial
coin
offerings
and
cryptocurrencies.”12 The SEC has brought dozens of cases
against issuers, promoters and brokers so far and is reportedly investigating many more13 Honduras’s plan to move its
real estate records to a block chain seems to have been
postponed, if not abandoned.14 Vermont decided that any
benefit of moving its property registration regime to a
were started in 2016 were still active as of the Spring of 2018. Castillo,
Coindesk (March 23, 2018).
In late 2018, DTCC announced that it was about to start testing its
distributed leger project for trading credit derivatives with the aid of a
consortium including IBM, Axoni and R3. DTCC Press Release: DTCC
Enters Test Phase on Distributed Ledge Project for Credit Derivatives
with MarkitSERV & 15 Leading Global Banks (Nov. 06, 2018), available
at http://www.dtcc.com/news/2018/november/06/dtcc-enters-test-phase-ondistributed-ledger-project-for-credit-derivatiatives-with-markitserv.
Nevertheless, DTTC has reported that private, permissioned,
distributed ledger “could process 6,300 trades per second continuously for
five hours to meet the 115,000,000 daily trades at peak rates in the
markets.” Tom Groenfeldt, DTCC Shows Private Blockchain Can Handle
US Equity Trade Volumes, Forbes (Oct. 16, 2018), available at https://ww
w.forbes.com/sites/tomgroenfeldt/2018/10/16/dtcc-shows-private-blockchai
n-can-handle-us-equity-trade-volumes/#d67701238023.
12

Ms. Szczepanik’s official titles are Advisor for Digital Assets and Innovation and Associate Director in division of Corporation Finance. SEC
Press Release: SEC Names Valerie A. Szczepanik Senior Advisor for
Digital Assets and Innovation (June 4, 2018), available at https://www.sec.
gov/news/press-release/2018-102.
13

SEC Cyber Enforcement Actions, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/cybe
rsecurity-enforcement-actions. Chairman Jay Clayton, Statement on
Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, available at https://www.sec.g
ov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11. Nevertheless,
ICO’s continue apace, raising $11.8 billion in the first five months of 2018.
Paul Vigna, Shane Shifflett & Caitlin Ostroff, What Crypto Downturn?
ICO Fundraising Surges in 2018, The Wall Street Journal (July 1, 2018),
available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-crypto-downturn-ico-fundra
ising-surges-in-2018-1530466008?mod=searchresults&page=1&.
14

J. Michael Graglia & Christopher Mellon, Blockchain and Property
in 2018: The End of the Beginning, Annual World Bank Conference on
Land and Poverty (March 2018).
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blockchain could not be justified by the cost at this time.15 A
much-ballyhooed project to sell downloads of music in
exchange for micropayments through a smart contract ended
up raising a sad $133.20.16 To date, one of the most successful projects on Ethereum, a smart contract platform, has
been “Cryptokitties”—a game in which one can buy and
breed computer cats—and even this was a fad that has already peaked.17 This does not mean that similar ventures
will not be successful in the future, however.
One of the so far intractable problems with cyber has been
the inability to scale up. Bitcoin can only process somewhere
between 3.3 and seven transactions a second, and Ethereum,
the system underlying most smart contracts to date, does
barely better at 10.18 This is to be contracted with Visa, which
regularly processes 1,700 transactions per second.19 This
may also be changing. Facebook recently released a whitepaper outlining its intention to launch a stable coin called Libra
15

Vermont State Archives and Records Administration, Office of The
Vermont Secretary of State, White Paper: Blockchains for Public
Recordkeeping and for Recording Land Records (Jan. 15, 2019), available
at https://www.sec.state.vt.us/media/914631/blockchains_for_public_record
keeping_white_paper_v1.pdf.
16

David Gerard, Attack of the 50 Foot Blockchain 129–30 (2017).

17

Although, this fad may have already peaked. Jeff John Roberts,
The Blockchain Bubble’s Latest Victim: Digital Cats, Fortune (June 18,
2018), available at http://fortune.com/2018/06/18/cryptokitties.
18

Alistair Marsh, MIT, Stanford Academics Design Cryptocurrency to
Better Bitcoin, Bloomberg Law (Jan. 17, 2019), available at https://www.b
loomberglaw.com/document/XB90A1IC000000?udv_expired=true.
19

Alistair Marsh, MIT, Stanford Academics Design Cryptocurrency to
Better Bitcoin, Bloomberg Law (Jan. 17, 2019), available at https://www.b
loomberglaw.com/document/XB90A1IC000000?udv_expired=true. Sue
Halpern notes that Visa “processed a hundred and seventy-five billion
payments in [2018], which works out to about fifty-five hundred transactions a second . . . At the height of Bitcoin’s popularity, in late 2018,
there was so much activity on the network that it could take as much as a
week for a transaction to go through . . .” Sue Halpern, Facebook’s Audacious Pitch for a Global Cryptocurrency, The New Yorker (Jul. 7, 2019),
available at https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/faceboo
ks-audacious-pitch-for-a-global-cryptocurrency.
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as a payment system, claiming that it will be able to process
1,000 transactions per second.20
In this paper I will be making a different point. Sense tells
me that even if blockchain technology can be scaled up so
that it is possible to process thousands of smart contracts
per second, they cannot live up to the claims of their
promoters. At most, they will be an incremental, not
revolutionary, increase in the efficiency of certain contract
functions.
I will, however, give in to sensibility and make a prediction.
Blockchain technology, including smart contracts, may
eventually have a significant impact on our economy and
markets, but it will not be because it will supplant existing
contract law and practice which works pretty well. Rather, it
will likely be used in ways that are today completely
unforeseen. Who at the Department of Defense working on
the development of ARPANET in the 1970’s would have
imagined that primary purposes of the internet would
include on-line shopping, pornography and cat videos. The
very concept of social media would have been
incomprehensible.
B. Smart Contracts
In an excellent essay, Eliza Mik notes the smart contract
narrative is often laden with ideologically charged arguments that associate certain technological features of
blockchains (e.g. decentralized consensus) with broader
social and economic issues, such as the disenchantment with
financial institutions or the (perceived) lack of trust in the
legal system. Many claims made in technical writings are
tainted by the assumption that certain technological features
(decentralization, again . . .) are absolute values and must
be preserved at any cost. In the same vein, it is often assumed that because a particular technology is innovative or
revolutionary, it is also commercially useful or capable of
20

Elena Lacey, The Ambitious Plan Behind Facebook’s Cryptocurrency, Libra, Wired (June 18, 2019), available at https://www.wired.com/st
ory/ambitious-plan-behind-facebooks-cryptocurrency-libra/. Facebook’s
blockchain technology is different from the open, public permissionless
one used by bitcoin. See also supra note 11, for a discussion of DTCC’s
private, permissioned distributed ledger that seems capable of processing
transactions quickly.
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solving actual legal problems. This, however, is often not the
case. Arguably, the entire idea of smart contracts may be the
result of a series of terminological misunderstandings.21
One problem has been, in the words of contract law
scholars, Kevin Werbach and Nicholas Cornell, that “[o]ne
group conspicuously absent from the debate over smart
contracts [has been] contract law scholars.”22
I would make a slightly different point. Although there is
a nascent legal literature on smart contracts, a group that is
still conspicuously missing seems to be contract attorneys
who actually negotiate and draft contracts. It is an old joke
among transactional attorneys, such as myself in my prior
career, that we know nothing about contract law. By this we
mean that all those issues of contract formation with which
contract professors love to bedevil first year law students—
offer, acceptance, consideration, statute of limitations, battleof-the-forms, etc.—almost never come up when you negotiate
and draft contracts. These are issues that concern commercial litigators—and contract professors reading caselaw.
Werbach and Cornell assert “[c]ontract law is a remedial
institution. Its aim is not to ensure performance ex ante, but
to adjudicate the grievances that may arise ex post.”23 This
is contract law as it is reflected in appellate litigation, not as
practiced by contract negotiators and drafters. For us,
contract law is a forward-looking tool that enables us to help
our clients achieve their goals.
Consequently, it is also a cliche among transactional
lawyers that to try to learn about contracting by only reading cases is like trying to learn about health by only visiting
21

Mik, Smart contracts: Terminology, Technical Limitations and Real
World Complexity, 9 Law, Innovation and Tech. 2 (2017). Research Collection School Of Law, available at http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/
2341.
22

Werbach & Cornell, supra note 3, at 317.

23

Werbach & Cornell, supra note 3, at 317 (citations deleted). They
assert “Contract law does not exist to alter our reasons going forward —
though it surely does that. Rather, it exists to adjudicate the justice of a
situation ex post. It is backward looking. Its basic function is to decide
whether one party has wronged another party by failing to perform a
promised action.” Werbach & Cornell supra note 3, at 361 (citations omitted).
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a hospital trauma ward where medicine is a remedial
practice. Reading about failed negotiations and contracts
gives one a distorted view of both the prevalence of poor
contracting, and, as Mik points out, a conflation of contract
performance and contract enforcement.24 Proponents of smart
contracts claim that they are automatically enforceable. This
is incorrect. No one enters into a contract with the intent of
enforcing it against someone else—indeed, they hope never
to enforce it. Consequently, Werbach and Cornell more accurately state that “Smart contracts [are supposed to] eliminate the act of remediation by admitting no possibility of
breach.”25
Proponents of smart contracts implicitly adopt a number
of empirically suspect assumptions. First, the fact that they
seek to make contracts that are automatically performed/
enforced reflects an assumption that contract performance is
a problem. I doubt both that this is the case as an empirical
matter and that their proposed “solution” is workable as a
practical one.
Parties enter into contracts to achieve goals. Consequently,
the vast majority of contracting parties expect to perform
them, and, as an empirical matter, the over-whelming majority of all contracts are performed in the ordinary course and
are not enforced. Our society and economy would not function if this were not the case.
The conflation of performance with enforcement, also
implicitly assumes that the preferred remedy for breach is
specific performance. Rather, it is damages—for good reason.
Contract law is not punitive; we allow people to walk away
from contracts so long as they compensate their counterparty.
Do some people take advantage of this, intentionally breaching in the knowledge that their counterparty may not risk
the expense and uncertainty of seeking judicial help in
enforcing their rights? Of course.26 But, why should these
exceptions to the general rule of performance justify a radical change in practice?
24

Mik, supra note 21, at 10.

25

Werbach & Cornell, supra note 3, at 317.

26

For example, my law firm had a client whose business plan was essentially to not pay his vendors in the expectation that they would eventu-
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Second, the proponents of smart contracts also assume
that contract ambiguity is a common problem and a major
cause of disputes. They believe that this results from the
flaws of natural language. They believe that this can be
solved by the precision and immutability of code.27 Not only
does this ignore, once again, the fact that the vast majority
of contracts are performed in the ordinary course. But it also
ignores the fact that the flexibility of contract language is, to
invoke another cliche, a positive feature, not a flaw or glitch
to be eliminated.28 If there is “ambiguity” it is often because
of the logically inevitable openness of all human interrelations, including contracts. As such, a contract written in code
would not accurately represent the agreement of the parties
and could hinder beneficial renegotiation and informal
modification of contract terms if circumstances change or
unanticipated contingencies occur. Mechanical performance
of contract language based on the parties’ assumptions when
the contract was drafted can defeat, not further, their intentions if those assumptions are proven to be incorrect.
Third, proponents of smart contracts are worried that
contracts require people to trust each other or, perhaps worse
from a libertarian perspective, the need to rely on what they
deride as “trusted third party” intermediaries such as banks.
Smart contracts are supposed to eliminate the need for trust
in commercial transactions with the impartial, objective
certainty of code and disaggregation. Mik notes that these
proponents view the world as a scary Hobbesian world and
have almost a dogmatic belief in the virtues of deally settle for a discounted price. As you might guess, we parted ways
when he tried to stiff us for our fees.
27

See infra text at notes 248–69.

28

In Mik’s words:

For a developer, the failure to do so evinces the limited skill or incompetence of
the lawyer. By virtue of their training developers perceive ambiguity as inherently bad. It is important to understand, however, that ambiguity has both advantages and disadvantages. While . . . developers fail to recognize that in
contract law, ambiguity is a feature not a bug. Apart from the natural ambiguity accompanying all human languages and the ambiguity that results from
sloppy drafting, many contractual provisions are deliberately written in a
broad, slightly imprecise manner to ensure a certain degree of leeway.

Mik, supra note 21, at 19.
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centralization.29 I argue that smart contracts in fact would
often require more not less trust between counterparties
than conventional contracts. For example, letters of credit—
which depend on the mediation of trusted banks—enables
actors to act as though they trust each other even though
they are strangers because the third party can do the due
diligence necessary to vet the paying party, and to examine
documents that are evidence that the counterparty has
performed. Moreover, proponents of smart contracts in fact
anticipate the intervention of external third parties known
in the literature as oracles.
At least in this country, contract disputes rarely arise
because of the failure or perfidy of intermediaries.30 Moreover, although smart contract proponents see these third
parties merely as transaction costs, they often perform necessary economic functions in addition to their supposed
superfluous role as intermediaries. That is, they provide
financing to mediate the cash flow shortfalls, and provide
investment opportunities protecting the time-value of money
for payors who do have the purchase price. Indeed, as I
argue, it is precisely the inability for smart contracts to meet
these needs that will prevent them from ever being completely autonomous.
Smart contracts may be post-modern in the pejorative as
well as the positive senses of the term. As Slavoj ŽiŽek has
29

Mik notes that many proponents of smart contracts:

reflect a surprising lack of trust in humans. As the latter are perceived as
inherently biased and unreliable, things should be left to computers. Humans,
especially bankers and judges, are fallible and not trustworthy. Computers, on
the other hand, are objective, infallible and trustworthy. The very idea of smart
contracts is thus inextricably tied to the elimination of human judgement, the
reduction of dependence on financial intermediaries and, in many instances, a
detachment from the legal system.

Mik, supra note 21, at 2.
30

Grimmelmann lists corruption (along with ambiguity and enforcement) as one of the three concerns proponents of smart contracts believe
plague natural language contracts. Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 4. Although I do have friends in other countries who have cited judicial corruption in certain jurisdictions as a major impetus for pursuing smart
contracts, I have not seen it discussed much in American legal literature.
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argued, post-modernism in a sense precedes modernism.31
That is, although presented as something new—as a wry,
self-conscious and self-referential, critique of modernism—it
is too often merely a regression to pre-modern ideas. Naive
post-modernism is reactionary—a romantic attempt to
reconstruct an imaginary lost pre-modern past.
Sense tells me that some writing on smart contracts is
postmodern in this pejorative sense. It is not a reconceptualization of contract theory, but an inadvertent reversal of the
great achievement of the Uniform Commercial Code (the
“UCC”)—wrenching contract law out of a pre-modern
paradigm based on an agricultural economy into a modern
one based on a mercantile economy.32 That is, it threatens to
bring back the common law that tried to answer all sales
disputes by reference to location of “title” of the good.
Similarly, some analysts have suggested that sales disputes
could be avoided if we recorded ownership of personal property onto a blockchain.33 This is because the problems that
arise to many personal property disputes involve not who
owns the property but who has physical custody and control
and whether the property conforms to the contract.
Karl Llewellyn, the father of the UCC, correctly argued
that title analysis implicitly viewed sales as “events,”
whereas modern sales are processes that take place over
time.34 By irrevocably pre-programming execution at the
time of contracting, smart contracts attempt to collapse the
process back into an event—in the words of Werbach and
Cornell to “break down the . . . line between executory and
executed contracts.”35 I will show how this is inadequate
because the economic and empirical reality that underlies
contracts remains a process—most contracts are, in fact, executory processes that take place over time and space. To
31

See e.g. Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of
Dialectical Materialism 255–56, 603–04 (2012); Slavoj Žižek, Living in the
End Times 172–73 (2010).
32

See infra text at notes 148–54.

33

See infra text at notes 71–74, 122–53.

34

See infra text at note 153.

35

Werbach & Cornell, supra note 3, at 31.
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ignore time and space is to ignore the time-value of money—
the raison d’etre of many financial contracts.
Nevertheless, sensibility reminds me that there is a sophisticated postmodernism as well. It seeks to examine and
bring to light certain aspects of pre-modernism that modernism has claimed to supplant, but in fact have only
suppressed. Such postmodernism, although critical of modernism, does not reject it because we cannot return to the
past.36
In this paper I will make a number of specific points all
based on a single proposition—the vast majority of contracts
cannot be completely automated and will continue to require
human intervention to complete performance. First, I
consider the simplest contractual obligation—the payment of
money.37 In order to make a commitment to make a future
payment completely self-enforceable, the obligor would have
to pre-commit value by transferring cybercurrency to a
virtual escrow at the time the smart contract is initiated.
That is, a completely autonomous smart contracts, in effect,
require the economic equivalent of pre-paying. Most financial
contracts in the “real world,” however, are executory
contracts made on an unsecured basis for good practical
reasons. It is inconceivable to me that business people would
be willing to tie up their capital pending the performance of
a contract. As such, although, the blockchain may prove to
be a more efficient way of settling financial contracts, the
loss of the time-value of money would make many, if not
most, completely automated smart financial contracts
untenable.
Second, I show how smart contracts have limited application to another very common and very simple contract, i.e.
the sale of goods.38 Even if a smart contract could automatically insure the buyer’s obligation to pay the price, it cannot
assure performance of the seller’s obligation to deliver con36

Sophisticated postmodernism is what G.W.F. Hegel called a “sublation” (aufheben), an uneasy reconciliation of two opposing and contradictory concepts in such a way that continues to respect their differences.
David Gray Carlson, A Commentary on Hegel’s Logic 29–31 (2006).
37

See infra text at notes 57–65.

38

See infra text at notes 66–120.
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forming goods. Alternately, if a smart contract could be
programmed so that payment would only be made upon a
buyer’s acceptance of goods, it cannot protect the seller from
wrongful rejection by a buyer in possession of the goods.
Suggestions that these issues could be addressed by
registering-title to goods on a block chain is an impracticable
non-solution.
Third, in a similar vein, proponents of smart security
agreements who argue that technology—such as automobile
starter-interrupters—could enable the self-enforcing foreclosure of security interests misstate both the law and practice
of secured lending. Although disablement may or may not be
a form of, or permitted alternate to, repossession under the
UCC, the remedy for breach of a secured obligation is not
repossession per se, but resale of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. This and other subsequent
steps will rarely, if ever, be susceptible to complete
automation. Moreover, a completely automated automatic
enforcement of a security agreement would almost certainly
violate the automatic stay of the Bankruptcy Code should
the debtor go bankrupt.
Perhaps more importantly, as a matter of good business
practice, secured creditors would not ordinarily want a smart
contract to automatically foreclose on collateral upon
nonpayment. Choosing when to declare a default and what
remedy to pursue are difficult discretionary decisions that
secured lenders must make on a case-by-case basis.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I will consider the
non-problem of ambiguity in natural language contracts. It
is not merely impractical, it is impossible, to craft any but
the simplest contract that will not require some degree of
interpretation.
C. Scope
Let me start by listing what I will not do in this paper.
Since there is a burgeoning literature that attempts to
explain blockchain technology to lawyers.39 I assume that
anyone who is interested in the specific application of smart
39

I particularly recommend Blockchain and the Law, co-authored by
my colleague, Aaron Wright. DeFilippi & Wright, supra note 2.
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contracts will already have some familiarity with the
concept.
There are also a number of articles discussing if and how
“smart contracts” meet the traditional conditions for contract
formation and enforceability such as offer, acceptance,
consideration and statute of frauds.40 I agree with my colleague Aaron Wright and his co-author, Primavera DeFilippi,
that “[t]he fact that a contract memorializes a contract in
code rather than in legal prose will make little difference, at
least in the United States.”41 I also think that the common
law, which governs many contracts, is flexible enough that it
will be able to adapt to new practices as they arise (perhaps
with the aid of occasional legislative assistance such as the
existing Uniform Electronic Transactions Act and the federal
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act,
as well as future tweaks to the UCC).
Similarly, I will not discuss contract theory per se in any
detail. Although I do agree with Werbach and Cornell, that
the idea of smart contracts seems incompatible with the notion of efficient breach,42 I postpone a more detailed discussion for another day.
Before moving on, however, I do wish to briefly address
the terminology relating smart contracts.
I have already referred to the cliche among critics that
smart contracts are neither smart nor contracts.43 This is
both correct and incorrect. They are the opposite of what
most lay people mean by “smart” in that they are incapable
of what we think of as human intelligence. Without opening
the can of worms as to what intelligence (or consciousness)
is, smart contracts are not self-conscious, cannot reason,
cannot exercise discretion or common sense, etc. Rather,
they automatically and mechanically execute preprogrammed instructions—the very opposite of human
“smarts.” However, they are “smart” in the sense that once
40

See e.g. Raskin, supra note 1.

41

DeFilippi & Wright, supra note 2, at 79.

42

Werbach & Cornell, supra note 3, at 366. See also Mik, supra note
14, at 12.
43

See supra note 4.
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they are put into operation, they automatically execute their
functions without additional, or limited, external input.
But are they contracts? Once again, the answer is yes and
no. Some would be and some would not be.44 The classic
example of a smart contract, proposed in a seminal work by
Nick Szabo, is supposed to be the vending machine.45 I agree
with Mik,46 that this misleading example has distorted the
conversation.
Although Szabo called a vending machine a smart contract,
in fact, the machine itself is not a contract.47 The contract
44

As Mik notes, part of the problem is the lack of precision or agreement in so much of the writing about smart contracts.
There are multiple definitions of smart contracts. Some of them are purely
technical and associate smart contracts with pieces of autonomous code operating on a blockchain or with “systems which automatically move digital assets
according to arbitrary pre-specified rules.” Other definitions associate smart
contracts with the formalized expression and automated execution of legal
contracts, with the use of code to perform contractual agreements, with
protocols that facilitate, verify, execute or embody the terms of a contract or
with the embedding of legal terms in hardware and software to prevent breach
or to control assets by digital means. Another group of definitions commences
with a technical description only to observe that the given protocol will have
serious legal implications. In some instances the term “contract” is used
informally, with no claims being made as to its legal significance; in others,
technical writings take the “contract” terminology seriously and theorize that
smart contracts in general will obviate the need for lawyers and judges by
automating and guaranteeing contractual performance.

Mik, supra note 20, at 4.
45

See e.g. Raskin, supra note 1, at 306–07; Werbach & Cornell, supra
note 3, at 323; Lipshaw, supra note 4; Stuart D. Levi & Alex B. Lipton, An
Introduction to Smart Contracts and their Potential and Inherent Limitations, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial
Regulation (May 26, 2018), available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2018/05/26/an-introduction-to-smart-contracts-and-their-potential-and-inh
erent-limitations; Riccardo de Caria, Law and Autonomous Systems Series:
Defining Smart Contracts—The Search for Workable Legal Categories,
Oxford U Faculty Blog (May 25, 2018), available at https://www.law.ox.ac.
uk/business-law-blog/blog/2018/05/law-and-autonomous-systems-series-def
ining-smart-contracts-search; Ameer Rosic, Smart Contracts: The
Blockchain Technology That Will Replace Lawyers, available at https://blo
ckgeeks.com/guides/smart-contracts/.
46

Mik, supra note 21, at 5.

47

As Mik states, some more enthusiastic proponents:

often use the term “contract” so liberally that it loses any resemblance to its
original definition — that of a legally enforceable agreement. One must wonder:
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consists of the offer by the operator of the machine to sell a
can of soda for a certain price, that the potential buyer can
accept by inserting the value. This is no different legally
from an offer by a grocer to sell you a can of soda for a certain
price that you can accept by tendering the purchase price to
a cashier. It would not occur to anyone to call a cashier a
“smart contract” even though, in this case, she (unlike the
machine) is in fact smart in the conventional sense of the
term. In other words, the vending machine—like the cashier—is merely the means by which the seller and buyer
perform their contract obligations.48 We do not confuse the
legal regime of payment through checks, wire transfers,
credit cards, etc. with the underlying contract requiring the
payment. Each of those payment systems are governed by
their own legal regimes and contracts that are distinct from
the contract between the payor and payee.
As Mik correctly notes, “if ‘smart contracts’ are nothing
but programs that run on a blockchain, there is no need for
lengthy academic papers debating their legal implications.”49
In other words, we need to distinguish between programs
that merely execute certain functions of a contract—such as
making a payment—from smart contracts that are supposed
to automate all aspects of a contract.50 The proposition that a
blockchain might prove to be more efficient technology for
once a linguistic clean-up is completed and once it becomes apparent that
many smart contracts are not contracts, will there be anything left worth
discussing from a legal perspective?

Mik, supra note 21, at 4.
48

Raskin has suggests that the vending machine (and other smart
contracts) are different from most conventional contract because the buyer
accepts by executing the contract (i.e. inserting the coin) rather than
manifesting her consent in words. Raskin, supra note 1, at 14–15. This is
also incorrect. As the grocery store example illustrates, performance is,
empirically, an extremely common mode of contract acceptance.
49

Mik, supra note 21, at 4.

50

As Lipshaw notes:

At one end of the continuum, the smart contract is little more than a cybernetic
artifact like Bitcoin, a virtual dollar bill having a social ontology and no less a
fixed and timeless meaning than a physical Federal Reserve note. At the other
end, it is like more than a digitized form into which someone plugs a few
chunks of data and comes out with a Kindle book or a mortgage loan.
Somewhere in the middle, say in connection with a program that can sort out
the puts and takes of ten years’ worth of contingency in a 50,000 square foot of-
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making payments does not raise particularly interesting
contracting issues. I will, therefore, only discuss the
practicality of completely automated contracts which
proponents claim would be self-enforceable because their
performance would be mechanistic and non-reversible.
II. Financial Contracts and the Time-Value of Money
A. Incremental Improvements
The lauded superiority of smart contracts over conventional contracts is supposed to be that they are selfexecuting. Once they are initiated, they will perform
automatically according to their terms without additional
input from the contracting parties.51 Although theoretically,
provisions could be added which would allow the parties to
make changes in the terms, they could also be made
immutable. The only conditions to performance would be
those already programmed into the code. Supposedly,
because there is no possibility of breach, and because smart
contract transactions are supposed to be irreversible there is
no need for courts and litigators.
Sensibility suggests that smart financial contracts might
be more efficient than conventional ones.52 Indeed, financial
institutions are already in the process of exploring this.53
However, sense reminds me that many financial contracts
fice lease, the contract needs to be able to create virtually a complex world of
real estate business and law that either maps on or substitutes for the physical
version.

Lipshaw, supra note 4, at 7.
51

In fact, many smart contracts would require occasional infusions of
external input—referred to as “oracles”—to function. Oracles could be as
varied as on-line data bases that the program could itself search, or human beings who on occasion could input information as needed. See infra
note 60.
52

Werbach and Cornell give the example of option contracts. Werbach
& Cornell, supra note 3, at 321–22 (citing Surden, Computable Contracts,
46 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 629 (2012)).
53

As O’Shields enumerates:

There is no shortage of potential uses for blockchain, or distributed ledger
technology, and smart contracts. The World Economic Forum has suggested
that they could be used in enhancing global payments, syndicated credit, collateral management, proxy voting, securities issuance, and regulatory and compliance activities. or example, syndicates of lenders could be formed using smart
contracts, and smart contracts could perform funding and servicing activities
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are already largely automated and smart financial contracts
would only be an incremental or evolutionary improvement
over current practice, not a major disruption of contract
practice.
One of the supposed innovations of smart contracts is that
they will eliminate or greatly reduce the role of lawyers in
negotiating and drafting repetitive contracts. Lawyers might
draft basic forms or “modules” of contract terms, but the
contracting parties would be able to download them and put
them together themselves. In the words of DeFilippi and
Wright:
Just like other code, smart contracts also are inherently
modular and can be broken down into discrete pieces and
chunks which can be easily assembled and reassembled.
Programmers or lawyers can create libraries of smart contract
code specifically designed to implement certain functionalities
that routinely appear in legal contracts.54

Once again, we must temper sensibility with sense. First,
it is already empirically the case that contracting parties do
not consult lawyers before entering into most contracts. I
have already mentioned the grocery store example. Adults
enter into and perform consumer contracts at stores and
restaurants on a daily basis. Even though the average lay
person probably does not think of these transactions in
technical terms, they understand what is expected of them.
In the comparatively rare cases where disputes arise in
simple contracts and the parties consult their lawyers, they
probably find that the default rules of the UCC and the common law provide sufficient guidance so that it can be resolved
for the syndicates. Central banks are exploring issuing digital currencies, possibly using blockchain technology. Smart contracts could be used to monitor
collateral posted for transactions, and facilitate the clearing and settlement of
collateral transactions. The British bank Barclays has led an effort that envisions derivatives documentation — such as ISDA master agreements, credit
support annexes, and confirmations — being reconstituted into automated
smart contracts. . . . Several large banks, including JP Morgan and Credit
Suisse, recently completed a successful test of a smart contract prototype for
equity swaps, which included complex post-trade services such as margin payment transfers and corporate action processing. The French bank BNP Paribas
is also exploring automating legal contracts.

O’Shields, supra note 4, at 182 (citations omitted).
54

DeFilippi & Wright, supra note 2, at 82.
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in a relatively amicable manner. Litigation is the exception
that proves the rule.
Other common contracts, such as those governing checking accounts and credit and debit cards are subject to form
contracts drafted by bank lawyers (and incorporating UCC
Articles 3 and 4 as well as federal statutes and regulation)
which are not negotiated on an individual basis. Similarly,
on-line sales and licensing contracts are subject to extensive
terms and conditions drafted by lawyers which very few
customers read before accepting. The typical sales contracts
between merchants are also subject to standard terms set
forth in catalogs and invoices (as well as the UCC) so that
parties only need to fill in certain negotiated terms such as
price and delivery date.55 Moreover, lawyers are also not
involved in the negotiation, preparation and implementation
of both simple financial transactions—such as commercial
letters of credit—as well as complex financial products—
such as swaps and repos. That is, although lawyers draft the
templates used for such contracts, business people do not
need to consult lawyers in filling them out for any specific
transaction. This is necessarily so. The hundreds of millions
of contracts that are required on a daily basis could not occur if this were not the case.
With respect to modularity: transactional law firms already maintain precedent libraries of standard provisions—
hence the additional cliche that transactional lawyers
plagiarize for a living.56 Form contracts for many types of
transactions are readily available on-line, as well as ser55

Over my teaching career in New York City I have had many
students in my commercial law survey course who either came from
merchant families or were merchants changing careers. Inevitably, when
asked a hypothetical, they could correctly describe what could or should
happen in such a fact pattern. However, when asked what the legal basis
for their answer was they would also, just as inevitably, answer something
like “I have no idea, but everyone in my business understands that that is
the deal. This is one reason why I am going to law school.”
56

Although we do a lot of copying, this is not plagiarism. Plagiarism
is not copying per se, but the attempt to pass of the ideas or expression of
another as one’s own. When an attorney uses a precedent or form contract
she does not present it as original. Only a naif tries to draft a financial
contract from scratch for numerous reasons. One reason for this, of course,
is to avoid the time and expense of reinventing the wheel. But perhaps as
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vices, such as LegalZoom, that enable consumers and small
businesses to structure many transactions without help from
attorneys. Consequently, there is no reason why law firms
(or industry groups) cannot move their electronic precedent
files to Ethereum or another blockchain platform. Sense tells
me that may or may not be a slightly more efficient—or
perhaps egalitarian—way of producing and sharing precedent files. But this does not mean that an inexperienced lay
person could easily cobble together anything but the most
standard form, let alone a contract that worked so mechanically that it could be made “smart.”57
B. Example 1: Interest Rate Swaps
Let us look for example at plain-vanilla interest rate swaps
as a prime candidate for smart treatment. Almost all swaps
are evidenced by the standard form contract promulgated by
the International Swap Dealers Association (“ISDA”) which
consists of a base contract in which the parties can choose
and insert modules with the specific terms of the deal.58
Repeat parties sign master agreements governing their onimportantly, courts have held that for the sake of predictability and consistency the actual intent of the parties is not relevant to the interpretation of boiler plate financial contracts. See e.g. Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1982).
57

I have already mentioned the trust indenture, certainly one of the
most boring and repetitive boiler plate contracts. This is why its drafting
is typically assigned to the most junior lawyer on a deal team. However,
these attorneys are the least competent to “mark up” the precedents
because these contracts are also quite complex.
58

Raskin uses the example of a credit default swap (“CDS”), noting
that although today ISDA typically makes a determination as to whether
a triggering event has occurred, a “smart contract using a decentralized
blockchain for authorization, a network itself can verify whether an event
took place and whether the contract will pay out.” Raskinsupra note 1, at
337. Actually, a smart CDS would have to be fairly complex because the
amount owed by the swap seller upon a triggering event is often
determined, not by the swap parties themselves (and, hence not by the
smart contract), but through an auction process run by ISDA in which all
swap buyers of debt issued by the defaulting issuer may participate. See
Sudip Gupta & Rangarajan K. Sundaram, CDS Credit Event Auctions
(Sept. 1, 2011); ISDA, The Credit Event Process, available at https://www.
isda.org/a/cKwEE/TheCreditEventProcess.pdf. This is further complicated
by the fact that payment by sellers under all CDS’s “insuring” debt issued
by the same issuer are netted. For example, when Lehman Brothers went
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going relations, and merely add a very short addendum each
time a new swap is entered into. Although the ISDA form
itself was developed over the years by lawyers, business
people can easily, and typically, cause their institutions to
enter into simple swaps without further consultation with
their lawyers.
This is not unique to swaps, however. For example, sophisticated transactions such as repurchase agreements (“repos”)
routinely are “papered” through industry-wide forms that
can be downloaded from websites such as that maintained
by SIFMA. This discussion can, therefore, be generalized for
any number of financial contracts and derivatives.
Perhaps, more importantly, the performance of swaps is
“mechanical” because they consist only of the mutual obligation of two counterparties to pay money at a specific time
based on a mathematical formula.
bankrupt, there was concern about the potential negative effect of triggering CDS’s having an aggregate notional value of $72 billion. Nevertheless
DTCC (which settles most CDS’s) reported that, after netting, a “mere”
$5.2 billion actually traded hands. Jean Helwege, Samuel Maurer, Asani
Sarkat & Yuan Wang, Credit Default Swap Auctions, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York Staff Report No. 372 (May 2009), available at https://w
ww.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr372.pdf.
DTCC could probably automate much of this process through a
smart contract. Indeed, it is in the process of moving its CDS reporting to
a blockchain. DTCC to Launch Blockchain Credit Default Swaps Reporting in Early 2018, Nasdaq (May 25, 2017) Nasdaq, available at https://ww
w.nasdaq.com/article/dtcc-to-launch-blockchain-credit-default-swaps-repor
ting-in-early-2018-cm794771. However, “unexpected obstacles” have
resulted in a delay from Spring 2018 until 2019. Castillo, supra note 11.
Nevertheless, Ryan Clements argues persuasively that although
certain aspects of CDS’s could be automated through smart contracts
there are many barriers to implementation, as well as costs, fragmentation
risks, technological deficiencies, and practical drawbacks. As a result, there is
some doubt on the extent of Blockchain’s short-term transformational value for
complex financial structures and mature trading markets. This, at least in
part, explains the fact that Blockchain projects are currently slow to materialize in derivatives and other financial market applications.

Clements, Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of a Smart Contract Blockchain Framework for Credit Default Swaps, 10 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev.
369 (2019). He suggests that “a partial implementation [of blockchain
technology] is the only feasible application.” Clements at 410. “[T]here are
costs and benefits to be explored, and right now the costs seem to outweigh
the benefits when using Blockchain for CDS.” Clements at 410.
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For example, in the simplest interest rate swap, the swap
contract provides for a “notional” amount, say $100 million.
A fixed-rate counterparty agrees to pay the variable-rate
counterparty an amount equal to a stated percentage of the
notional amount on some future date, for example, 3% of
$100 million on December 31, 2019. A variable-rate counterparty agrees to pay the fixed-rate counterparty on the same
date an amount equal to a percentage of the same notional
amount determined by reference to a floating rate in effect
on that date, for example, 25 basis points over the one-year
LIBOR on December 31, 2019.59 On the settlement date, the
two counterparties do not pay each other the full amount of
their respective obligations. Rather they set them off, with
only one counterparty paying the net surplus to the other.60
Obviously, the economic point of the swap is that the fixedrate counterparty is concerned that interest rates are going
up and wants to lock in a favorable rate, while the variablerate counterparty is betting that they that they are going
down and that it can make a profit on the swap. Consequently, although they were originally invented in the 1980’s
59

The London Interbank Offered Rate, which has been the benchmark
rate for a significant portion of floating rate financial contracts is being
phased out after it was revealed that it had been rigged. As of the writing
of this paper it is not yet clear whether the Federal Reserve Banks’s
proposed Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) or some other rata
will be generally accepted as an alternative. One problem, of course, is
that perhaps $200 trillion face amount of outstanding derivative and loan
contracts currently refer to LIBOR. See e.g. Wolf Richter, The Fed is Trying to Replace a Decades-Old Benchmark Rate—Here’s What You Need to
Know, Business Insider (April 4, 2018), available at https://www.businessi
nsider.com/a-new-benchmark-rate-is-replacing-libor-heres-what-you-needto-know-2018-4.
60

For example, presume that the one-year LIBOR on December 31,
2018 goes up to 3.25%. The variable-rate counterparty must pay the fixedrate counterparty $250,000 (i.e. (3.25% × $100 million) — (3% × $100 million)). If, in contrast, if the one-year LIBOR goes down to 2.75%, the fixedrate counterparty must pay the variable-rate counter party $250,000 (i.e.
((3% × $100 million) — (2.75% × $100 million)).
If the counterparties had entered into multiple swaps, this would
be slightly more complicated since all payments under all swaps covered
by the master agreement would be netted. As this is, however, purely a
mathematical calculation it can be automated.
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as a way of arbitraging between different credit markets,
today swaps are a common hedging device.
It would seem that a smart contract could be programmed
both to make the calculation as to the net amount to be paid
and cause transfer of the funds from the net payor to the net
recipient. Note, this smart contract is not completely selfcontained because the amount the variable-rate counterparty’s obligation cannot be pre-programmed but must be
determined on the payment date by reference to an external
variable. This could be solved by programming the contract
to find the relevant rate by accessing a predetermined
outside source known in the literature as an “oracle.”61 Today,
these contracts are often settled through DTCC. Although
61

As explained by DeFilippi and Wright, an oracle is:

a trusted third-party source . . . Oracles can be individuals or programs that
store and transmit information from the outside world, thereby providing a
means for blockchain-based systems to interact with real-world persons and
potentially react to external events. For example, oracles can be connected to a
data feed from a third party conveying the latest London Interbank Offered
Rated (LIBOR), or they can be linked to sensors that transmit the outside temperature, humidity, or other relevant information about a particular location.
More experimentally, an oracle can also be made to convey the insights of human beings or support private dispute resolution and private arbitration
systems (sometimes referred to as judge-as-a-service of arbitration-as-aservice).

DeFilippi & Wright, supra note 2, at 75. Of course, reliance on a trusted
third-party defeats one of the supposed advantages of smart contracts
over conventional contracts. See Jalinder Singh & Johan David Michels,
Block Chain as a Service, Queen Mary University of London School of
Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 269/2017 at 14–15 on the
importance of trust in oracles.
The actual smart contract would have to be a little more complex.
For example as discussed (supra note 58), LIBOR is being phased out.
Since this is well known, parties entering into a LIBOR-based swap today
would presumably take this into consideration when drafting. However, as
there is always a chance that either a benchmark or a source for determining a benchmark might change or disappear (for example, what if the
swap refers to LIBOR as reported on the Wall Street Journal’s website,
and the Journal for whatever reason does not publish on that date, ceases
reporting the LIBOR or whatever?) The contract would have to be
programmed to reference a different source if the first source is unavailable.
In addition, to make a swap absolutely self-executing would change
the basic terms of a swap. Swaps today provide that either party can
unwind the swap at any time, so long as the terminating counterparty
pays a contractual settlement amount. Presumably this could be
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smart swap and derivative contracts would not be a revolutionary change in practice, they could be a more efficient
way to effectuate these transactions.
Now my sensibility is once again is tempered by sense
because the following proposal by Werbach and Cornell for
how a smart weather-hedge contract work in fact, reveals,
the fatal flaw for their use for financial contracts:
Consider a simple insurance contract under which Abby
promises farmer Bob, in return for a monthly payment, a lump
sum in the event the temperature exceeds 100 degrees for
more than five straight days during the term of the agreement.
In a traditional contracting arrangement, the parties would
likely reduce that agreement to a writing, signed to memorialize mutual intent. If the temperature exceeded the threshold
for six straight days and Abby failed to pay, Bob could file suit
for breach and present the contract as evidence. To implement
a smart contract with the same terms, Abby and Bob would
translate the provisions into software code. Each would make
available sufficient funds to fulfill his or her side of the
agreement. An agreed mechanism would be specified to
determine performance, such as the daily high temperature
for the area, as published on Weather.com. Abby and Bob
would then each digitally sign the agreement with their
private cryptographic key. One of them would send it as a
transaction onto a blockchain, where it would be validated
through the consensus process and recorded on the distributed
ledger. Bob’s payments would automatically be deducted each
month and credited to Abby’s account. (emphasis added).62

As this example illustrates, the only way that a smart
contract could be truly self-executing and decentralized is if
at the onset of the contract both parties deposit into the
contract itself as a virtual escrow account cryptocurrency
equal to the maximum amount that either might be expected
to pay at settlement. Otherwise, all the smart contract could
do is to determine the amount that is owed, order the netpaying counterparty to deposit money at that time, and then
make the transfer to settle the account (i.e. act like an
automated DTCC). If the paying party refused to deposit
funds at that time, this would lead to conventional litigation.
programmed into the contract by providing that, if one counterparty enters
an unwinding notice into the contract, the contract will automatically pay
out the settlement amount and terminate other performance.
62

Werbach & Cornell, supra note 3, at 323.
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If that party were unable to pay, this might result in a claim
in the paying party’s bankruptcy or other insolvency
proceeding.63
In other words, each party must, in economic effect, prepay
the contract, unproductively tying up their capital pending
the term of the contract. This means that, in the case of an
interest-rate swap both counter parties lose the opportunity
to invest the money between the time the contract is entered
into and settlement—defeating the purpose of the swap as a
hedge. Werbach and Cornell correctly state that smart
contracts try to break down the line between executory and
executed contracts—or, in my words, try to change contracts
from processes to events as a legal matter This ignores the
economic reality that not only do financial contracts take
place over time, but that the time-value of money is of their
essence.
Contrast this to a conventional sales contract between sophisticated merchants. The time value of the purchase
price—i.e. whether the buyer prepays, pays upon delivery or
buys on credit—will be largely a pricing term. In the smart
financial contract example, however, neither party will be
compensated and both will lose the time-value of money.
Because derivatives such as swaps are often based on very
small differences and fluctuations in interest rates applied
to very large notional amount, even one day’s loss of the
ability to invest might be fatal.
C. Example 2: Repos
Let us look at another common financial contract that also
seems ripe for automation—the classic repurchase agreement or repo. In this alternative to secured lending using securities as collateral, the party seeking financing—the repo
seller—sells a security to the financing party—the repo
buyer. The parties simultaneously enter into a reverse repo
pursuant to which the repo seller agrees to repurchase the
63

As I discuss below in my treatment of security interests (see infra
text at notes 237–40), ordinarily if one of the counterparties to a transaction were to go bankrupt, the automatic stay would prevent the other
counterparty from enforcing its remedies. There is an exception to the
automatic stay for settlement of financial contracts including swaps. Holleran et al., Bankruptcy Code Manual § 362(b)(17) (2019 ed.).
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same (or an equivalent) security from the repo buyer for a
purchase price equal to the original repo price plus a
premium representing an interest component. Although
repos can theoretically have any term, traditionally they
were for very short-term financing—sometime overnight.
Obviously, the economic purpose of a repo for the repo seller
would be lost if it had to deposit the reverse repo repurchase
price into a smart contract and did not have the free use of
funds pending the consummation of the reverse repo.
Perhaps less obviously, an automatically executing smart
contract would also destroy much of the economic purpose of
a repo for the repo buyer as well. This is because the security sold in the repo and to be resold under the reverse repo
would also have to remain deposited into the smart contract.
However, the repo buyer often acquires the underlying security for the purpose of resale. For example, the repo-buyer
might enter into a back-to-back repo in which it sells the security to another party against the agreement to buy it back.
In contrast, a true repo does not require the repo buyer to
maintain the security pending the exercise of the reverse
repo and the repo buyer is not contractually required to redeliver the original security upon consummation of the reverse repo. Rather, the repo buyer is merely required to
deliver an equivalent security or its market value. These
provisions are necessary not only so that the repo buyer gets
the economic advantages of being able to deal with the security, they are also necessary for legal reasons as well. As I
have argued elsewhere, 64 without these provisions, the
transactions would not be deemed to a “true repo,” but
merely an Article 9 security interest disguised as a repo.
This would be disastrous for the $2.3 trillion daily repo market65 because security interests are not entitled to the Bankruptcy Code’s favorable treatment of repos in the event that
the repo seller were to go bankrupt.
64

Schroeder, A Repo Opera: Reflections on Repos and Criimi Mae, 76
Am. Bankr. L. Rev. 565 (2002); Schroeder, Repo Redux: Repurchase Agreements Under the 1995 Revisions to the U.C.C., 29 U.C.C. L.J. 3 (1996);
Schroeder, Repo Madness: The Characterization of Repurchase Agreements Under the Bankruptcy Code and the U.C.C., 46 Syracuse L. Rev.
999 (1996).
65

SIFMA, US Repo Market Fact Sheet, 2016, available at https://ww
w.sifma.org/resources/research/us-repo-market-fact-sheet-2017.
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D. Cash Collateral Distinguished
Sensibility might be tempted to argue that it is not unknown for financers—including swap partners—to require
their counterparties to post cash (or other) collateral pending the consummation of certain financial contracts. For
example, in my experience, issuers of commercial letters of
credits frequently do so.
At further thought, one realizes that depositing funds in a
virtual escrow agreement is not the economic equivalent of
posting collateral for the life of the contract. Cash collateral
does not consist of delivering piles of dollar bills to be placed
in a safe held by a lender or escrow agent.
Cash collateral consists of either granting a security interest in a interest-bearing deposit account maintained with a
bank or financial institution or the pledging of other highly
liquid assets. Consequently, the party posting the collateral
earns interest on the funds pending the settlement of the
contract secured by such collateral. One of the supposed
virtues of smart contracts is that they eliminate third-part
intermediaries—but this means that they also eliminate the
interest paid by such intermediaries. There would be no such
earnings opportunity for posted cryptocurrency precisely
because there are no third-party intermediaries in a smart
contract.
To my surprise, I have found only one commentator who
has discussed this problem and he admits that he does not
have a workable solution. Michael Abramowicz notes that:
The peer-to-peer trust . . . lacks one common feature: the
ability to invest trust funds. The trust money is set aside until
the money is needed, so the investment is ultimately in the
cryptocurrency itself, rather than in a diversified form. Ideally, it would be beneficial for the trustee to be able to invest
deposited Bitcoins pending trust withdrawals to grow the trust
corpus. This is, of course, possible with conventional trust
relationships. The trustee simply relies on a financial institution such as a bank or mutual fund, deposits the trust moneys
and then withdraws them as needed. Peer-to-peer decisionmaking could support mechanisms for deciding when cryptocurrency should be exchanged for other assets controlled by a
bank. The challenge for a cryptocurrency is how to execute
that exchange. The problem, however, is that there is no mechanism allowing cryptocurrency accounts to own virtual assets.
For a peer-to-peer institution to own assets besides virtual
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currency, some interface is needed between the virtual and
real worlds.66

In other words, in order to invest and protect the timevalue of money, which is of the essence of all financial
contracts, there must be a provision in the smart contract
transferring the deposited cybercurrency to a trusted third
party who will invest the funds in conventional assets and
then later redeposit them onto the contract. This would destroy the two essential aspects of a truly smart contract—
the elimination of third-party intermediaries and selfexecution.
Consequently, blockchain technology may be a superior
way of settling financial contracts. It may also be possible to
automate certain aspects of a contract—indeed we do so
already. However, at this time financial institutions are
unlikely to enter into completely self-executing smart
financial contract for a future payment because of the opportunity cost of devoting capital to the contract. A similar
point can be made for any other smart contract for future
performance.
Once again, I indulge in sensibility. Blockchain technology
might progress so that someday income-bearing instruments
could themselves be registered to a blockchain. For example,
under a smart swap, rather than depositing cybercurrency
into a digital escrow account, the counterparties could
instead post cyber-commercial paper issued by a third party,
with the smart contract automatically collecting and
distributing interest to the parties. Back-to-back smart repos
might be linked together on a single blockchain. This might
allow the repo buyer to transfer the repo’ed security out of
the smart repo pending consummation of the smart reverse
66

Abramowicz, Cryptocurrency-Based Law, 58 Ariz. L. Rev. 359, 411
(2016). Facebook’s new Libra coin does anticipate interest. The Libra
would be a stable coin backed by a pool of conventional currencies such as
the U.S. Dollar the Euro which would be invested in interest bearing accounts of some sort. Apparently, transactions would be confirmed by up to
100 founding members who would be entitled to collect this income. Lacey,
supra note 20.
Perhaps in the future, parties who wish to create smart contracts
using the Libra blockchain could buy Libra with conventional currency
and also participate in this income stream. Of course, this system is dependent on “trusted” third party intermediaries.
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repo, with the smart back-to-back smart repo automatically
providing for the transfer of a substitute security to be
delivered to the repo seller.
III. Sales of Goods
A. Smart Contracts and UCC Article 2
In the previous section, I showed that, although smart
contracts for the payment of money in financial contracts
could be made “self-executing” (if we allow for the use of
oracles), in the near term they can be expected to have
limited utility because, under current technology, a completely autonomous smart contract would require at least
one paying party to tie up its capital pending the performance of a contract. The problem with using smart contracts
for executory contracts for the sale of goods is somewhat different than that for financial contracts. For financial
contracts, the primary problem is one of time—neither party
is compensated for the time-value of money. One might be
tempted to assume that time is not the problem with contract
of sales. I have already suggested that the question as to
who gets the benefit of the time-value of money pending the
creation of the contract and its consummation—i.e. must the
buyer pre-pay or can it buy on credit—seems largely a question of purchase price to be negotiated by the parties.
But this ignores the role of cash flow. Take for example,
the extreme example of the market for toys. The biggest
marketing event for manufacturers of toys in this country is
the International Toy Fair held every February in New York
City. Although, toys are sold year around, 50% of total retail
revenues are earned in the last quarter of the year67 because
of the December holidays. This causes a mismatch between
the cash needs of retailers and wholesalers. A retailer would
not have the cash to enable it to deposit cybercurrency into a
virtual escrow when it enters into a purchase contract in the
first quarter of the year. Moreover, although a wholesaler
needs cash to manufacture toys in the second and third
quarters, a smart contract presumably would not deliver
cash to the wholesaler/seller until it makes delivery of the
67

Frederique Tutt, Let’s Reconsider Discounting Toys for Christmas,
NPD, available at https://www.npd.com/wps/portal/npd/us/blog/2017/lets-r
econsider-discounting-toys-for-christmas.

© 2020 Thomson Reuters E UCC Law Journal E Vol. 49May 2020

283

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 49 #2]
goods to the retailer/buyer in the fourth quarter. Consequently, either or both parties will require third-party
financing.
The unique issues that arise with respect to sales, however,
are matters of space—good have physical characteristics and
are physically possessed by either the buyer, seller or a third
party such as a carrier. A blockchain cannot alter physical
reality.
Werbach and Cornell describe the goals of completely
smart contracts as follows:
Smart contracts are designed to eliminate the need for legal
enforcement. The central feature of a smart contract — what
supposedly makes them smart — is that legal enforcement
will not be necessary, or even possible. In a very real way,
smart contracts are not intended to be legally enforceable.
This is not to suggest that they are intended to be legally invalid; rather, the question of legal enforcement should never
arise. In this sense, smart contracts are not intended to be
enforced in a legal proceeding.68

Sensibility makes me sympathetic to this instinct. Although
a good contract negotiator and drafter is always acting in
the shadow of legal remedies, given the expense and
uncertainty of conflict resolution, we try to structure transactions in such a way as to minimize the possibility that
disputes might arise.69
As I have already mentioned, 70 Mik emphasizes that
proponents of smart contracts conflate the very different
concepts of performance and enforcement (remedies). Specifically, proponents proclaim that since block chains automatically execute, they make transactions final and irreversible.
As such, they eliminate the necessity of trust between
contracting parties and the need for enforcement. I shall illustrate through the example of a very simple sales contract.
68

Werbach & Cornell, supra note 3, at 339.

69

As I tell my commercial law students, sometimes attorneys do not
want to find out whether or not their analysis is “correct” because the only
way to do so would be through years of litigation that should be avoided if
possible. Nevertheless, sense dictates that the goals of completely eliminating enforcement is a pipe dream and not just because of poor contract
drafting.
70

See supra text at notes 24–25.
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The fact that one party may have delivered goods and the
counterparty has paid money—independent actions that
could perhaps be automated through a smart contract—does
not mean that there has not been a breach and that one of
the parties might yet have a claim for breach of contract
that could be enforced in a court.
Assume that two parties enter into a smart contract for
the sale of goods that provides that the seller will automatically be paid upon the delivery of the good. Assuming that a
buyer would be willing to deposit cryptocurrency in the
amount of the purchase price when it enters into a smart
contract, one can imagine how the contract could be programmed to automatically pay the seller upon the occurrence of some event effectively protecting the seller from one
form of possible breach by a buyer. Today, carriers electronically track delivery and could act as oracles to send electronic
messages to the smart contract when they drop packages at
the buyers’ locations. This is far from perfect—we have all
experienced mis-deliveries. In some industries, the supply
chain is already largely automated71 and we are, however, on
the verge of technology that will allow for complete automated tracking of the location of goods from the seller’s
warehouse to the buyer, perhaps via a automated drone
delivery vehicles, radio-frequency identification (“RFID”) or
other sensors, and automated locks on the buyer’s doors that
would provide to the smart contract more reliable evidence
that at least something has been actually delivered to the
buyer.
Josh Fairfield and Larissa Lee have suggested that the
buyer could also be protected if we adopted a system of recording title to personalty on a blockchain.72 When the smart
contract transfers the purchase price from the buyer to the
seller, it could simultaneously transfer title from the seller
to the buyer. As discussed below, this would not remotely
71

See Bradley, Disrupting Secured Transactions, 56 Hous. L. Rev.
967, 987–92 (2019). Based on the fact that individual items of inventory
can now be tracked in real time, Bradley makes the quixotic suggestion
that we replace the current filing system for perfection of security interest
in goods with an electronic notification system.
72

Fairfield, Bitproperty, 88 S. Cal. L. Rev. 805 (2015); Lee, supra note

5.

© 2020 Thomson Reuters E UCC Law Journal E Vol. 49May 2020

285

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 49 #2]
solve the problem in the case of the sale of goods.73 Indeed,
under U.C.C. Article 2 as currently in effect, title in the good
would ordinarily have already been transferred to the buyer.74
The buyer of goods is not seeking mere title, she wants physical possession of the good and rights that would be enforceable against third parties in the event of the bankruptcy of
its counterparty.
Under modern law, “title” is incompetent to answer such
questions. Moreover, as I shall discuss,75 identifying the performance of a sale with the conveyancing of title would reverse one of the primary innovations of UCC Article 2,
returning commerce to a pre-modern agricultural model.
More importantly, the fact that the seller has physically
delivered goods to the buyer does not in and of itself mean
that the seller has performed the contract or that the buyer
might not need to seek remedies from a court. A seller’s
obligation under a contract is to deliver goods that conform
to the contract. Indeed, the American rule (with an exception
for installment contracts) is perfect tender—pursuant to
U.C.C. § 2-601 a buyer may reject goods if they “fail in any
respect to conform to the contract.” Consequently, the buyer
has a reasonable time after delivery to inspect (U.C.C. § 2313) and to either accept or reject the goods (U.C.C. § 2-602).
Most importantly, the fact that a buyer has prepaid for the
goods, does not deprive the buyer of its rights to inspect.76 In
short, payment is not acceptance.
73

One author blithely states, “For example, once a good or service has
been delivered, the smart contract could enforce payment through the
distributed ledger. In the event of nonpayment, it could initiate recovery
of the good.” O’Shields, supra note 4, at 179. As I shall discuss in this section, the actual law and mechanics of sales are much more complex and it
is not clear how a contract could recover physical possession of the goods.
74

That is, under U.C.C. § 2-401(2) “Unless otherwise explicitly agreed
title passes to the buyers at the time and place at which the seller
completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the
goods.” The default rule is that where a seller is to ship goods, the contract
is a “shipment contract” (U.C.C. § 2-404) in which case, title passes to the
buyer at the place of shipment (U.C.C. § 2-401(2)(a)).
75

See infra text at notes 148–54.

76

U.C.C. § 2-512 clarifies that “Where the contract requires payment
before inspection . . . Payment . . . does not constitute an acceptance of
goods or impair buyer’s right to inspect or any of his remedies.”
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An analogy to commercial letters of credit might be helpful.
Classically, a commercial letter of credit is issued on behalf
of a buyer for the benefit of a seller in a contract for sales,
often in international transactions, to insure payment of the
purchase price. The issuing bank is required to honor the
letter of credit and pay the beneficiary (seller) when the beneficiary presents documents that on their face conform
strictly to the terms of the credit. Although the buyer will
negotiate that the documents to be presented represent some
evidence that the seller has performed, under the independence principle, the issuing bank must pay upon a conforming presentment regardless of whether or not the seller has
performed (with a limited exception for fraud).77 If the issuing bank pays over a conforming presentment, the applicant
(in this case the buyer) must reimburse the bank.78 In any
event, because documents generally move faster than goods,
the seller/beneficiary is typically paid (and the buyer/
applicant becomes liable to reimburse the issuing bank)
before the goods are delivered. Nevertheless, performance by
the issuing bank under the letter of credit is not performance
by the seller under the underlying sales contact. The buyer
retains its right to inspect and reject the delivered goods and
77

As Article 4 of the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary
Transactions (the “UCP”)—which is typically incorporated by reference in
most international, and many domestic commercial letters of credit—
states, “In credit operations all parties concerned deal in documents, and
not in goods, services and/or other performances to which the documents
may relate.” U.C.C. § 5-108(a) provides that the issuer “shall honor a presentation that . . . appears on its face strictly to comply with the terms
and conditions of the letter of credit . . . [and] the issuer shall dishonor a
presentation that does not appear so to comply” This “independence
principle” is made further express in U.C.C. § 5-103(d) which states:
Rights and obligations of an issuer to a beneficiary . . . under a letter of credit
are independent of the existence, performance, or nonperformance of a contract
or arrangement out of which the letter of credit arises or which underlies it,
including contracts or arrangements between the issuer and the applicant and
between the applicant and the beneficiary.

Similarly, Article 3 of the UCP states:
Credits, by their nature, are separate transactions from the sales or other
contract(s) on which they may be based and banks are in no way concerned
with or bound by such contract(s), even if any reference whatsoever to such
contract(s) is included in the credit.
78

U.C.C. § 5-108(i)(1).
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to pursue its contract remedies in the case of non-conforming
delivery.79
Specifically, if the goods are non-conforming, the buyer has
the right to reject the goods and obtain a refund of the
purchase price under U.C.C. § 2-711(1). Alternately, under
U.C.C. § 2-714(a), the buyer may accept the goods, in which
case, assuming it gives proper notification, it has the right to
damages for nonconformity.
Lee tries to demonstrate the superiority of a smart sales
contract with the following hypothetical:
The Blockchain replaces the role of the third party typically required to resolve disagreements. As an example,
imagine a red-widget factory receives an order from a new
customer to produce 100 of a new type of blue widget. This
requires the factory to invest in a new machine and they will
only recoup this investment if the customer follows through
on their order. Instead of trusting the customer or hiring an
expensive lawyer, the company could create a smart property with a self-executing contract. Such a contract might
look like this: For every blue widget delivered, transfer price
per item from the customer’s bank account to the factory’s
bank account. Not only does this eliminate the need for a deposit or escrow—which places trust in a third party—the
customer is protected from the factory under-delivering.80
This example fails to persuade for several reasons. First,
it does not eliminate third party intermediaries as funds are
transferred between deposit accounts, rather than directly
on a block chain. Accordingly, this smart contract is not all
that smart because it is not completely self-enforceable. It
does not transfer the funds itself. Rather, it originates a payment order to the buyer’s bank to effect a funds transfer.
Since this is a contract between merchants, this would be
governed by U.C.C. Article 4A. This would, of course, require
the agreement with the buyer’s bank and reliance that the
bank would accurately execute the payment order—and er79

See text at note 75 supra. For simplicity, I am only discussing remedies that would apply if the UCC applied. Obviously, in an international
sale, other law might apply, but my basic point as to the impracticality, if
not impossibility, of fully automating a sales contract would be the same.
80

Lee, supra note 5, at 113–14.
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rors do sometimes occur. Although I believe that any risks
this would create are minimal, this can already be done
through existing terminology so that the use of smart
contracts would not be the brave new world without banks
that block chain proponents envision.
Second, this proposal does not yet truly protect the seller.
Merely giving the seller the power to order transfers out of
the buyer’s deposit account standing alone, does not deprive
the buyer from also making withdrawals from the account.
That is, the seller has no assurance that there will be sufficient funds in the account at the time payment is due. This
could be “solved” by a three-party agreement among the
buyer, seller and the buyer’s bank depriving the buyer from
making withdrawals. In effect, the buyer would be granting
the seller an Article 9 security interest in its deposit account
perfected by control.
Another alternative is for the buyer to obtain a letter of
credit payable in the amount of the purchase price—once
again adding the services of a dreaded third-party
intermediary. Notoriously, as just discussed, a letter of credit
does not eliminate the possibility of breach of the underlying
sales contract. Although it almost completely assures the
seller that it will get payment, the documents delivered
under the letter of credit can at best only give the buyer
good reason to believe that the seller has performed. It is
always possible the seller will deliver non-conforming goods
despite conforming presentation of documents.
Third, it does not solve the problem of the buyer’s right to
inspection, so that it is not truly self-executing.81
However, this proposal does have two advantages. Because
it involves bank accounts, the buyer can earn interest pend81

Note, since this is an installment contract the usual perfect tender
rule does not apply. Rather, pursuant to UCC § 2-612(2) “The buyer may
reject any installment which is non-conforming if the non-conformity
substantially impairs the value of that installment and cannot be cured
. . .” Nevertheless, the buyers still has the right to inspect and reject any
substantially non-conforming installment, subject to the seller’s right to
cure.
Moreover, pursuant to U.C.C. § 2-612(3), “Whenever non-conformity
or default with respect to one or more installments substantially impairs
the value for the whole contract there is a breach of the whole.”
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ing payment, eliminating the tied-up capital problem
discussed in the previous section. Second, it involves
conventional currency, not cybercurrency. To date, the value
of cybercurrencies has been so volatile that they cannot be
used as the unit of account for legitimate non-cash sales.82
Indeed, the rights of the parties in even a simple contract
are somewhat more complex. Even if the goods delivered by
the seller were non-conforming, under U.C.C. § 2-508 the
seller has the right to cure non-installment contracts in two
circumstances. If the time for delivery has not yet lapsed,
the seller still has time to make a substitute delivery of
conforming goods. If the seller had reasonable grounds to
believe that the buyer would accept the non-conforming
goods with an adjustment of price, the buyer still has the
right to reject, but the seller has an additional reasonable
time to make a conforming tender. Under U.C.C. § 2-612, the
seller’s rights to cure non-conformance in installment
contracts is even greater. For example, even if an installment substantially impairs the value of the installment, the
buyer must accept if “the seller gives adequate assurance of
its cure.” That is, the law reflects the practice that in most
cases, the counterparties seek less to “enforce” their rights,
but to “perform,” i.e. work things out.
82

Presumably, if the parties did want to eliminate banks and use
cybercurrency for payment, the contract could be denominated in dollars
or another conventional currency, and the contract could access a
designated oracle to calculate the purchase price into cybercurrency based
on the then prevailing conversion rate on the payment date.
This is similar to what Dell and other sellers who supposedly accepted payment in bitcoins did in the past. They would post the price of
the good to be sold in dollars. If a customer elected to pay in bitcoin, a
third-party intermediary—Coinbase in the case of Dell—would quote a
price in bitcoin based on the then prevailing exchange rate that would be
effective for a matter of minutes. The customer would open an account
with the intermediary which would sell it bitcoin which would then be
transferred to the seller’s account with the intermediary. The intermediary would then immediately buy back the bitcoin from the seller at the
quoted exchange rate minus a service fee by transferring the bitcoin out
of, and transferring dollars into, the seller’s account. Schroeder, Bitcoin
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 1, 31 n.
89, 33 (2016) [hereinafter, Schroeder, Bitcoin]. Neither Dell nor virtually
any other legitimate business are now accepting payment in bitcoin of the
sale of goods and services. See supra note 7.
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DeFilippi and Wright, recognizing the problem of protecting buyer’s rights under Article 2, suggest a different form of
smart contract. They suggest that the contract could be
programmed to release payment of the purchase price not
upon delivery, but upon the buyer’s acceptance of the goods
shipped. Unfortunately, this raises issues that are the mirror image of those we have just discussed. That is, although
it might solve many of the buyer’s issues, it shifts risks to
the seller. Consequently, as this would require the buyer to
manifest its acceptance, it would also not be truly selfexecuting.
Let us look in more detail as to how this would work. As is
often the case under the UCC, there are more than one way
to accept goods. The buyer can make an actual affirmative
manifestation of acceptance under U.C.C. § 2-606(1).
Consequently, DeFilippi and Wright suggest that “the buyer
[would] send[] a digitally signed block-chain-based message
to the escrow account, which [would] then release[] the
amount of the purchase price to the seller.”83
However, I believe that in the “real world” such affirmative acceptance may be empirically unusual—I don’t believe
I have ever contacted an on-line seller to accept a delivery.
Commonly, the buyer accepts not by affirmatively accepting,
but by failing to give seller notice of rejection after a reasonable opportunity for inspection (U.C.C. § 2-606(b)). Presumably a smart contract could provide for payment to the seller
upon the earlier of i) the buyer’s sending a message of acceptance to the contract or; ii) the lapse of a contractually agreed
“reasonable time”; unless iii) prior to that time the buyer
sends a digitally signed block-chain-based rejection message
to the escrow account in which case payment would not be
made.
What happens next? The simplest would be for the escrow
account to release the purchase price back to the buyer if it
sends a rejection notice. However, this would not protect the
seller if the buyer wrongfully rejects the goods. Moreover,
there is yet another mode of acceptance. Even assuming that
a buyer had initially rightfully rejected the goods, under
U.C.C. § 2-606(c), the buyer accepts the goods if it “does any
83

DeFilippi & Wright, supra note 2, at 76.
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act inconsistent with the seller’s ownership [such as, for
example, using the good], but if such act is wrongful as
against the seller it is an acceptance only if ratified by him.”
Consequently, to protect the seller, one would have to add
another level of complexity to the programming.
DeFilippi and Wright suggest that “if a dispute arises over
the quality of the good or if the product simply never gets
delivered, a human-based oracle steps in to analyze the facts
of the case and determine who should receive the escrowed
funds.” 84 And so, the smart contract is not in fact selfexecuting, let alone self-enforcing, but is dependent on s a
dreaded third-party intermediary—with the term “oracle,” in
this case, referring to a mediator or arbitrator. Indeed, as
discussed below, with respect to consumer sales, the buyer
would be worse off than under current law.
But, since consumer transactions raise paternalistic
protection issues, let us assume for the time being that the
hypothetical smart sales contract only involves merchants.
The proposal so far does not adequately reflect the rights
and remedies of parties under sales law. Nor does it reflect
the procedures under Article 2 which are designed to force
the buyer and seller to engage into conversation and give
and take precisely to avoid submitting the dispute to a third
party. That is, in the “real world,” merchants are unlikely to
submit to a smart contract’s binary world of specific
performance. Rather, they “work things out.”
So let’s return to the smart contract and examine how it
would have to work under Article 2. First, if would not be
sufficient to program the contract to release funds back to
the buyer upon receipt of a notice of rejection—indeed, this
84

DeFilippi & Wright, supra note 2, at 76. In a footnote, they suggest
submitting the issue to an arbitrator.
A few days latter when [buyer] receives the [good], she inspects it and — if
satisfied with the product — sends a digitally signed blockchain-based message
to the smart contract to release the bitcoin to [seller] The transaction is thus
completed without the need for any trusted third party. If, however, the [good]
was defective, or was never delivered, [buyer] can appeal to a third-party
arbitrator (a human-based oracle) to retrieve her funds. Both parties would
submit relevant information to the arbitrator, who would render a decision and
release the escrowed funds either to [buyer] or to [seller].

DeFilippi & Wright, supra note 2, at 239 n. 23.
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could not be the case if DeFilippi and Wright want the
contract to be able to submit a dispute to an oracle.
First, in order to be effective as a rejection, under U.C.C.
§ 2-605 a buyer must “state . . . a particular defect” in the
goods. In addition, upon the request of the seller, a merchant
buyer must “in writing”85 supply “a full and final written
statement of all defects on which the buyer proposes to rely.”
That is, Article 2 pushes the parties into negotiation.
Consequently, when the smart contract receives a rejection
notice from the buyer it would have to deliver the notice to
the seller, and should not release the funds if it receives a
notice of objection from the seller within some reasonable
time. If the seller does send an objection, the smart contract
would then presumably need to give the buyer some means
of replying. If the parties come to a resolution, then they
could give a multi-signature notice to the contract designating how the funds should be distributed. If they are unable
to do so within a specified period of time, then the issue
would be submitted to an oracle.86
Moreover, it would not be sufficient for the contract to
merely provide for the possibility of acceptance and payment
or rejection and non-payment. It would also have to provide
85

I assume that electronic notice would satisfy this writing require-

ment.
86

This back-and-forth of instructions is, essentially, how a wellwritten stand-by letter of credit works. However, under a “commercial”
letter of credit (such as those issued to pay the purchase price of goods),
the issuing bank pays the beneficiary when it receives documents designed
to give the beneficiary reason to believe that the customer has performed
a contract. The parties expect the letter of credit to be drawn down in the
ordinary course because most parties in fact perform their contracts.
A stand-by letter of credit, in contrast, is the economic (but not
legal) equivalent to a guarantee of performance. The problem is that it is
difficult to come up with documents that prove a negative (nonperformance). Consequently, the beneficiary’s attorney might deliver an
affidavit swearing that a breach occurred. The issuing bank would then
pay the letter of credit unless the applicant’s attorney delivered an affidavit denying the breach. The issuing bank would then only pay the letter of
credit when it received either joint instructions from the party or a decision by an arbitrator or other designated third party. Such a stand-by letter of credit, in effect, does not assure the beneficiary that it will be paid
quickly, but that funds will be available to pay damages if and when a
dispute as to breach is resolved.
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for a third option. As already mentioned, if a good is nonconforming, the buyer may accept it non-withstanding nonconformity and (if it follows the notice procedures of Article
2) recover damages under U.C.C. § 2-714, and perhaps
incidental and consequential damages under U.C.C. § 2-715.
Because the purchase price has not yet been paid, the buyer
would have the right to reduce the amount payable to the
seller by the amount of damages as a claim in recoupment
under U.C.C. § 2-717. Consequently, the contract would need
to be programmed to enable the buyer to give a notice of acceptance not withstanding non-conformity, specifying the
defect and the amount of funds to be delivered to the seller
and the amount to the buyer. Once again, there would need
to be a provision for the seller to object, etc.
One can imagine that with respect to mercantile transactions (particularly when the buyer is a merchant who wishes
to resell the goods) that the buyer would often be willing to
take non-conforming goods with reasonable price adjustment.
This is why U.C.C. §§ 2-508 and 2-612(2) give the seller the
opportunity to cure a non-conforming delivery.
Consequently, this smart contract is not yet, in fact, selfexecuting and does not yet eliminate the possibility of default
either by the seller delivering non-conforming goods, or the
buyer’s wrongful rejection. As I just said, for it to be sufficient, it would need to deal with contract remedies. For
example, in addition to price adjustment, the buyer may
have a right to incidental and consequential damages.
(U.C.C. § 2-715) Finally, in the case of non-delivery, under
some circumstances, the buyer does have a right of specific
performance. (U.C.C. § 2-715). It is hard to see how any of
these could be easily programmed into the contract. As we
have shall discuss with respect to specific performance,
Fairfield and Lee’s suggestion that “title” to the good could
be transferred on a blockchain is a non-solution.
The potential problems with respect to the seller are even
greater if, as DeFilippi and Wright suggest, the goods are
physically delivered to the buyer before payment. Assume
that the buyer has rightfully rejected the goods. The smart
contract itself can not return them to the seller and,
therefore, cannot enforce the contract.
Let us look at the party’s respective rights and
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responsibilities. Under U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(b), the buyer must
“hold [rejected goods] with reasonable care at the seller’s disposition for a time sufficient to permit the seller to remove
them,” but the seller must, of course, figure out how to recover them. The buyer does have the right to either store or
ship them back under U.C.C. § 2-604, but at the seller’s
expense. How does the buyer obtain payment?
A merchant buyer’s obligations are greater than those of a
consumer buyer. Under U.C.C. § 2-603, it must under some
circumstances follow instructions of the seller and, “in the
absence of such instructions to make reasonable efforts to
sell them for the seller’s account if they are perishable or
threaten to decline in value.” If it does so, the buyer must
account for the seller for the price received upon sale, but is
entitled to reimbursement of expenses. If the buyer has a
right to damages against the seller, it has a security interest
in the goods. (U.C.C. § 2-711). This means that it can sell the
rejected goods, apply the sales price towards payment of
damages, and remit any surplus to the seller.
Another complexity is that, even assuming that the buyer
initially rightfully rejected the good, any action the buyer
takes that is inconsistent with the seller’s ownership of the
goods—such as using them or throwing them away—is itself
an acceptance of the goods (if ratified by the seller) reestablishing its obligation to pay the price. (U.C.C. § 2606(a)(c)). Moreover, any “exercise of ownership” of the buyer
after rejection—such as using them or throwing it away—is
wrongful vis a vis the seller, giving it the right to damages
for conversion. (U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(a)).
In other words, the obligations of the parties after a nonconforming delivery goes way beyond merely the nonpayment of the price that could be easily programmed into a
smart contract. And, we have not yet even considered the
right and remedies of the parties if the buyer wants to revoke
acceptance.
Once again, a smart contract, even if supplemented with
an oracle, cannot make this self-performing, let alone selfenforcing. All the oracle can do it to declare that the seller
has the right to the goods, or that the buyer has an obligation to either allow the seller to pick them up or to send
them back. If the parties refuse to do so, there is no way for
© 2020 Thomson Reuters E UCC Law Journal E Vol. 49May 2020
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the contract to make it happen. Remember, the recalcitrant
party refused to do so before the dispute mechanism was
triggered. Why would one think that it would do so now that
some third party tells it to?
Consequently, all the oracle could do is transfer the funds
already deposited. With respect to physical recovery of the
goods, the seller would have to take the oracle’s disposition
to a court and reduce it to a judgment (assuming that the
oracle constitutes a legally cognizable arbitrator). The
plaintiff would then have to turn the judgment into a lien
(and probably hire a sheriff to grab the goods). In the
meantime, if the possessory buyer had gone bankrupt before
the lien attached, the seller would be a general creditor who
is unlikely to have a meaningful recovery. If the buyer were
to go bankrupt after the lien attaches, the automatic stay
would prevent the seller from taking possession of the good.87
In any event, my point is that a smart sales contract might
be an attractive payment system for the seller, it cannot be
made completely self-executing because of the physicality of
the of the goods and, therefore, the rights, responsibilities
and remedies to the contracting parties.
One possible ways to program smart contracts to deal with
sales law would, in fact, defeat the purpose of smart
contracts. One extreme non-solution would be for the seller
to disclaim all warranties and for the buyer to agree to accept all goods “as is.” Indeed, I attended one panel discussion on smart contracts at which one panelist declared that
there could be no breach under a smart contract because the
obligations of the parties are merely whatever is in the code
and nothing more. This ignores the fact that there is an
existent world of contract law and if a “smart contract” is
silent on a subject, under basic principles of law, default
rules will apply. However, it is possible for the smart contract
to waive rights. Consequently, even if the “smart contract”
only provides for payment by the buyer and delivery by the
seller the buyer has rights unless the contract meets the
rules of Article 2 for “as is” sales, i.e. silence in the smart
contract is insufficient. There seems to be no theoretical reason why the requirements of U.C.C. § 2-316 could not be
87

I discuss the automatic stay infra in text at notes 237-40.
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written into the code of the contract, so long as notification
requirements of Article 2 were otherwise met.88
However, supposedly one of the primary advantages touted
for smart contracts is to eliminate the need for trust. An “as
is” contract where the buyer has no opportunity to inspect
before payment, depends entirely on trust that the seller will
deliver goods acceptable to the buyer despite the fact that
the seller would have no legal liability if it did not. It is hard
to imagine a buyer who would be so naive to enter into such
a contract.
B. Consumer Sales
1. Warranties. I suspect that merchants as a class are
savvy enough that they would rarely agree to as-is contracts
without a right of inspection. However, Fairfield has suggested that, because smart contracts could be made modular,
consumer buyers would have the ability to effectively negotiate for more and better warranties in on-line contracts than
they do now.89 Extended warranties would, however, keep
these smart contracts from being “self-executing.” I am also
doubtful that the typical consumer who does not now read
the terms and conditions of her on-line sales contract will
abandon her rational apathy and start to take the time and
effort to negotiate the terms.
One of the primary reasons for this is that consumer buyers are currently not now “forced” to accept non-warranty
contracts as Fairfield suggests. Fairfield asserts that
disclaimer of warranties in on-line contracts are “routine”
and have “eviscerated consumer protections offered by the
Uniform Commercial Code”90 citing an article that discusses
the enforceability of disclaimers in on-line contracts but, in
fact, does not discuss the issue of their prevalence. In fact, it
88

A potential issue with “as is” contracts is that complete waivers
“must be by a writing and conspicuous” and this can be done by using
such “expressions like ‘as is.’ ’’ U.C.C. §§ 2-316(2), (3). Would a provision
solely in computer readable code meet this requirement, or would there
have to also be a human readable, natural language document as well?
89

Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection,
71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. Online 36 (2014).
90

Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection,
71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev at 44.
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is my experience that there is tremendous diversity among
merchants with respect to disclaimers.91
For example, Amazon—which accounts for approximately
50% of online-sales of goods—does not disclaim warranties
with respect to the sale of goods in its standard terms and
conditions,92 although its subsidiary, Zappos, does.93 BestBuy’s terms provide that “warrant[ies] on any product sold
. . . is provided by the manufacturer of the product” and
that “to the fullest extent permitted by applicable law, Best
Buy will not be liable for any indirect, incidental, or
consequential damages with respect to such product or
services.”94 Both Amazon and BestBuy’s terms do disclaim
any warranties with respect to the website itself, using the
“as if” language permitted by Article 2, even though it is
very doubtful whether Article 2’s warranty provisions would
apply since the website itself is almost certainly not a “good.”
However, as I discuss below,95 large on-line merchants including Amazon and Best Buy typically adopt almost unlimited
refund policies even for conforming goods that go beyond the
rights granted by Article 2. Smaller e-tailers tend to feel the
market pressure to follow suit.
Moreover, if smart contracts would make it easier for
consumers to add warranties to on-line sales, it is not clear
that this would be beneficial because of pricing. For example,
today sellers of appliances and electronics do offer to sell
extended warranties (i.e over and above the warranty given
by the manufacture) for a price. However, the reason why
they hawk these warranties so incessantly is because the
quality of these products have become so consistent that
these warranties are relatively rarely exercised. This means
91

I personally, have never seen, let alone bought a good that was
subject to, a full warranty, because it would then have to meet the onerous standards of the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 104 (15
U.S.C.A. § 2304).
92

https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=
508088.
93

https://www.zappos.com/terms-of-use.

94

https://www.bestbuy.com/site/help-topics/terms-and-conditions/pcmc
at204400050067.c?id=pcmcat204400050067.
95

See infra text at notes 115-16.
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that they are usually extremely profitable for merchants and
terrible deals for consumers.96
Another example of modular contracting that has been of
dubious value to consumers is the cafeteria-style pricing
adopted by airlines in recent years—charging separate and
often opaque fees for such extras as checked luggage,
carry-on luggage, seat selection, etc.—that make it difficult
to compare pricing across airlines.97 The Government Accountability Office reported that airlines collected $7.1 billion in fees for “extras” in 2016.98
2. Credit Card Sales v. Smart Contracts. As already
quoted,99 Werbach and Cornell assert that smart contracts
break down the distinction between executory and executed
contracts—as though we could do away with the constraints
of time and space which are the raison d’etre of financial
contracts and the limitation of sales contracts. They argue
that smart contracts could be programmed “as if” performance had already occurred, and certain aspects of performance could be made inevitable. As I have argued, the fact
that the buyer has paid and the seller has delivered goods
does not mean that the seller has performed or that the
buyer does not have enforceable remedies.100
Werbach and Cornell attempt to contrast self-enforcing,
quasi-executed smart contracts with consumer credit card
transactions. In fact, they misstate the law and practice of
consumer credit contracts and on-line shopping. As such
they seem insensitive about how the development of smart
sales contracts—if they could be made practicable—would do
96

See e.g. Don’t Buy Extended Warranties, Consumer Reports (August
26, 2016), available at https://www.consumerreports.org/shopping/don’t-bu
y-extended-warranties.
97

See Airline Fees Make it Tough to Compare Deals on Flights,
Consumer Reports (June 8, 2018), available at https://www.consumerrepor
ts.org/airline-fees/airline-fees-make-it-tough-to-compare-deals-on-flights.
98

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Commercial Aviation: Information on Airline Fees For Optional Services, GAO 17-756 (Sept. 20,
2017), available at https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-756.
99

See supra text at note 34.

100

As I explain below (infra text at notes 148-54), the great innovation
of the UCC was precisely to argue that modern sales contracts could not
be reduced to events.
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away with one of the central bulwarks of consumer
protection.
They try to distinguish blockchain and conventional
consumer on-line contracts as follows:
Bitcoin tokens are digital bearer instruments, functionally
equivalent to cash, yet flexible and scalable in the manner of
credit cards. A blockchain-based smart contract, like a cash
transaction, therefore involves the complete exchange of
value.101

In contrast, they claim, when one makes an on-line purchase
using a credit card:
I am in a position to prevent a complete transfer of value,
because I can still ask Amazon for a refund, or dispute the
charge with the credit card company. This is possible because
my contract with Amazon is executory—I have traded the
e-book for the promise to pay my credit card issuer. Imagining
the same exchange with a smart contract, by contrast, it is as
though when I click the buy button, a drone picks up a stack
of one-dollar bills from my house and flies them to Amazon.
The contract fully executes with no human intervention. I can
still dispute the transaction with Amazon, but now the
contract is fully executed. Amazon has the cash; I am now
asking them to return the money, rather than preventing them
from receiving it. (emphasis added)102

Their statements as to the law of cash sales, however, is
misleading and as to the executory nature of credit-card
sales is wrong.
Article 9 of the UCC sets forth the conveyancing rules for
when a transferee of money takes free of only one subset of
adverse claims, namely security interests. Otherwise the
conveyancing of money is left to the vagaries of the common
law which is surprisingly poorly worked out. Nevertheless,
Werbach and Cornell are correct that, in the absence of
fraud,103 when a buyer transfers physical currency (i.e. bills
and coins) to a seller in exchange for goods or services, in
101

Werbach & Cornell, supra note 3, at 349.

102

Werbach & Cornell, supra note 3, at 349.

103

This is not the case, however, if the seller has defrauded the buyer.
In fraud, the buyer continues to have voidable title in the dollars with the
right to replevy them. Although, the seller could transfer good title in the
actual notes and coins to a good faith purchaser, under general principles
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most circumstances the seller will be a good faith purchaser
for value of the currency who receives it free and clear of
any continuing ownership interest of the buyer. That is, the
buyer loses her property interest in the dollar bills conveyed.
If the buyer is dissatisfied with the underlying contract, she
can sue for damages, but cannot replevy the money paid.
This distinction is of the essence, of course, if the seller were
to go bankrupt.
There is not yet a common law of the conveyancing of
cryptocurrency. It does not constitute “money” for the
purposes of the UCC.104 Rather it is a “general intangible”105—
the UCC’s basket clause for any type of personal property
that does not fall within its other enumerated categories (i.e.
such as goods, accounts, instruments, etc.).
Article 9 currently treats physical money and general
intangibles very differently. U.C.C. § 9-332(a) provides that a
transferee of money takes free of a security interest in the
money unless the transferee colludes with the debtor in order to defeat the rights of the secured party. U.C.C. § 9332(b) contains a similar rule protecting transferees of funds
out of a deposit account subject to a security interest—the
empirically most common mode of payment in this country.
Note, these rules are much broader than the common law as
they apply to transferees, as well as purchasers, and to badfaith transferees with knowledge of the adverse claims so
long as they are not actively in cahoots with the transferor.
of law, the buyer could replevy any traceable proceeds of the currency
from the fraudster. For example, if the seller defrauded the buyer by
delivering an empty box rather than a toaster in exchange for $100 in
bills, the seller would have a property right to recover those specific dollar
bills. If the seller takes those dollar bills and uses them to buy a blender
from X, the buyer could not get back those dollar bills from X, but it does
have a property right to take the blender away from seller.
104

This is a completely distinct question as to whether cryptocurrency
constitutes “money” for other purposes such as anti-money laundering, tax
or securities laws.
105

Although the statutory language is far from a model of clarity, read
in context it is quite clear that the UCC’s term “money” is limited to physical currency, and does not even cover the primary form that U.S. dollars
are in fact held in this country—i.e. “deposit accounts” maintained at
banks. I explain the UCC’s treatment of money and cybercurrency in
Schroeder, Bitcoin, supra note 81, at 19–29.
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There is, however, no such exceptions for transferees, let
alone good faith purchasers, of general intangibles. Article
9’s failure to include a subsection to U.C.C. § 9-332 freeing
up cybercurrency is a historical relic. Obviously, cybercurrency did not exist and could not have been anticipated by
the drafters the last time NCCUSL proposed substantial
amendments to Article 9. However, the import of this is that,
once cybercurrency becomes subject to a security interest,
cryptocurrency remains subject to the security interest no
matter how many times it is transferred and re-transferred.
As I have argued elsewhere,106 despite the fact that the
identities of the owners of cryptocurrency might be pseudonymous, one of the beauties of the blockchain is precisely that
the chain of title is completely transparent. This means that
a secured party may have the ability to trace and foreclose
on cryptocurrency even in the “hands” of remote transferees.
As such, current law could significantly negatively impact
the ability to use cryptocurrency as a substitute for money
or other conventional payment modes.
At this stage, absent legislation to answer this question, it
is unknown whether in the context of claims other than security interests courts will adopt a common law good-faith
purchaser rule for transferees of cryptocurrency by analogy
to the common law of money, or whether they will look to
Article 9 for guidance and find that transferees of cybercurrency take subject to adverse claims. For the limited
purposes of this paper, I will assume arguendo that judges
will treat cybercurrency like money in the sales context—
that is, that good faith purchasers for value will take
cybercurrency free of claims other than security interests.
The simplest form of sale is cash sale reflected in the
default rule of U.C.C. § 2-507: unless the parties agree
otherwise, the seller does not have to deliver the good until
the buyer tenders payment and the buyer does not have to
deliver the price until the seller tenders delivery of a conforming good. However, in Werbach and Cornell’s hypothetical on-line sale, the parties have modified the default rule by
agreeing that the buyer is to pay for goods with cybercurrency when she clicks “accepted” before delivery of the good,
106

Schroeder, Bitcoin, supra note 81, at 42–43.
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but before the buyer has had the opportunity to inspect. This
is not, however, correct with respect to credit card sales.
The typical arrangement between merchants and their
acquiring bank for online credit card transactions (as opposed to “point-of-sale” or “POS” transactions) is that the
customer’s card will be charged, and the merchant account
will be credited, not when the contract is entered into, but
upon shipment of goods.107 Nevertheless, they are correct,
that the payment is often, if not usually, instituted before
the buyer receives the goods. Nevertheless, to reiterate, the
point in the last section, the buyer’s acceptance of the contract is not acceptance of the underlying good itself. They
buyer still has the right to inspect the goods for a reasonable
time after receipt and is entitled to damages if she rightfully
rejects for non-conformity.
Whether a buyer rejects a non-conforming good or accepts
it while retaining its right to damages, Werbach and Cornell
are incorrect in saying that the buyer can “ask . . . [the
merchant] to return [all or part of] the money.” As is the case
in cash sales (or cybercurrency sales), absent fraud by the
seller, the buyer in a credit card sale does not does not have
a property interest in any funds it delivered to the seller giving it a right of replevy. Rather, absent fraud, the buyer has
a mere contract right for contract damages vis a vis the
seller.
If this seems like a distinction without a difference to the
layperson, to a commercial lawyer the distinction is of the
essence. If the seller were to go bankrupt, a claimant with a
property right will be made whole. A contractual claimant,
however, is only a general creditor who will probably only
receive a small percentage of her claim, or nothing at all.
Moreover, as I shall explain in more detail, in the case of
credit-card transactions, this is the case not merely because
the common law good-faith-purchase law of money applies.
107

See, e.g. Visa’s Card Acceptance Guidelines for Visa Merchants, 13,
available at https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/download/merchants/card-acc
eptance-guidelines-for-merchants.pdf [hereinafter, Visa Guide]; American
Express Merchant Operating Guide, United States, Including Puerto Rico
& U.S. Virgin Islands Sec. 6.4.1 p. 39 (April 2019), available at https://icm.
aexp-static.com/content/dam/gms/en_us/optblue/us-mog.pdf. [hereinafter,
Amex Guide].
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More importantly, it is because Werbach and Cornell do not
internalize that, unlike a simple cash sale, a credit-card
transaction is a three-party, not a two-party transaction. The
consumer’s rights of charge back spring not from any executory duty to perform a contract, but are granted by a
consumer protection statute.
Werbach and Cornell’s infelicitous language suggests that
the difference between cash, debit card and smart contract
sales on the one hand and credit card sales on the other is
that the former are executed and the latter executory on the
buyer’s part. That is, they implicitly assume that in the
credit card context the buyer does not complete its performance of the sales contract until the buyer pays her credit
card bill—i.e. after delivery (and presumably inspection and
acceptance) of the underlying good. This is incorrect.
Under contract law, the buyer has paid for the goods when
the merchant’s bank (in the parlance of the trade, the “applicant’s bank”) credited its account with the purchase price.
As mentioned, in the case of on-line sales, this is typically
done when the merchant ships the goods. Consequently, an
on-line credit card sale is typically a prepayment of the
purchase price to the merchant upon shipment but prior to
delivery. The buyer’s obligations vis a vis the merchant under
the contract are executed, not executory, by the time delivery
is made. The buyer has no property right in the funds
transferred to the seller, and no right to ask for the seller to
“refund” the money. Rather, under Article 2, if the goods are
nonconforming, she has a contract right to damages.
What no doubt confuses Werbach and Cornell is that § 170
of the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”)108 gives consumers who purchase goods and services using a credit card
statutory rights against the bank that issues her credit card,
and not against the merchant who sold her the goods or services over and above the rights she has against either the
merchant or the bank under contract law. The credit card
networks have responded to this by adding the notorious
“charge-back” provision to their contracts with merchants.
To understand TILA, we need to take a detour into the law
of credit sales.
108

15 U.S.C.A. § 1666i.

304

© 2020 Thomson Reuters E UCC Law Journal E Vol. 49May 2020

SENSE, SENSIBILITY AND SMART CONTRACTS: A VIEW FROM A CONTRACT LAWYER
Variation 1: Simple credit sale. B wants to buy a toaster
from S for $100 but does not want to pay cash. S agrees that
B can pay for the toaster 90 days after delivery. Upon
delivery of the toaster, B inspects it and finds it defective.
The defective toaster is worth $80. Upon appropriate notice
to S, B can either reject the toaster and hold it for S to pick
up, or she can accept it and maintain her right to damages
for $20 (i.e. the difference between the value of a conforming
toaster and the value of the toaster as delivered). B has a
“claim in recoupment” against S. Under basic principles of
commercial law, B does not have to pay S the entire $100
purchase price and then sue for the amount S owes it for
breach. Rather, she can setoff the amount that S owes
against the amount B owes. i.e. B now either owes nothing
or only $80 depending on which remedy she elects.
Variation 2: Factoring. This time, although S has agreed
to sell the toaster to B on credit, S has cash-flow concerns.
Accordingly, S seeks financing from a bank, X. X will advance
funds to S on the condition that S transfers an interest in S’s
rights against B—which the UCC calls an “account”109 to X.
X may either lend S money, or buy the account—either way,
the right X acquires in B’s obligation to S is an Article 9 security interest.
B inspects the toaster, finds that it is defective and only
worth $80. UCC § 9-404(a)(1) provides the basic rule that X’s
rights in the account are no greater than S’s. This means
that, if the toaster is defective, B may assert the claim in
recoupment she has against S against X. That is, B only
owes X nothing or $80 depending on the remedy she elects.110
Variation 3: Third-party credit to buyer. This time, although B wants to buy on credit, S refuses to extend credit,
109

U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2).

110

U.C.C. § 9-403 provides an exception to this rule, if the account
debtor agrees in writing that it will not assert defenses and claims in
recoupment against an assignee of its account. If it does so, and if the
secured party acquiring the account otherwise meets the conditions of
U.C.C. § 9-403 (which parallel those of being a holder in due course of
instruments), then the secured party takes free of claims and defenses
That is, the account debtor must pay the secured party the face amount of
the account and seek redress from the seller. U.C.C. § 9-403(e) notes that
this exception may be subject to extra-Code consumer protection law.
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insisting on cash. Consequently, B goes to a bank, Y. Y lends
B $100. B in turn uses these funds to pay S for the toaster.
For simplicity, but rather unrealistically, assume that Y
hands B a crisp $100 bill, which B in turn hands over to S.
If, as in the earlier variations of this hypothetical, B finds
that the toaster is defective, she still has the right to reject
or accept the toaster. Under the common law, however,
(absent fraud) S takes the $100 purchase price from B free
and clear of any property right in the payment of B. In the
case of breach, B has a contract claim against S for damages.
Most importantly, B has no right to assert this right to damages against Y as a claim in recoupment, because Y is a
stranger to the contract between B and S. Consequently, B
must repay Y in full and seek redress from S.
Variation 4a: Credit-card debt without TILA. Today, the
more typical way for a consumer to obtain a loan to buy
goods and services is to obtain a credit card, in this case issued by bank, Z. A credit card is a revolving credit facility
pursuant to which the issuing bank agrees to make loans to
the consumer for the purposes of purchasing goods and services when she and the merchant comply with the conditions
and procedures that Z and the credit card network have
established. When it lends under a credit card, however, the
issuing bank does not transfer the loan proceeds directly to
the cardholder-borrower. Rather, it remits the funds directly
to the merchant from which the cardholder is purchasing
goods and services.111
From the perspective of basic state contract and com111

The actual procedure is somewhat more complicated. There are five
legal functions in a credit card transaction, 1) the buyer, called the
customer, 2) the bank that issues the credit card, 3) the seller, called the
merchant, 4) the bank through which the merchant maintains its credit
card transactions, called the acquiring bank, and 5) the credit card
network that communicates and settles transactions between the issuing
and acquiring banks. As an empirical matter the issuing bank and the
acquiring bank might be the same, but the legal relationships remain
distinct. When a transaction is approved, the charge is posted to the
customer’s account and funds are transferred from the issuing bank to the
acquiring bank (minus a fee charged by the issuing bank) and then to the
merchant’s account at the acquiring bank (minus a fee charged by the
acquiring bank). The details of settlement do not concern us here. The
largest credit-card network is operated by Visa, followed by MasterCard.
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mercial law principles, Variation 4a is identical to Variation
3: It is as though Z hands a $100 bill to B, which B then
turns over to S. B’s obligation to pay S for the purchase price
is final in the sense that S received these funds free and
clear of any property claim by B. If the toaster is defective, B
has a contract claim for damages against S. B cannot,
however assert its claim for damages against Z as a claim in
recoupment because Z. Consequently, under commercial law,
B must pay Z the amount of her credit card loan in full, and
seek redress against S.
Variation 4b: Credit-card transaction under TILA. TILA,
however, gives B additional rights if, and only if, this is
consumer credit card transaction. TILA § 170112 grants a
consumer-credit cardholder a statutory right to assert any
defenses (claims in recoupment) she might have against the
merchant (i.e. S) against her credit card lender (i.e. Z).113
That is, in my continuing hypothetical, if the toaster is defective and B follows the procedures set out in TILA, she will
only need to pay nothing or $80 to Z depending on the elected
remedy.114 Consequently, if the consumer-customer thinks
she has a claim against the merchant, she contacts her issuing bank who must promptly reverse the charge on her account pending an investigation.
TILA does not set forth the relative rights of Z, the
American Express does not merely operate the network, it also performs
the functions of both the issuing and acquiring bank.
112

15 U.S.C.A. § 1666(i).

113

TILA § 170 provides: “[A] card issuer . . . shall be subject to all
claims (other than tort claims) and defenses arising out of any transaction
in which the credit card is used as a method of payment or extension of
credit” . . . 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666(i). There are a number of conditions in the
statute including the requirement that the transaction occur in the same
state as, or within 100 miles of, the consumer’s billing address. In fact,
credit card issuers routinely waive this geographic restriction—perhaps in
part because of uncertainty as to where online transactions are deemed to
occur. American Express has handled numerous disputes for me with respect to transactions in many different states and countries.
114

Under TILA § 162 the consumer has additional rights if the goods
or services are never received at all or she has rejected them. These are
considered “billing errors” which the issuer must delete from the
customer’s statement if the consumer follows certain procedures. 15
U.S.C.A. § 1666.
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customer’s bank, S and S’s acquiring bank. This is left to
contract. Pursuant to the standard contract, if a customer
asserts her statutory rights against the issuing bank, the issuing bank will charge back the disputed amount against
the acquiring bank which will, in turn, charge this amount
back against the merchant.115 The exact charge-back procedure followed by the credit card network and the banks do
not concern us here.
Werbach and Cornell’s confusion probably arises from the
pro-consumer procedures that the credit card network and
issuing banks have set up to effectuate this. When the
consumer reports the dispute to the issuing bank, it typically reverses or suspends the disputed charge on the
customer’s account pending resolution of the dispute. If it
determines the customer’s claims are meritorious, the
amount is permanently expunged from the account. If it is
found not to be, the charge is reposted to the customer’s
account.
In other words, Werbach and Cornell are incorrect to assert that the customer’s obligation to pay the merchant is
executory and that the customer has a contractual right of
charge back against the merchant. Rather, the customer has
a statutory right to assert its claim to damages against its issuing bank, and the issuing bank has a contractual right of
charge back against the merchants.
Why then do Werbach and Cornell mistakenly believe
otherwise, i.e. that they have a right against Amazon?
Because Amazon, and many other big internet merchants,
by practice, usually act as though they do for two practical
business reasons. First, particularly with respect to small
purchases, it might be cheaper for the merchant to pay for
the customer to return the good, then to dispute the matter.
Moreover, there is a widespread perception among merchants, accurate or not, that the credit card networks tend
to support customers over merchants regardless of the merits
of the claim. Consequently, there is an incentive for the
merchant to treat the customer as though she had a right to
charge back so that she does not pursue the more expensive
statutory remedy.
115

See e.g. Amex Guide supra note 106, at §§ 11, 73–85.
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Secondly, and more importantly, Amazon, like many other
large merchants that deal with consumers have decided that
it is excellent public relations to act as though their customers have rights beyond those established by either state or
federal law. (It might also be cheaper to allow returns than
to dispute, or even respond to, customer complaints.) It is
not merely that these merchants will pay damages for
nonconforming goods. Amazon, for example, generally
permits free returns for any or no reason.116 If it decides that
a specific consumer has abused this privilege, it stops accepting her orders.117 Because Amazon and other large online merchants have such great market power, smaller
merchants often feel the competitive pressure to do the same.
This suggests that Fairfield is also somewhat incorrect to
suggest that on-line merchants use their market power to
force customers to accept warranty-free contracts.118 Whether
or not the terms and conditions disclaim warranties as a
legal matter, as a practical matter they give better than a
money-back guarantee for the average consumer.
We are now in the position, once again, to see why smart
sales contracts require more not less trust than other sales
contracts in the consumer context. Because a smart contract
116

See e.g. Amazon, About our Return Policies, available at https://ww
w.amazon.com/GP/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201819200.
117

Kadeeja Safdar & Laura Stevens, Banned From Amazon: the Shoppers Who Make Too Many Returns, The Wall Street Journal, (May 22,
2018), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/banned-from-amazon-theshoppers-who-make-too-many-returns-1526981401.
118

By coincidence, while I was procrastinating while typing the first
draft of this paper, I opened a delivery by Sephora. This was the first time
I had ordered on-line from it as it has three locations within a few blocks
from my home and office. Much to my annoyance, it sent me the wrong
color lipstick. Under Article 2, I clearly had the option to reject this nonconforming delivery. However, rather than raising my common law and
TILA rights, much to my satisfaction, the package contained instructions
as to how I could return the product free of all re-delivery charges for any
or no reason. Moreover, it offered me free over-night delivery of a replacement. This was a sound business decision because, given my initial disappointment, without the offer I would probably have never placed another
order.
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would not be a credit card,119 TILA would not apply. Pace
Werbach and Cornell, the buyer has a right to pursue the
seller for breach whether or not the transfer of the funds is
“final.” However, having a right to damages and being able
to enforce it are two different things. This potential problem
is exacerbated by the potential pseudonymity of the seller
under a smart contract120 and the fact that almost all on-line
terms and conditions contain arbitration and waiver-of-classaction provisions.
Consequently, although a smart sales contract might be
more attractive to a merchant, it is unclear as to why a buyer
would be interested—unless the price offered under a smart
contract were so much less than that offered under a
conventional contract to compensate the buyer for the additional risk of non-conforming delivery.121
Of course, the vaunted pseudonymity offered by smart
contracts would probably have little effect as a practical
matter. As already stated, 122 Amazon and other online
merchants have made the calculation that business reputa119

TILA § 103(l) defines a credit card as “any . . . credit device existing for the purpose of obtaining money, property, labor, or services on
credit.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1602(l).
120

In a conventional contract, the buyer will usually know the identity
of its seller (absent fraud) and will know who to pursue if a delivered good
is non-conforming. This right may be of questionable value in the case of a
dishonest or insolvent seller, particularly if it is located in a foreign jurisdiction, but it is still exists.
Despite the common misperception, bitcoin transactions are not
anonymous. They are pseudonymous in that parties are identified by a
public key—very roughly analogous to an email address. Consequently, it
is theoretically possible that the buyer will not know who to sue if nonconforming goods are delivered. I say “theoretically” because I assume
from this that few sophisticated purchasers would agree to make payments through smart contracts unless they have actual knowledge of the
identity of the seller. That is, it must have reason to trust the seller. In
any event, at first blush, these examples may suggest reason why a
merchant seller might be interested in entering into pseudonymous smart
contract, but not why a buyer would want to, unless the items being
purchased were illegal drugs or other contraband.
121

Of course, there are consumers who pay for on-line purchases with
debit cards which are not protected by TILA § 170. I presume that this
seemingly irrational behavior is driven by ignorance.
122

See supra text at notes 115–16.

310

© 2020 Thomson Reuters E UCC Law Journal E Vol. 49May 2020

SENSE, SENSIBILITY AND SMART CONTRACTS: A VIEW FROM A CONTRACT LAWYER
tion is extremely important—maybe even more so than for
brick and mortar merchants since the buyer can’t inspect
the goods in the store. Consequently, not only do merchants
treat customer’s as though they have greater rights than the
law grants, online customers are constantly barraged with
requests to fill out customer service forms or to rate then on
Yelp or other websites. We see a similar reliance on customer
ratings in internet services that match purchasers of goods
and services with strangers such as Uber, AirBnB, Angie’s
List, eBay, etc. Consequently, very few reputable on-line
merchants could be expected to choose to remain anonymous.
C. Title
1. Personal Property. Fairfield and Lee propose that a
blockchain be used to record title in personal property. In
Lee’s words “[s]mart contracts could be used for virtually
anything that can be owned — tangible property like homes,
cars, phones, and computers, and intangible property such
as intellectual property rights could all be purchased using
smart contracts.”123 This begs two questions i) because we
could do so, is not an argument as to whether we would
want to do; and ii) the fact that we purport to move legal
title onto a blockchain, does not mean that it would have
any legal implication absent legislation.
I argue that, in fact, a general personal property title recording system would be a step backwards for commercial
law. Fairfield starts his article with the dubious empirical
assertion that “The vast bulk of owned wealth is recorded in
systems that tell users who owns what.”124 This is misleading with respect to personal property. Currently, we record
ownership and leasehold interests in a small subset of
personal property, such as motor vehicles at the state level,
123

Lee, supra note 5, at 14. Even in an otherwise extremely insightful
article, that is otherwise skeptical of some of the more extreme claims for
smart contracts, Abramowicz suggests that “what makes Bitcoin remarkable is that it settles the most controversial issue-who owns wealthwithout need for a law enforcement apparatus. Bitcoin can be seen not
just as a currency, but more grandly as an institution that creates and
enforces property rights.” Abramowicz, supra note 65, at 361. At least
with respect to goods, determination of “ownership” (title) does not decide
many if not most legal disputes.
124

Fairfield, supra note 71, at 807.
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and airplanes and airplane engine at the federal. What these
objects have in common is that they are expensive, uniquely
identifiable and have a long usable life so that they often
pass through multiple hands. Being relatively identifiable,
long-lived and valuable, they are particularly attractive to
be used as collateral for secured financing. Registered property often tends to be potentially dangerous. The government has good reason to want to be able to identify the owner
of a car seen speeding from an accident or a gun found at a
crime scene.
In contrast, most tangible personalty is relatively inexpensive, fungible and short lived. When the original owners no
longer want them, they are more likely to throw them away
than resell them. As Article 9 recognizes, secured parties
take pools, rather than individual items, of many types of
personal property as collateral.
Certain claims with respect to certain categories of
intangibles are also subject to recording regimes. To be generally enforceable, copyrights and trademarks must be filed
with the federal government, and patents can only be issued
by the federal government. What they have in common, other
than being intangible, is that they are grants by the government that give the owner a limited monopoly over certain
intellectual property. By definition, each patent, copyright,
and trademark is unique and identifiable.
Certain types of investments—such as stock and publicly
traded debt—are recorded privately on the books of the
issuer.125 This is for the practical reason that the issuer needs
to be able to identify who is entitled to vote, and receive
dividends and other distributions. Tax authorities also have
an interest, particularly with respect to debt, in knowing
who is the recipient of interest and other payments which is
why bearer bonds issued by U.S. companies are now virtually unknown. However, as is the case with vehicles and
intellectual property, investment securities are characterized
by uniqueness and scarcity. That is, although each share of a
security issued by an entity might have identical rights with
125

For example, Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 159 provides that transfer of
common stock is governed by Article 8 as in effect in Delaware. Article 8,
in turn, provides for registration of directly held securities on the books of
the issuer.
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every other security of the same class, the rights of each
class will be unique and there will, at any given day, a
limited number of securities of that class outstanding.
We do not, however, have a comprehensive property recording system for securities either at a governmental or
public level. Beneficial ownership of securities frequently, if
not usually differs from record ownership. For example, the
majority of equity securities in this county are owned
indirectly through brokers, banks and other intermediaries
that are the record owners.126 As a practical matter, under
both Article 8 of the UCC and the federal securities laws,
these indirect interests are typically recorded on the books of
these financial intermediaries, but with some exceptions neither the issuer of the securities, the public or the government knows or cares about their identities.127
However, these are the exceptions that prove the rule.
Most types of claims in most types of personal property,
tangible and intangible, need not be recorded. In order to be
enforceable generally against third parties, security interests
in personal property are must subject to a notification but
126

Consequently, in 1984, Article 8 of the UCC, which governs investment securities, was radically amended better to reflect the prevalence of
indirect ownership of securities through intermediaries. Now, only direct
holdings of investments in the name of the investor are defined as “securities” (U.C.C. § 8-102(b(15)). Investments held indirectly fall under a new
definition of “securities entitlement.” (U.C.C. § 8-102(b)(17)). I discuss this
regime extensively in Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time? The Radical
Reform of Secured Lending on Wall Street, 1994 Calum. Bus. L. Rev. 291
(1994) and Schroeder, Bitcoin, supra note 81, at 47–55 (2016).
By far, the largest securities intermediary is DTCC, a subsidiary of
the Depositary Trust and Clearing Corporation which is the record owner
of more than 1.3 million active securities issues valued at US$54.2 trillion. http://www.dtcc.com/about/businesses-and-subsidiaries/dtc.
127

A noted exception is that under the Williams Act, individuals or
groups that acquire beneficial ownership of 5% or more of a class of
publicly registered securities must give notice to the issuer of the securities and the SEC. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(d). Public companies must also disclose the beneficial ownership of their securities owned by directors, executive officers and 5% shareholders. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(d). Public companies
must also disclose the beneficial ownership of their securities owned by
directors, executive officers and 5% shareholders. 17 C.F.R. §§ 401, 403.
But, importantly, these are mere disclosure provisions and do not constitute a legally recognized registration of ownership.

© 2020 Thomson Reuters E UCC Law Journal E Vol. 49May 2020

313

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 49 #2]
not a registration regime. This “notice filing” system is very
different from recordation, in that is not necessary to specify
specific items of property is covered. Moreover, perfection, by
filing or otherwise, is not however necessary for the enforceability of security interests between the debtor and the
secured party.128 In addition, although filing is the only
perfection formality permitted for some classes of collateral,
such as accounts and general intangibles, other perfection
formalities are available for some types of collateral. Indeed,
sometimes filing is not even permitted.129 Consequently, a
general requirement for recording ownership of specific items
of personalty on a blockchain or otherwise would be a radical
change.
In his article Bitproperty, Fairfield proposes what he calls
a theory of “property as information.”130 He claims that his
way of thinking about property is superior to traditional approaches such as first-appropriator, personality, and economic efficiency theories of property.131 I believe that Fairfield
is incorrect from both a theoretical and empirical perspective.
Indeed, he never discusses these alternatives directly which
are variously explanatory, justificatory or descriptive in
nature. However, in this paper, I will limit myself to a purely
practical critique.
128

U.C.C. § 9-203, Although in most cases this agreement must be
objectified in the sense that there must be a record containing a description of the collateral authenticated by the debtor (traditionally, this
required a signed agreement, but the modern language contemplates
electronic signatures), unlike perfection, attachment does not require a
public record. Rather, its formality is, according to Official Comment 2, an
“evidentiary requirement.” Accordingly, depending on the type of collateral, physical possession or “control” are permitted alternatives.
129

For example, first-generation original security interests in deposit
accounts can only be perfected through “control.” U.C.C. § 9-312(b)(1). The
exception to this rule is provided by U.C.C. §§ 9-315(c) and (d)(2). Secondgeneration security interests in cash proceeds, including those in the form
of deposit accounts, are automatically perfected and remain perfected if
the security interest in the original collateral was perfected. For example,
if the original, first-generation security interest was in inventory perfected
by filing, then cash proceeds deposited in a deposit account would continue
to be perfected by that filing.
130

Fairfield, supra note 71.

131

Fairfield, supra note 71, at 842–44.
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Fairfield argues, as do others, that a blockchain provides a
way of recording information about property claims that
would be more secure and less ambiguous than traditional
means.132 Fairfield asserts that a “major use of the internet
is the transfer of property interests,” giving eBay and Amazon as examples.133 By this he seems to mean that people,
particularly consumers, do a lot of on-line shopping. This is
true in the sense that the UCC defines a “sale” as “the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price.”134
Fairfield suggests that these transfers could be done on a
distributed ledger.135 Unfortunately, the fact that we could
record title on a blockchain does not help us decide the
fundamental legal and jurisprudential issues concerning
what intellectual property claims society should recognize.136
Moreover, the fact that it might be possible to record prop132

Fairfield, supra note 71, at 808–08, 873–74.

133

Fairfield, supra note 71, at 816.

134

U.C.C. § 2-106(1).

135

U.C.C. § 2-106(1) at 838–42, 869–70, and 873–74.

136

For example, in Carpenter v. U.S., 484 U.S. 19, 108 S. Ct. 316, 98 L.
Ed. 2d 275, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1853, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1059, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) P 93423, R.I.C.O. Bus. Disp. Guide (CCH) P 6785 (1987) and
U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 138 L. Ed. 2d 724, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P 99482, 191 A.L.R. Fed. 747 (1997), the Supreme
Court adopted the misappropriation theory that analyzes material nonpublic information as property of the source of such information for the
purposes of federal wire and securities fraud law, respectively. Nevertheless, courts and scholars in this and other contexts disagree as to whether
society should decide to analyze trade secrets and other confidential information in terms of property law, as opposed to contract, tort or, perhaps, a
hybrid or sui generis legal regime. Personally, although I have argued that
trade secrets can be coherently analyzed in terms of property, I disagree
with the Supreme Court’s application in the misappropriation theory.
Schroeder, Unnatural Rights: Hegel’s Theory of Personality and Intellectual Property, 60 U. Miami L. Rev. 453 (2006).
On a related matter, Christopher Bradley suggests that, because we
soon might be able to tag individual goods electronically, we should replace
Article 9’s perfection-by-filing regime. Bradley, supra note 70. Although
my critique of this proposal is beyond the scope of this article, I basically
believe that he elevates issues of technologically over jurisprudential
policy. For example, primarily because of technological difficulties, he
proposes doing away with automatic attachment and perfection of security
interests in proceeds, thereby throwing out the baby of hundreds of years
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erty claims on a blockchain does not shed any light on why
we might want to do this in any specific situation.
Fairfield does not limit himself to special cases such as
copyrights, cars, guns or even securities and, perhaps in the
future, the fine arts. Nor does he limit himself to security
interests where property disputes are potentially common.
He argues, that property is information.137 From this he
draws what I believe is the non sequitur that, therefore,
blockchain recording should be considered for all forms of
personal property. 138 The reasoning seems to be that a
blockchain has the possibility of being an effective way of
conveying information.
I agree that information—publicity—is necessary for a
property regime to function. It does not follow from this,
however, that property is information, as Fairfield argues.
Fairfield’s approach conflates what Henry Smith has identified as means and ends139 That is, making information about
property available through recording may or may not be an
appropriate means to achieve certain goals of property law.140
One must, therefore, first identify what one believes the
function of property is before one can decide if recording is
appropriate or even useful.
For example, from the perspective of personality theory,
information is directly relevant to only one of the three
traditional elements of property. 141 This is possession
understood as the identification of a specific object to a
of the law of restitution with what he sees as the bathwater of inconvenience.
137

Fairfield, supra note 71, at 811.

138

Fairfield, supra note 71, at 873–73.

139

Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 Harv. L. Rev.1691, 1698
(2012).
140

Indeed, it might not be particularly practical in the context of a
wide variety of material non-public information which would be constantly
changing and not particularly subject to recordation—and certainly not
for publicity.
141

The other two being rights of use and alienation. As I explain
elsewhere, I reject the “bundle of rights” analysis of property—i.e. that
there is no core definition of property—that was fashionable among legal
academics in the late-20th century. Following Hegel, I argue that the supposedly myriad rights supposedly identified by bundle-of-rights proponents
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specific identifiable claimant which necessarily includes the
exclusion of other claimants.142 Other theories, such as economic efficiency (which Fairfield sometimes invokes) also
agree that property claims should be knowable by other economic actors for practical reasons. From this perspective, information is neither property nor possession per se, but
publicity (information) is necessary or useful for claims of
possession to be effective, i.e. it is a means not an end. But
even if one agrees that property interests should be publicized, it does not follow that recording, on a blockchain or
otherwise, is the appropriate, let alone, best method to do so.
I also agree with Fairfield that much legal analysis is
hampered by an implicit identification of the norm of property being ownership of tangible things and the related tendency to conflate the empirical fact of the physical possession with the legal right to possession.143 Indeed, I think that
it is unfortunate and potentially confusing that, although
never expressly defined, read in context, the UCC uses the
word “property” to mean not merely the legal right of property, but the object that the right144 relates to and uses the
term “possession” to mean physical custody of tangible
things—goods, instruments, and money understood as coins
and notes.145 It does not follow from this, however, that physical custody of tangible things should be irrelevant to property disputes relating to tangible things—such as the sale of
goods. Physical possession has traditionally been recognized
as an effective means of publicizing one’s claim to a good. It
all, in fact, fall within the three traditional categories defined very broadly.
Jeanne Lorraine Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces: Hegel, Lacan,
Property, and the Feminine 37–52 (1998) (hereinafter, Schroeder, Vestal).
Why this is analytically important is beyond the scope of this paper.
142

The personality theory sees property as a means of establishing
subjectivity of a person through recognition of her legal rights. Consequently, claims to possession require publicity to make them recognizable.
Schroeder, Vestal at 38–45.
143

This is one of the primary themes of my first book. Schroeder, Vestal,
supra note 140.
144

See for example ‘‘ ‘Collateral’ means the property subject to a security interest . . .” U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(12).
145

I set forth the UCC’s use of the word “possession” in Schroeder,
Bitcoin, supra note 81, at 23–26.
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is can also be an effective way of exercising one’s rights. For
example, one cannot exercise one’s right to use a good
without first having physical possession. A secured party’s
physical possession of pledged goods traditionally protects it
from unauthorized transfers by the debtor.146
To return to the analysis of the use of smart contracts to
automatically execute sales contracts. Fairfield suggests that
by registering title in goods, the blockchain could be used to
automatically transfer title to a good.147 This might be true,
but as I have already shown in my discussion of sales
contracts, it is almost entirely irrelevant. First, unlike realproperty, most objects of personal property that are not currently subject to recording regimes are not unique, but
fungible. This is particularly true of consumer goods bought
on-line. That is, when a consumer orders a toaster from Amazon, she does not care whether she obtains legal title to any
specific toaster. Rather, she wants to obtain physical custody
of a toaster meeting the on-line catalogue description. Second
following from this, unlike priority disputes between rival
secured parties, most disputes between buyers and sellers
are not property disputes. The buyer does not claim a specific
toaster, she wants a toaster, or her money back. Third, to
elaborate, the buyer wants not title to a toaster, but physical
delivery of a conforming toaster so that she can use it,148 or if
she herself is a merchant, perhaps to resell it. Moreover, as
discussed in previous sections, even physical custody is not
146

This why, after the notorious case of Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 35 A.D.2d 469, 318 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1st Dep’t 1971), order
aff’d, 29 N.Y.2d 690, 325 N.Y.S.2d 419, 274 N.E.2d 751 (1971) in which a
non-possessory buyer was found to have taken goods free and clear of the
security interest of a possessory secured party, the definition of “buyer in
the ordinary course” was clarified by the addition of adding “Only a buyer
who takes possession of goods or has a right to recover the goods from the
seller under Article 2 may be a buyer in the ordinary course of business.”
U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(9).
147

Fairfield, supra note 71, at 820, 826–27, 834–35.

148

For example, in the Summer of 2017 I ordered eclipse glasses from
Amazon in what I thought was plenty of time for the big event. They
never arrived, although I was assured by the USPS’s tracking service that
they did. Much to amazement, without my asking (I was responsible for a
typo in the delivery address), Amazon eventually reimbursed me when it
somehow determined that they had, in fact, been mis-delivered.
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sufficient, because the consumer needs the ability to inspect
it to determine that it in fact conforms to the contract.
2. Title Under the UCC. Most importantly, Fairfield’s
(and Lee’s) suggestion concerning the registration of title in
goods generally would reverse the great achievement of Karl
Llewellyn and his fellow realists in drafting what became
Article 2 of the UCC. That is, it would be post-modern in the
negative sense I identified at the start of this paper. It would
merely replicate pre-modernity, albeit disguised in contemporary dressing.
Article 2 expressly rejects common law title analysis of the
sale of goods. Note, this is not a rejection of “title” per se, as
is sometimes said about Article 2. Title is just another word
for ownership. The legal realists who drafted the UCC were
thorough-going capitalists and not Poudhonian socialists
who believe that property is theft. Notably, UCC § 2-106(a)
defines a sale as “the passing of title from the seller to the
buyer for a price” and Article 2 is replete with rules as to
when title passes. Rather, Article 2 rejects the common law’s
attempt to resolve all or most contract disputes concerning
the sales of goods by identifying which of competing claimants had “title” to the goods.149
I have explicated Llewellyn’s theory extensively elsewhere150 and will only summarize it here. Llewellyn believed
that by overemphasizing the location of title, the common
law incorrectly conflated all sales law with property law—
i.e. rules of conveyance—when many issues are merely
contractual in nature.151 It is not that Llewellyn thought that
common law judges applying title analysis always made bad
decisions. Rather, it was that title analysis required judges
to twist themselves into conceptual pretzels in order to
obtain results that were pragmatic and intuitively satisfying
149

See infra text at note 154.

150

Schroeder, Vestal, supra note 140, at 191–208; and Schroeder, Death
and Transfiguration: The Myth That The U.C.C. “Killed” Property, 69
Temple L. Rev. 1281 (1996).
151

For example, the common law purported to allocate the risk of casualty loss to a good in accordance to whom the sales contract designated as
the title owner. In fact, the allocation should more appropriately be
determined by which party is in the better position to prevent or protect
against loss and, therefore, to buy insurance (or self-insure).
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despite self-serving and often irrelevant contractual statements as the location of title.
More specifically, Llewellyn thought that common law
“title” analysis implicitly assumed that the archetypical sale
was, what he called, a “farmer’s transaction,”152 reflecting an
outdated, pre-modern, agricultural economy. In a farmer’s
contract, a sale is an event. The buyer transfers cash and
the seller transfers a good—a horse in Karl Llewellyn’s
continuing hypothetical—simultaneously. The sale would
classically take place at a market which would be held a few
times a year. The buyer would have the opportunity to literally look the horse in the mouth before the sale. The buyer
would then manifest his acceptance of the horse by tendering payment. Consequently, when the parties shook hands,
and the seller handed the reins to the buyer, the contract
was fully performed by both parties and the buyer could ride
off into the sunset on old Dobbin. The collapsing of all
contract into executed “farmer’s transaction” is the dream
that smart contract enthusiasts wish to replicate.
That is, in a farmer’s transaction, all incidence of a sale
occurs simultaneously so that there is no delay between the
time of contract creation and performance. There is no credit.
There is no need to transport the good. Consequently, there
is never any ambiguity as to who has title in the goods and
who has what rights in the goods. The seller has both the
fact and right of possession of the horse before, and the buyer
has them after, the handover. There is no question as to who
has risk of casualty loss. There is no question as to acceptance and rejection of the good because the buyer inspects
the good before, not after, delivery. There are no issues of
enforcement because the contract has been performed on
both sides (absent fraud).153 That is, the farmer’s transaction
(i.e. a cash sale) is indeed an executed contract.
In contrast, Llewellyn thought that the farmer’s paradigm
(sale as discrete event) was ill suited to what he thought the
152

Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 725, 727
(1939).
153

For example, there is always the possibility that old Dobbin was
stolen property. The basic Anglo-American rule is that a true owner can
replevy a good even from a good faith purchaser for value, in which case
buyer would be left only with an in personam claim against the seller.
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modern norm had become—a merchant’s transaction in
which the sale is a process that took place over time.154
Article 2 does make a cash sale the default rule that applies
absent agreement to the contrary,155 in the understanding
that merchants will almost always in fact agree otherwise as
a practical matter. That is, the cash sale is the empirical
exception, not the norm. Although Werbach and Cornell
argue that a smart contract tries to treat an executory sales
contract as though it were an executed on in that it makes
certain aspects of performance automatic at the time the
contract is entered into, the empirical and economic incidences of the contract continue to take place over time and
space—that is, they remain executory processes.
Once one internalizes that the archetypical merchant’s
transaction is a process that takes over time, then the location of title is revealed to be unhelpful in deciding the many
issues that can arise over the process. It is clear that the
seller had “title” before the sales process began, and the
buyer will have title when all aspects of the sale have been
consummated, including transit of the good, final payment
on credit, inspection, etc. But, between these two extremes
the totality of the benefits and costs of ownership is divided
between the two parties.
Consequently, Llewellyn argued that the law would be
simpler and clearer if it jettisoned most of title analysis (and
its agricultural imagery) and develop practical rules to deal
directly with recurring issues. This is why, famously U.C.C.
§ 2-401 provides that:
Each provision of this Article with regard to the rights, obligations and remedies of the seller, purchases or other third parties applies irrespective of title to the goods except where the
provision refers to such title. (emphasis added).

Following what Llewellyn thought were good practical
reasons, including the actual practices of merchants, many
Article 2 rules depend in part on the location of physical
custody. For example, U.C.C. § 2-401(2) continues:
154

Schroeder, Vestal, supra note 140, at 198–200; Llewellyn, supra
note 151, at 730–31; Karl N. Llewellyn, Cases and Materials on the Law
of Sales 220 (1930).
155

U.C.C. §§ 2-507(1), 511(1).
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Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at
the time and place at which the seller completed his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods, despite any reservation of a security interests . . .

To install a rule that registration of title on a ledger would
govern most property interest in goods would be to regress
back to the formalism of the common law that Karl Llewellen
and the other realists who drafted the UCC wanted to
supplant.
D. Intangibles
So far, I have concentrated on the sales of goods. However,
I agree with Fairfield that it is misleading to think of goods
as the archetypical object of property and contract law. If
Llewellyn’s modern mercantile paradigm replaced the common law’s pre-modern agricultural one, perhaps it is due to
be replaced by a truly post-modern digital one.
I do not speculate as to whether a blockchain would be a
technologically superior means for delivering digital content
than those currently available. However, it might be practical to create smart contracts for conveyancing electronic
content that can be entered into a blockchain. Freed from
the limitations of space that govern tangible property, the simultaneous exchange of value and intangible property online might be possible.
For example, Juliet Moringiello has suggested that the
blockchain could solve practical problems with security
interests in electronic chattel paper.156 Although, security
interests in chattel paper can be perfected by filing,157 security interests perfected by filing are traditionally subordinate to certain second-in-time security interests perfected by
possession. When Article 9 was amended to anticipate the
use of electronic chattel paper, this principle was expanded
156

Juliet Moringiello, Electronic Issues in Secured Financing, in
Research Handbook on Electronic Commerce Law 285, 293–95 (John A.
Rothchild, ed. 2016). Chattel paper is a record evidencing both a monetary
obligation and a property interest (such as a security interest or a
leasehold) in a specific good. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(11). A classic example would
be the interests that a financing car dealership has against its customers.
157

U.C.C. § 9-312(a).
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to second-in-time priority to perfection by control.158 However,
control of electronic chattel paper required “a system
employed for evidencing the transfer of interests in the chattel paper [that] reliably establishes the secured party as the
person to which the chattel paper has assigned,” a standard
that could be met if there were “a single authoritative copy
. . . which is unique, identifiable and [with certain exceptions] unalterable.”159 This, as Moringiello correctly notes,
“import[s] a paper-world concept . . . into a world in which
perfect copies could be made electronically.”160 In other words,
Article 9’s test was nonsensical at the time it was adopted.
However, blockchain technology, although not preventing
copies of a chattel paper contract to be printed out, would
make it possible to establish the type of ownership system
that Article 9 anticipated, retroactively importing sense into
the UCC.161 Chattel paper is a pretty narrow category, and I
would suggest, antiquated financial device. One can, however, imagine that in the future Article 9 could be amended
by permitting super-priority perfection by control of other
forms of electronic assets.
Fairfield argues that the blockchain could eliminate
certain other problems he sees with current contracts for
electronic content. For example, he bemoans the fact that a
reader is merely the licensee, not the owner, of her e-books.162
Infamously, because of copyright concerns, Amazon on at
least one occasion deleted e-books from customers’ devices
that they had naively thought they had purchased.163 He
ascribes this to failures of the current intellectual property
law regime. He suggests this could be solved through a
158

U.C.C. § 9-330(a), (b).

159

U.C.C. § 9-105.

160

Moringiello, supra note 155, at 293–94.

161

Moringiello, supra note 155, at 294.

162

Fairfield, supra note 71, at 839–40.

163

The customers were, of course, reimbursed. Brad Stone, Amazon
Erases Orwell Books From Kindle, The New York Times (7/18/2009), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18amaz
on.htm. The irony that the two books that were the subject of this
“Orwellian” action were George Orwell’s 1984 and Animal Farm was not
lost to commentators. Stone, Amazon, The New York Times (7/18/2009).
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blockchain property registry that could enable Amazon and
other merchants to sell and record the ownership right to
read a specific e-book to a specific buyer.164
Sense suggests, however, that the proper question is not
whether parties could enter into such smart contracts, but
whether they would have an economic incentive to do so. If a
customer’s insecurity in access to her reading material (or
music or video downloads) is really a problem, it is more one
of relative market power than of technology or law. Content
providers do not want to grant any greater rights in their
content to their customers than they have to. Today, with no
change in the law or the development of a blockchain
registration system, the owners of the content of e-books
could give their customers a close economic equivalent to
ownership by granting them perpetual, unconditional,
transferable, prepaid licenses.165 It would take a change in
the competitive environment, not technology or the law, for
them to decide to do so.166
An object lesson might be taken from the recent history of
recorded music. Until the turn of this century, music recordings were embodied in physical media—vinyl records, tapes,
and then CD’s—that were sold to users like books. The buyer
was merely the licensee of the content so she was not permitOf course, the fact that this event generated publicity suggests that
it is a very rare occurrence — the exception that proves the rule.
164

Fairfield, supra note 71, at 839–41.

165

It is true that under current law there are circumstances where a
perpetual license might not be equivalent to ownership.
166

One set of authors assert:

The main distinction between granting a license and performing a sale is the
actual and exclusive transfer of ownership of the copy of software. The problem
with intangibles such as software is that, as per current international conventions, intangibles cannot be possessed, and thus, ownership cannot be sold in
exchange for a price.

Greenbaum, Gelbart and Sheinberg, Digital Delivery of Physical Goods
Shipping in the 3D Printing Era-Problems and Solutions, 41 Tul. Mar.
L.J. 395, 412 (2017). Having specialized in technology transferring and
licensing when I was in practice, I cannot even begin to fathom what
these authors have in mind. Of course intangibles are sold and exchanged
in the ordinary course. It is true that they, by definition, cannot be physically possessed (which is how the UCC implicitly, and confusingly, defines
possession). But they can be possessed in the legal sense of being subject
to an enforceable right to exclude another’s use.
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ted to copy it. However, as she was the owner of the physical
record etc., under the first sale doctrine,167 she could transfer
the right to listen to the content by transferring or even
lending the record to another person.
In the 2000’s, led by iTunes, these media were largely, but
not entirely, supplanted by downloads. The issue of rights
vis a vis Apple and its customers with respect to music on
their iPods parallel those between Amazon and its customers
with respect to e-books on their Kindles—i.e. they were mere
licensees, not owners of the downloaded music.168 Currently,
downloading of music is being supplanted by streaming services, where the listener has even lesser rights in her music.
That is, rather than acquiring a permanent license in a song
downloaded to a specific device, a consumer acquires the
temporary right to listen to it on any device either by paying
a monthly fee or submitting herself to advertisements. In
other words, we seem to be moving further away from, not
closer to, the ownership of digital content.
There has been a similar movement away from “sales” to
subscriptions in the distribution of other intangibles such as
software.169 One of the practical issues of acquiring operating
systems and other software is keeping them updated, rendering previous releases obsolete. Apple, Google, etc. have
167

17 U.S.C.A. § 109.

168

In a reverse of the Amazon book deletion gaffe, Apple created a public relations debacle in 2014 when all iPhone owners found that a new
album by U2 (unofficially the most pretentious rock group of all time) had
been placed on their device. Moreover, it was initially impossible to delete
it without also removing the ability to download new purchases on ITunes.
After a week, Apple issued an apology and a custom deletion tool to
expunge the intrusion. Yijith Assar, Apple’s Devious U2 Album Giveaway
is Even Worse Than Spam, wired (9/16/2014), available at https://www.wir
ed.com/2014/09/apples-devious-u2-album-giveaway-even-worse-spam/.
169

Probably the example most familiar to consumers is video streaming services like Netflix which has largely supplanted the business of selling and renting DVD’s. See e.g. Tiffany Hsu, The World’s Last Blockbusters Has No Plans to Close, The New York Times (March 16, 2019),
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/06/business/last-blockbuste
r-store.html. Microsoft now offers its Office suite of software for both
personal and business as a software as services subscription (https://www.
office.com/). Apple’s music as a service subscription platform, Apple Music,
now supplements, but does not fully replace, its older iTunes music individual license purchase model. See Apple Previews macOS Catalina (June
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always permitted (or, forced) owners of phones and tablets to
download new releases of their operating systems for free.
More recently, rather than “selling” (i.e. granting a perpetual
license) new releases of software, software developers are
increasingly marketing month-to-month subscriptions, such
those offered to businesses by Salesforce170 and Adobe
Cloud, 171 that automatically include upgrades. In other
words, the market seems to be moving away from more permanent ownership type interests of end users, to more and
more short-term temporary licensing. Or, perhaps, more accurately, rights to software is moving away from an implicit
analogy of purchasing a good, to, in the current faddish
terminology, “X as a service.” 172 Once again, blockchain
technology might prove to be an efficient way of managing
subscriptions, but the technology alone is unlikely to drive
the business model.
Now I that I have allowed sense to criticize Fairfield, I will
indulge him with little sensibility. A well-known problem
with internet commerce is how to “monetize” content. For
most websites, the alternatives are either advertisements—
which consumers find annoying and try to avoid with
adblocking software—or monthly subscriptions. It is,
however, expensive to subscribe for premium services for
very many websites. It is likely that we are about to face a
similar issue with video streaming services. Multiple
“cafeteria-style” streaming services arguably give consumers
more choices, but the evolving market may at least in the
3, 2019), available at https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2019/06/apple-prev
iews-macos-catalina.
170

Salesforce Master Subscription Agreement, http://www.salesforce.co
m/assets/pdf/misc/salesforce_MSA.pdf.
171

Adobe Creative Cloud Pricing and Membership Plans, https://www.
adobe.com/creativecloud/plans.html. The large cloud computing services,
such as Amazon Web Services, help their customers to create and maintain
their businesses on a SaaS model. https://aws.amazon.com/partners/saas-o
n-aws/.
172

See Adam Rubin, The Subscription Economy (unpublished paper
2017 in possession with author). Indeed, some businesses are offering access to goods on a subscription basis. Tien Tzuo & Gabe Weisert,
Subscribed (2018).
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short to intermediate term become too expensive, with different services cannibalizing each other.173
This may be where cryptocurrency, blockchain technology
and, indeed, smart contracts may have a role to play. The
success of iTunes showed that consumers are willing to pay
for content if they believe that the price is fair. However, a
consumer may not be willing to pay for a monthly subscription for an entire magazine service when she only wants to
read one article on one day, to subscribe for premium
YouTube service when she only wants to watch one video or
to subscribe to be a patron to numerous Patreon creators
when she only wants to browse content. She might, however,
be willing to pay a fraction of a cent to do so.174
These micro-payments and licenses are impractically
expensive using conventional payment technology—the
interchange (colloquially the “swipe”) fee charged on a credit
or debit card would be greater than the charge itself. At
most, a payment system might be able to “run a tab” and
transfer value to the content provider when it cumulated
above an amount that would justify the fee.
As of the time I am writing this paper, bitcoin transactions
have become both slow and expensive. The one widely
publicized debut of a service to sell downloads through a
smart contract under which a customer would be able to
listen to a song in exchange for a micropayment, which the
contract would then automatically distribute to the talent
and the producer was hardly auspicious—grossing only
$133.20.175 However, it arguably showed that such arrangements might be technologically possible, if not yet practical.
It is widely assumed that blockchain technology will eventually be “scaled up” to make micro-transactions practicable. If
and when this happens, it does present the major changes in
173

For a discussion of the heated competition among video streaming
subscription services see Jonah Weiner, The Great Race to Rule Streaming TV, The New York Times Magazine (July 14, 2019), available at http
s://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/10/magazine/streaming-race-netflix-hbo-hul
u-amazon.html.
174

DeFilippi & Wright, supra note 2, at 76.

175

As blockchain skeptic Gerard notes, the venture “literally got more
press articles than sales” and was ended in 2016. Gerard, supra note 16,
at 130.
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electronic commerce, although sense reminds me that we
probably cannot predict what these might be.
IV. Smart Security Agreements
A. Repossession
Another of the proposed uses for smart contracts is selfenforcing security interests. Lee asserts:
This could easily be implemented with car purchases. A car
could contain code that is tied to the smart contract. If the
borrower becomes late on a car payment, the parties could
agree on a code that would forbid the keys from opening the
car until the default is cured. If it gets to the point where the
lender needs to repossess the car, the code could automatically
provide that the lenders keys could open the door in that
situation. Finally, when the final payment is made, the smart
contract could provide that the lender no longer has any legal
rights to the car, and the borrower has full rights.176 (emphasis
added)

Proponents of smart security agreements typically cite
with approval this legally dubious current practice of remote
shut-off switches in cars as a prototype for a self-enforcing
security interest.177 Unfortunately, sense shows that this
example reveals that the writers have a fundamental misunderstanding of both the law and practice of secured
transactions. Indeed, this example illustrates the impracticality of smart security agreements. As is the case of the
176

Lee, supra note 5, at 114.

177

See e.g. Raskin, supra note 1, at 319; Werbach & Cornell, supra
note 3 at 182; Lee, supra note 5, at 14; O’Shields, supra note 4, at 182;
Mik, supra note 14 at 10; Fenwick, et al, supra note 6, at 15. Werbach and
Cornell criticize Raskin’s analysis “The starter interrupter is a mechanism
introduced, after an agreement is reached, to enforce its terms; but, unlike
smart contracts, this mechanism has nothing to do with the substance of
the agreement. By contrast, a smart contract literally contains the terms
of the agreement, transformed into machine-readable scripting code.”
Werbach & Cornell, supra note 3, at 347. I think that this is an unfair
reading of Raskin.
Surprisingly, even Karen Levy, who in her excellent article
otherwise takes a skeptical view towards the possibility that most
contracts should or could be made self-executing in the way that
proponents suggest, cites automatic ignition shutoff as an (unfortunate)
exception. Levy, Book-Smart, Not Street-Smart: Blockchain-Based Smart
Contracts and The Workings of Law, 3 Engaging Sc., Tech., and Soc’y 1, 11
(2017).
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recurring example of the vending machine, it is extremely
misleading and has unfortunately distorted the discussion in
the literature.
First, to go back to Mik’s point, we must distinguish between performance, execution and enforcement of contracts.
To do this, we must understand the positive law of secured
lending, the remedies under Article 9 of the UCC and the
limitations imposed by bankruptcy law as well as the business considerations involved. We will see that it is probably
not possible—or desirable—to make most security interests
self-enforcing with two potential exceptions—a security
interest in a demand deposit and a security interest in
financial assets held in securities accounts.
Second, we must consider the business and economic reality of secured lending. Although there is no way to verify
this empirically, based on my experience, I believe that
secured parties would rarely want their security interests to
“enforce” themselves automatically. Interestingly, the most
important exceptions to this generalization are margin loans,
where the secured party’s discretion is limited by federal
regulation—is also one that can be made largely, if not
perfectly, self-enforcing.
The rub, however, is that these exceptions are precisely
those that are almost effortlessly enforceable by secured parties using current technology. Consequently, although
blockchain technology might make these transactions
slightly more efficient, it is unclear what, if any advantage, a
smart contract would have over current practice.
Let us look at the recurring example of automobile ignition cut-off devices.
Today some car financers install devices in motor vehicles
that enable a creditor or lessor to remotely disable it. As we
move into the “internet of things” presumably more and more
equipment (and consumer goods) will become susceptible to
remote disablement. Although not free from question in the
case of consumer transactions, this might be permissible
under the UCC with merchant debtors.
U.C.C. § 6-609 expressly provides for disablement in only
one circumstance:
(a) after default a secured party:
(1) may take possession of the collateral: and
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(2) without removal, may render equipment unusable
and dispose of collateral on a debtor’s premises under
Section 9-610. (emphasis added)
“Equipment” is defined in U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(33) as “goods
other than inventory, farm products, or consumer goods.” An
automobile or other motor vehicle held for business would be
equipment. However, if it is “used or bought for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes” it would be a
“consumer good” under U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(23), so the provisions expressly permitting rendering equipment unusable
would not apply. The question is whether the express reference to disablement in U.C.C. § 9-609(a)(2) should be read as
implying by negative pregnant that disablement is an
alternate to, rather than a type of, repossession permitted by
U.C.C. § 9-609(a)(1)? Alternately, should this provision be
read as merely clarifying that disablement is a permitted
form of repossession in the case of equipment, leaving the
question as to when it is appropriate for other categories of
goods to the courts?
Three states, California, Colorado and Connecticut have
adopted statutes authorizing, but limiting, remote disablement of cars.178 Moringiello notes that the Connecticut and
Colorado statutes, which are non-uniform amendments to
U.C.C. § 9-609, seem implicitly to adopt different interpretations of this provision. Connecticut, by expressly referring to
consumer-owned cars, without amending subsection (a)(2)
seems to assume that disablement is a form of repossession
under subsection (a)(1).179 Colorado, in contract, adds a new
subsection to UCC § 9-609 referring expressly to motor
vehicles suggesting that it believes that it is not a form of
repossession under subsection (a)(1).180
Moringiello further suggests that other states may or may
not allow disablement of consumer-owned cars under “general principles guiding the exercise of self-help
178

Cal. Civ. Code § 2983.37; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-9-609(e), (g); Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 42a-9-609(d). Moringiello, supra note 155, at 297–98.
179

Moringiello, supra note 155, at 298.

180

Moringiello, supra note 155, at 298–99.
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repossession.”181 If so, the issue would become if and when
disablement would constitute a prohibited breach of the
peace because of the possibility of injury (concerns of the
Colorado and Connecticut statutes).182 Although she seems to
conclude that, by analogy to caselaw in other contexts,
remote disablement of cars, at least on a public street, would
probably not be prohibited, this is less clear with respect to
the remote disablement of other smart consumer goods located within the home because the common law of self-help
has considered the home to be sacred.183 She notes that the
unloved proposed Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, which was only adopted by two states and is not
expected to be introduced into any others, banned remote
disablement of any software as self-help.184
Nevertheless, for the limited purposes of this paper, I will
assume that the courts would permit the remote disablement of automobiles that constitute consumer goods (as a
form of repossession) as well as equipment so long as some
obvious limitations for public safety (for example, one should
not be able to disable a car that is operating).
However, repossession (and disablement) is neither performance of the secured obligation nor is it the same thing as
enforcement of a security interest. First and foremost, one
must remember that an economically rational secured party
is not interested in enforcing its security interest, per se, let
alone in repossessing collateral. Rather it wants to receive
payments with respect to its secured obligation. The threat
of enforcement is, of course, one way of incentivizing an
obligor to pay.185 However, as discussed below,186 there may
be circumstances where the secured creditor may rationally
181

Moringiello, supra note 155, at 299.

182

Moringiello, supra note 155, at 298–302.
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Moringiello, supra note 155, 301–02.
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Moringiello, supra note 155, at 302–03.
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Under the idiosyncratic terminology of the most recent version of
Article 9, a “debtor” is defined not as the person owing a debt but as the
person who has “an interest, other than a security interest or other lien,
in the collateral, whether or not the person is the obligor.” U.C.C.
§ 102(a)(28).
186

See infra text at notes 241–46.
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decide that it would be less, not more, likely to be paid if it
enforces its security interest then if it allows the debtor to
use the collateral.
Raskin suggests an (I hope facetious) example of automatic
enforcement: “if an individual . . . were to install a device in
his brain that would cause crippling pain if . . . [he breached
a smart contract] there is a case that the contract is in a
stronger sense self-enforcing.” 187 Of course, this such a
contract would also be illegal, and would no doubt be void as
against public policy. Moreover, it is not really self-enforcing
in the sense usually meant in the smart contract literature
because it does not guarantee performance ex ante—i.e. it is
possible, albeit painful, for the debtor to breach. It is a threat
of punishment for non-performance that serves as a very
strong incentive for performance—rather like a loan shark’s
threat to knee cap a borrower that doesn’t make her vig.
But, we don’t need to rely on criminal law or a court’s ability to invoke public policy to test the limits of smart
contracting. U.C.C. Article 9, which governs all secured
transactions in personal property regardless of its form sets
forth an exclusive set of permissive remedies for nonperformance. Physical harassment is not one of them.
Consequently, smart security agreements would be limited
to the remedies and subject to the procedures set forth in
Article 9 Part 6. Moreover, in the not-unlikely case that a
defaulting debtor is also bankrupt, they are subject to the
Bankruptcy Code. As is also the case with Article 2 sales
law, Article 9 remedies are designed to be compensatory for
the non-breaching party not punitive for the breaching party.
In the case of a security interest that secures an obligation,
Part 6 of Article 9 only permits the secured party to use the
collateral in certain commercial reasonable ways in order to
raise money to pay the secured obligation.188
Although, under U.C.C. § 9-603, the debtor and secured
party may contractually agree to standards to govern their
behavior, they cannot be “manifestly unreasonable.” More187

Raskin, supra note 1, at 311.

188

In this section I am only discussing security interests that are assignments of collateral to secure the payment or performance of an obligation. See infra text at note 196.
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over, under U.C.C. § 9-602, some debtor rights and secured
party obligations—including those governing disposition—
cannot be waived. The disposition is subject to a number of
conditions, including notice to the debtor, secondary obligors
and junior secured creditors and lienees, and the right of
those parties to redeem the collateral.
The basic remedy for collateral that is a good, such as an
automobile, is not foreclosure but commercially reasonable
disposition under U.C.C. § 9-610—with foreclosure being a
preliminary step in this process. After disposition, the
secured party must account to the debtor for any surplus
remaining after application of foreclosure proceeds under
U.C.C. § 9-615, first, the expenses of collection (most
importantly legal and often a sheriff’s fees), second, satisfaction of the secured obligation and third, satisfaction of any
junior secured obligation or lien. Any leftover proceeds belong
to the debtor.
U.C.C. § 9-620 contemplates an alternate remedy of strict
foreclosure—the retention of the collateral as satisfaction or
all or part of the secured obligation. Strict foreclosure is,
unfortunately for the proponents of smart security agreements, disfavored and cannot be proposed to the debtor until
after default of the secured obligation. That is, it is permitted only as part of a negotiated settlement.
One reason for this should be obvious after a little thought.
An insolvent debtor may not care about maximizing the
value of his equity in the collateral because it will just go to
his other creditors. Consequently, he may be willing to agree
to walk away from the transaction. Junior secured creditors,
secondary obligors, lien creditors and unsecured creditors,
however, do want to maximize debtor equity, so we give the
debtor’s bankruptcy trustee the right to insist on a sale.
More importantly for the automobile example, U.C.C. § 9620(e) completely prohibits strict foreclosure of security
interests in consumer goods if
(1) 60 percent of the cash price has been paid in the case
of a purchase-money security interest . . .; or
(2) 60 percent of the secured obligation has been paid in
the case of a non-purchase security interest . . .
Another complication is that, even if the 60% limitation of
U.C.C. § 620(e) does not apply, U.C.C. § 620(a)(3) permits
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strict foreclosure of security interests in consumer goods
only if they are “not in the possession of the debtor when the
debtor consents to the acceptance.” As I have shown elsewhere,189 although the U.C.C. never defines the word “possession” if the over one hundred times it uses the word are
read in context it becomes apparent that it means not the
legal right of possession, or even practical control over an
object, but the empirical fact of physical possession in the
layperson’s understanding of the term. Consequently, a
secured party cannot strictly foreclose on a disabled automobile that is still within the consumer debtor’s possession, but
must hold a foreclosure sale.
In other words, repossession of tangible collateral is neither performance of the secured obligation not itself enforcement of a security interest—it is only a preliminary step
towards enforcement. It would be unlawful to have a debtor
enter into a “smart” security agreement that would allow the
secured party to disable the collateral and terminate the
debtor’s ownership interest—as Lee suggests—because a
debtor may not pre-commit itself to a strict foreclosure in a
security agreement.
It is not clear whether all of the steps for a commercially
reasonable sale of most collateral could effectively be
programmed into a smart security agreement given current
technology. As noted in the language quoted above,190 we currently have the technology that would give a secured party
the ability to unlock and drive a car away—indeed, if selfdriving cars actually become the norm, the car might be able
to drive itself to the secured party. But this is nothing new
in concept. The repo man has long been a fixture in American life. But, this is a feature that is probably unique to cars
and other motor vehicles.
Other forms of equipment that could be foreclosed through
disablement would not be so easily movable. Indeed, as Official Comment 6 to U.C.C. § 9-609(a)(2) notes, the very
justification of repossession through disablement is that “[i]n
the case of some collateral, such as heavy equipment, the
189

Schroeder, Bitcoin, supra note 81, at 23–27.

190

See supra text at note 175. Indeed, this is how car “sharing” services like Zipcar works.
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physical removal from the debtor’s plant and the storage of
the collateral pending disposition may be impractical or unduly expensive.” Moreover, one must remember that although a secured party may enter a debtor’s property to
repossess its property, in doing so, it cannot breach the peace.
This is why, as a practical matter, a secured party may need
to obtain the services of a sheriff to repossess or sell the
collateral.191
Let us look at the foreclosure sale procedures. Before a
sale, the secured part must give reasonable notice not only
to the debtor but to secondary obligors and certain other
secured parties and lien holders claiming an interest in the
collateral (U.C.C. § 9-611). If the collateral is of a type that
is perfected by filing, and assuming that the relevant state
has a computer searchable filing system,192 the contract could
consult an electronic oracle that would search the UCC filings to determine to whom other notices need be sent and
arrange to send the notice. However, this raises another
problem.
Currently, UCC filings are done on a state-by-state basis.
If the collateral is of a sort that can be perfected by filing,
the place for filing with respect to most types of collateral193
is the state of the debtor’s location. U.C.C. § 9-307 governs
the location of the debtor, which varies by the type of debtor.
The basic rules are that individuals are located at their
principle residence, registered organizations (i.e. corporations, limited liability companies, limited partnerships, etc.)
191

U.C.C. § 9-609(a)(2) expressly permits the disposal of disabled
equipment “on a debtor’s premises.” This is, however, subject to the general requirement of U.C.C. § 9-610(b) that “[e]very aspect of a disposition
of collateral, including the method, manner, time, place and other terms,
must be commercial reasonable.”
192

Under current practice, this will vary state by state. For example,
although one can do an on-line search in New York, the website contains a
disclaimer that it is maintained by a contractor and that, although the
data from the state, it does not constitute the official state record. New
York Department of State, Division of Corporations State Records & UCC,
available at https://appext20.dos.ny.gov/pls/ucc_public/web_search.main_fr
ame.
193

U.C.C. § 9-301(1). There are exceptions. For example, the law of filing for fixtures, timber and as-extracted collateral (i.e. minerals, oil, gas,
etc.) is governed by their physical location. U.C.C. § 9-301(c)(4).
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are located in their states of organization and other organizations (such as general partnerships) are located at their chief
executive office. What if the debtor changes location? If it
does so, the search of the debtor’s original location will not
be accurate. Moreover, change of location can cause the
perfection of the security interest to lapse. Although perfection is not necessary for the enforcement of an attached security interest outside of bankruptcy, an unperfected security interest will be subordinated to a rival perfected security
interest, and to other liens that attach after lapse
perfection.194 Moreover, an unperfected security interested
will fall to the strong arm power of Bankruptcy Act
§ 544(a)(1) should the debtor go bankrupt. In other words, at
the time the smart security agreement “automatically”
enforces the security interest, the secured party may not
have the legal right to do so. Under current practice there is
no way to completely automate this. At most, the debtor
might covenant to give the contract notice should it change
its location, but if it fails to do so, there is no way for the
contract to autonomously discover the correct location.
Of course, this problem would be obviated if the UCC were
to be amended to provide for a national filing system. This
will almost certainly not happen in the foreseeable future for
a very practical reason—state by state filing results in significant income from filing fees. I have suggested elsewhere195
that blockchain technology might, however, be able to
ameliorate this problem. Under the UCC there is no reason
why a state cannot delegate the task of maintaining its UCC
filings to a contractor and no legal reason why these files
could not be maintained on a blockchain. A single contractor
could, then, maintain the records for a consortium of states
(or, eventually, all states and other U.S. jurisdictions that
have adopted the UCC). The contractor could (perhaps
through a smart contract) collect the relevant filing fees and
remit them to the appropriate jurisdiction. This could enable
a single nationwide filing search. This would not eliminate
the problem of lapse of perfection upon change in jurisdic194

The priority rules for lapsed security interest vis a vis other security interests and liens that attached prior to the lapse are complex and
beyond the scope of this paper.
195

Schroeder, Bitcoin, supra note 81, at 46–47.
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tion (because a dishonest or negligent debtor might still fail
to inform the secured party or the contact of the change),
however, if a second-in-time third party were to file a financing statement in the new location, this would show up in the
search.
Nor would it work in the case of a security interest in an
automobile used by the debtor because perfection of motor
vehicles is not accomplished by filing a financing statement
with the a state’s UCC filings, but by complying with the
procedures of a state division of motor vehicles.196 Luckily, all
bankruptcy petitions can be located on-line through the U.S.
government PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records) system that an electronic oracle could search. Presumably, the contract would have to be programmed to not
commence a foreclosure sale if it discovered anomalous UCC
or bankruptcy filings.
Another factor that would prevent a completely automated
security agreement is that, under U.C.C. § 9-613 the notice
sent to the debtor and other parties must state the time and
place of the foreclosure sale. This information would have to
be entered into the contract after the loan is called and the
collateral repossessed. Although U.C.C. § 9-624 provides that
any of these parties can waive this notice, this can only be
done by an agreement entered into after a default in the
secured obligation. Consequently, it is not clear what
advantage a smart contract would have over conventional
contracts.
196

There are certain other types of collateral where perfection by filing
is not accomplished by centralized filings that are even more problematic.
For example, security interests in fixtures are filed in the place for the
registering of real estate interests where the building is located—a notoriously local and paper-based system. U.C.C. § 9-501(a)(1).
There are other exceptions U.C.C. § 9-109(c) proves that Article 9
does not apply to “to the extent that (1) a statute, regulation, or treaty of
the United States preempts this article” (emphasis added). Federal regulation provides that all property interests (including security interests and
leases) in airplanes and airplane engines must be recorded with the
Federal Aviation Administration. 14 C.F.R. Pt. 45, 47, 49. As the regulations do not set forth a substantive rule of security interests in aircraft,
the result is that Article 9 applies, but perfection is accomplished by filing
with the FAA. Schroeder & Carlson, Airplanes in Bankruptcy, 4 J. Bankr.
L. & Prac. 203 (1994).
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One more complication with the foreclosure of consumer
goods is that U.C.C. § 9-614 requires the notice to the debtor
include a telephone number that would enable her to receive
information concerning her right or redemption and a
telephone number or mailing addresses to enable her to
receive other information. Programming the contract to
include this information in the notice would presumably not
be problematic. But, the smart security agreement could not
perform the secured party’s duties completely autonomously
because this language, while it does not strictly mandate,
implies that the secured party must supply a human being
to communicate with the consumer-debtor.
Sensibility suggests that, although it is not the case now,
one can anticipate commercially reasonable electronic foreclosure auctions of collateral like motor vehicles could
develop in the not too distant future. Indeed, on-line auctions have become common in other contexts. Consequently,
after an oracle determines that the notice requirements of
Article 9 have been met and that a bankruptcy petition has
not been filed, the contract could automatically put a vehicle
up for sale in an on-line auction and transfer the ability to
drive the car to the highest bidder who would transfer value
to the smart contract (assuming that on-line auctions will
eventually be deemed commercially reasonable). If the collateral is a car or other motor vehicle that is subject to
registration there is, of course, the necessity that the secured
party be able to transfer title to the person who wins the
auction. The problem, of course, is that currently, title is
registered with the appropriate state division of motor
vehicles and security interests and other liens are noted on a
physical certificate of registration that would have to be
physically delivered to the buyer along with the necessary
documentation that would enable it to have the care reregistered in its name with prior liens expunged. Although
one might imagine that this system will eventually be
digitized, this is not yet the case. Consequently, this part of
foreclosure cannot yet be fully automated.
Once again, the contract would have to be a little more
complex in order to fully execute a foreclosure. Pursuant to
UCC § 9-623, any time prior to the disposition in the foreclosure sale, “(a) A debtor, any secondary obligor or another
secured party or lienholder may redeem the collateral” (b) by
338
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tendering “(1) fulfillment of all obligations secured by the
collateral; and (2) . . . reasonable expenses and attorney’s
fees . . .” A procedure could be no doubt programmed into
the contract that would stop the sale if one of the parties
were to exercise its right of redemption. However, under current law this procedure could not be entirely automated,
because, even though Official Comment 2 does clarify that
this tender requires “payment in full of all monetary obligations,” a secured party could not require that this tender be
made electronically in cybercurrency through the contract.
Consequently, human input such as oracle, or more likely, a
sheriff would be needed to handle the redemption.
Once the sale is consummated, presumably the sales
proceeds could be converted into cybercurrency that could be
deposited into the contract, upon which the contract could
automatically distribute the sales proceeds in accordance
with Article 9. According to U.C.C. § 9-615, proceeds must go
first towards the expenses of enforcement including sheriff’s
and attorney’s fees, payment the secured obligation, satisfactions of obligations secured by junior security interests and
liens and finally, if there is any balance, to the debtor. Although the amount of the secured obligation (including interest through the day of sale) could be calculated by the
contract itself, the amounts owed to the sheriff, the lawyer,
other secured parties, etc. would have to be calculated by a
third party oracle and entered into the contract at that time.
Once again, smart contracts might or might not make parts
of this procedure slightly more efficient but could not result
in a significant change in current practice. In fact, my sense
is that the use of a smart contract is likely to complicate,
rather than simplify, the procedure.
A final fly of in the ointment of sensibility, of course, is the
possibility that the debtor goes bankrupt. I will consider this
possibility and smart contracts shortly.
B. Accounts and Other Rights of Payment
Sense suggests that smart security agreements covering
collateral that consists of rights of payment may be able to
make enforcement somewhat more efficient, but would also
probably not be a game changer. In addition to assignments
for security for any type of right of payment, Article 9 also
governs the outright sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment
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intangibles (a subset of general intangibles) and promissory
notes. 197 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(3) defines the persons owing
money under accounts, chattel paper and general intangibles
(but not promissory notes) as “account debtors.” To oversimplify, there are two basic types of secured financing using
rights of payment (although hybrids combining aspects of
both are possible)—notification financing and nonnotification financing. Under notification financing, the
secured party notifies the account debtor of the security
interest and the account debtor pays its obligation directly to
the secured party. As its name suggests, in non-notification
financing, the account debtor is not so notified and makes
payments to its obligee (confusingly called the debtor).198
The secured party can initiate enforcement of nonnotification security interests by making them into notification security interests. That is, U.C.C. § 9-607 provides:
(a) . . . after default, a secured party:
(1) may notify an account debtor or other person obligated on collateral to make payment or otherwise render
performance to or for the benefit of the secured party;
Presumably, contact information for the account debtors
could be entered into the contract and, if the debtor failed to
make a timely payment, the contract could then automatically send out such notices. (I’m assuming here, that
electronic notice would eventually be considered commercially reasonable).
The smart security agreement could not, however, be
entirely autonomous. Security interests in accounts, general
intangibles and chattel paper are often made as part of a
revolving credit arrangement. That is, the secured party will
197

U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3). Note, sales of other certain other rights of payment, such as letter-of-credit rights are not governed by Article 9.
198

One of the most important differences between notification and
non-notification financing is that (unless the “account debtor has made an
enforceable agreement not to assert defenses or claims”) the assigneesecured party is subject to all defenses and claims in recoupment that the
account debtor may have against the debtor arising from the transaction
giving rise to the assigned transaction, but only subject to other defenses
that accrued before notification. U.C.C. § 9-404(a). In other words, account
debtors may setoff extra-contractual claims against non-notification
secured parties but not against notification secured parties.
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agree to advance funds to the debtor from time to time up to
a percentage of a borrowing base of qualified collateral. When
account debtors pay (or default on) their obligations so that
they are no longer outstanding or qualify for the borrowing
base, the debtor needs either to assign new collateral to the
secured party to replenish the borrowing base or pay down
the secured obligation in an amount to re-establish the
percentage. Consequently, a mechanism would be needed to
update the information programmed into the contract as the
identity of the account debtors change. Once again, the smart
security agreement could not be completely autonomous, but
would require periodic external intervention.
More importantly, just as repossession of goods is merely a
step towards the remedy of foreclosure, notification of account debtors is merely a step towards the remedy of collection of the assigned obligations. The contract itself could not
do this autonomously.
Like all other aspects of enforcement, collection by a
secured party is subject to the standard of commercially
reasonableness.199 I cannot imagine that any judge today
would find that it would be commercially reasonable to
demand that account parties pay their debts in cybercurrency to be deposited into the contract. Consequently, the
secured party would have to collect these debts by conventional non-smart procedures—such as ordering the account
debtors to wire funds to a deposit account maintained by the
secured party.
Assuming that, in some hypothetical future when mandatory payment in cybercurrency would be deemed reasonable,
then the contract could, presumably, be programmed to remit funds as required by Part 6. This would be relatively
simple if the transaction were an outright sale—all funds
received would be remitted to the secured party. 200 If,
however, “the security interest . . . secures payment or performance of an obligation” then the collection proceeds shall
be applied in accordance to the usual priorities, i.e. first to
the payment of collection expenses, second to the satisfaction
of the secured obligation and third to the satisfaction of
199

U.C.C. § 9-607(c)(1).

200

U.C.C. § 9-608(b).
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junior claimants with the debtor entitled to any surplus.201
This would raise the same issue of the mechanics of disbursement discussed above in connection with foreclosure sales.
Finally, one must consider the problem that, inevitably,
some account debtors will not pay the assigned obligation.
This could be because a account debtor asserts a defense or
claim in recoupment against the obligation or is insolvent or
otherwise. In any event, the secured party would have to
resort to the usual legal tools—negotiating, suing, obtaining
liens, filing claims in bankruptcy, etc.—to actually enforce
its interest.
C. Exceptions
So, if sense tells us that completely self-enforcing security
agreements even outside bankruptcy are not practical with
respect to most categories of collateral, our sensibility will be
gratified by at least two possible exceptions. These are security interests in deposit accounts, and margin loans secured
by indirectly-held investment securities. Indeed, a number of
companies are in the process of establishing on-line lending
platforms that would make the equivalent of margin loans
secured by cryptocurrency or other crypto-assets, rather than
conventional securities, pursuant to smart security
agreements. However, with respect to the first two types of
loans—current law and practice already allows for essentially automatic foreclosure. Consequently, sense suggests that “smart contracts” would at best add a marginal
improvement to practice—perhaps worthwhile, but not
revolutionary. Certainly, it would not supplant the role of
lawyers, who now draft the standard form contracts used by
banks and brokers. Indeed, all a smart contract would do is
to deprive the secured party of the discretion that it might
elect to exercise in certain cases.
1. Deposit Accounts. One of the most important categories of assets in our economy are deposit accounts, i.e. the
UCC’s term for checking and similar bank accounts.202 This
is the primary way that “money” and “cash” are held in our
201

U.C.C. § 9-608(a).

202

U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(29) defines a deposit account as “a demand, time,
savings, passbook, or similar bank maintained by a bank. The term does
not include investment property or accounts evidenced by an instrument.”
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economy. Consequently, as already mentioned,203 the UCC’s
implicit limitation of the defined term “money” to mean physical currency is very misleading.
One of the goals of blockchain enthusiasts is to minimize
the roles of third parties such as banks and brokers in the
payment and investment holding systems. Consequently, to
them, my discussion of deposit and securities accounts may
be only of interest in the short run, as they should be
expected to fade away in the long term. This is misguided.
If and when blockchain technology is able to be scaled up,
it could play an important role in payments and securities
holding. However, acting as intermediaries is only one of the
roles played by banks and brokers. The others include investments, lending and financial services. Individuals and businesses often do and want to hold cash. But, “cash,” once
again, should not be confused with money.
Blockchain enthusiasts assume that persons will hold cash
in the form of cybercurrency on blockchains. But, this would
be as foolish as to hide dollar bills under ones mattress.204
When one reads that companies like Apple own billions of
dollars in cash, this does not mean they have vaults filled
with greenbacks, or for that matter, deposits in non-interest
bearing accounts. Rather, it means that they hold these
funds in the form of highly liquid investments like moneymarket accounts (which is how I hold most of my “cash,”
other than the small amounts currency I carry around for
203

See supra notes 104–05.

204

If one holds bitcoin or another cybercurrency as an investment,
hoping that it will increase in value, then one is treating it, not as money,
but as a commodity, which is how the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the “CFTC”) analyses it. (See Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
P 34222 (E.D. N.Y. 2018), adhered to on denial of reconsideration, 321 F.
Supp. 3d 366, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) P 34289 (E.D. N.Y. 2018) upholding the CFTC’s position that virtual currency is a commodity for the
purposes of the Commodity Exchange Act).
Indeed, whether or not bitcoin falls with the definition of “money”
for one or another legal regime, one reason why bitcoin does not yet
functioned as “money” in the tri-partite economic sense of a unit of account, store of value, and means of exchange, is that its extreme volatility
vis a vis conventional currencies reflects the fact that it is held as a
speculative investment.
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buying groceries and other small purchases). Although the
interest paid on these funds is small, any return is better
than no return.
Moreover, banks and other financial institutions are not
merely places to deposit one’s “cash,” they are sources of
financing. And, deposit and similar accounts often serve as
collateral for loans.
The law with respect to security interests in deposit accounts reflects two basic principles. First, original, firstgeneration security interests in deposit accounts can only be
perfected by “control”—a defined term that roughly means
the ability to direct withdrawals from the account over the
debtor’s objection.205 Second, pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-327,
priority disputes are, in most cases, to be determined not by
the temporal “first-to-file-or-perfect” rule that governs most
other categories of collateral.206 Rather, priority is determined
primarily by the identity of the secured party and the mode
of perfection. Although the details of the perfection regime is
beyond the scope of this paper, as a practical matter this
means a secured party that is the bank at which the deposit
account is maintained will prevail over other secured parties, unless the bank authenticates a subordination agreement to the contrary.207
A security interest granted by a debtor in the deposit account it maintains with a secured party that is also its bank
could easily be made largely if not entirely self-enforcing,
since a deposit account is itself an electronic record of a debt.
However, it is not clear what, if any, benefit a smart contract
205

U.C.C. § 9-312(b)(1). This is to be contrasted to second-generation
security interests in cash proceeds in the form of deposit accounts which
can be perfected by other means. U.C.C. § 9-315(d)(2).
206

U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1).

207

U.C.C. § 9-327(3). An alternate way a secured party could obtain
priority over the bank is to cause the debtor to transfer the account into
the secured party’s name so that it is substituted for the debtor as the
bank’s customer. U.C.C. § 9-327(4). For a discussion of the priorities in deposit account, see David Gray Carlson & Jeanne L. Schroeder, Three
Against Two: On the Difference Between Property and Contract in the
Context of Bank Accounts, Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal
(forthcoming 2019). U.C.C. § 9-339 permits a secured party to contractually subordinate its priority.
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would have over current practice. Indeed, it would have the
disadvantage of hindering the secured party of exercising
discretion in the perhaps rare times when they would choose
to forebear rather than foreclose.
To understand this, it helps to take a brief detour into the
law and practice of deposit accounts because it is antiintuitive and the terminology of banking is archaic and
misleading. Indeed, despite the fact that deposit accounts
are involved in almost every bankruptcy, courts evince confusion as to the basic mechanics.
When a customer “deposits” money “into” a deposit account, it is doing no such thing insofar this language implies
that she retains a property interest in the deposited funds
and that there is some sort of custodial or fiduciary relation
between customer and bank. Rather, the customer is making
a demand loan to the bank, i.e. the customer loses all property interest in the funds transferred to the bank.208 The relationship between the customer and the bank is purely
contractual in nature, governed by the checking account
agreement that includes and is subject to the provisions of
UCC Article 4 as well as state and federal banking law and
regulation.209
It is easy to understand how a third party could take a security interest in the depositary bank’s obligation to repay
the customer—this is conceptually the same as taking a security interest in any other obligation owed to the debtor,
such as an “account.”210 It might seem peculiar that a bank
could take a security interest in its own obligation to its
208

U.C.C. § 9-327(3).

209

Traditionally, the customer makes its demand to be repaid by use of
a check which is an order to the bank to pay funds to a named payee.
Demands are increasingly made via debit card or ACH instruction, in the
case of consumers, and wire transfers, in the case of businesses.
210

U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) includes in the definition of an account a
number of rights of payment including, but not limited to what are generally known as accounts receivable, i.e. money owed for goods sold or services rendered. Assume that a X has sold goods to Y on credit. Y’s obligation to X would be an account. Vis a vis this two-party relationship
between X and Y, this is a purely contractual relationship. Assume that X
needs financing and approaches bank, B. X could either borrow from and
assign its rights against Y to secure its obligation to repay the loan. Or, X
could sell all of this interest to B. Either way, in this three-person uni-
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customer. Indeed, prior to the 2000 amendments, one occasionally found statements to the effect that it was logically
impossible.211 Nevertheless, Article 9 now not only recognizes
such security interests, it provides, as just stated, that such
a security interest claimed by the bank at which the deposit
account is maintained usually has priority over security
interests claimed by other secured parties. I have shown
elsewhere how such security interests are, in fact, conceptually coherent and distinguishable from a bank’s right of set
off.212 This is beyond the scope of this paper.
The primary reason why such a security interest can easily be made self-executing is that the remedy for default on a
bank’s security interest in its own obligation under a deposit
account is, effectively, setoff. That is, suppose the debtor has
granted the bank a security interest in its deposit account to
the depositary bank. That debtor owes bank $100 and there
is $80 “in” the deposit account maintained with that bank
(i.e. technically, the bank owes the debtor $80). When payment is due, pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-607(a)(4) the bank can
net the $80 it owes to the customer against the $100 the
customer owes to the bank, so that the customer now owes
the bank only $20.213
Interestingly, as I have shown elsewhere,214 this means
that, when the bank “takes” the funds in the deposit account
pursuant to this provision, the secured party/bank is techniverse of X, Y and B, the account is now collateral with the status of property (i.e. UCC § 9-102(a)(12)) defines collateral as “the property subject to
a security interest” B’s property interest in the account is an Article 9 security interest (U.C.C. §§ 1-201(a)(35), 9-109(a)(1), (3)).
211

Carlson & Schroeder, supra note 206.

212

I explain why it is, in fact, logically coherent for a bank to have a
security interest in its own debt in Carlson & Schroeder, supra note 206.
213

U.C.C. § 9-607 provides:

(a) If so agreed, and in any event after default, a secured party:

. . .
(4) if it holds a security interest in a deposit account perfected by control
under Section 9-104(a)(1) [i.e. the provision that governs control by a secured
party which is the bank with the deposit account is maintained], may apply
the balance of the deposit account to the obligation secured by the deposit account;
214

Carlson & Schroeder, supra note 206.
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cally “foreclosing” its security interest under U.C.C. § 9607—i.e. from a technical legal matter, it is not that the
debtor is performing or paying its secured obligation. Rather,
the secured party is enforcing its remedy.
Consider a simple revolving credit facility secured by a security interest in a deposit account. Assume that a customer
may borrow from a bank an amount up to 80% of its balance
in a deposit account maintained with that bank in which the
bank has a security interest, i.e. if the base is $100, the
debtor may borrow $80. If the base goes down to $90 because
of withdrawals from the deposit account, the borrower must
repay $8 in order to reestablish the 80% borrowing base.
Now it is possible, that this transaction could be made
automatic through a smart contract. However, when the
secured party is the bank at which the deposit account is
maintained, there is no particular advantage of using a
smart contract—the bank can automatically program its
computer to set off the bank account whenever it dips below
a certain dollar amount of percentage of a borrowing base,
Indeed, a common provision in these transactions is a
periodic automatic, “sweep” of the account.
A smart contract, however, may be a possibly more convenient device if the secured party is not the bank at which the
deposit account is maintained. As mentioned, the only way
to perfect a first-generation security interest in a deposit account is through control.215 The typical way a security party
that is not the bank at which the deposit account is maintained obtains control is under U.C.C. § 9-104(a)(2) by having “the debtor, secured party, and bank . . . agree[] in an
authenticated record that the bank will comply with instructions originated by the secured party directing disposition of
the funds in the deposit account without further consent by
the debtor.” Assuming arguendo that an electronic “smart
contract” can constitute “an authenticated record” (which is
almost certainly the case), it is simple to imagine how a
smart contract could be programmed to instruct the bank to
automatically transfer money out of the debtor’s account and
into an account maintained by the secured party at the same
bank upon pre-programmed instructions—such as a periodic
sweep.
215

U.C.C. § 9-312(b)(1).
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An example of how this can work can be seen in the case
of Garner v. Knoll, Inc. (In re Tusa-Expo Holdings, Inc.)216 Although the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals analysis of this
complex case is confused, it illustrates how a secured arrangement that could be made “smart.” In this case, a
secured party that was not a bank had a security interest in
a debtor’s deposit account maintained at a bank. The secured
party had “control” over the deposit accounts pursuant to a
U.C.C. § 9-104(a)(2) three-party control agreement. Pursuant to this arrangement, the debtor would make deposits
into the deposit account from time to time. The bank was
instructed by the secured party to “sweep” the deposit account at the end of every business day and pay the money to
the secured party as partial payment of the balance of the
outstanding secured obligation.217 That is, the bank would
debit the debtor’s deposit account by an amount equal to its
entire balance, and credit that amount to a deposit account
the secured party maintained at the same bank. The secured
party would, then, automatically apply these funds towards
the debtor’s secured obligation.
That is the secured party would consensually foreclose on
its security interest in the deposit account under U.C.C. § 9607 that reads:
(a) If so agreed, and in any event after default, a secured party:

. . .
(5) if it holds a security interest in a deposit account perfect
by control under section 9-104(a)(2) . . ., may instruct the
bank to pay the balance of the deposit account to or for the
benefit of the secured party.

Since this arrangement was already “automatic” (i.e. the
depositary bank had standing instructions to make the
sweep every business day), there is no reason why it could
not be completely automated—with the program irrevocably
instructed to “sweep” the deposit account every day. Indeed,
in a totally “smart” world, we could conceivably remove the
216

In re Tusa-Expo Holdings, Inc., 811 F.3d 786, 62 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
(CRR) 24, 74 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1743, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P
82917, 88 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 990 (5th Cir. 2016). I analyze this case and
the 5th Circuit’s opinion in Carlson & Schroeder, supra note 206.
217

811 F.3d. At 789–90.
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depositary bank entirely from the transaction. Rather than
making occasional deposits in dollars into a deposit account,
the debtor would post cybercurrency to the smart contract
which would, in turn, transfer these payments to the secured
party on a daily basis.218 This would do away with the bank
entirely.
Why then maintain the traditional transaction pattern at
all? The first is my point about the time-value of money. This
fact pattern was unusual in that the debtor’s deposit account
was swept on a daily basis. In my experience, it is more common for sweeps to be done periodically, such as weekly or
monthly so that the debtor could earn interest on its account.
Also, it is not unusual for the debtor to retain the right to
continue to use the deposit account in the ordinary course
pending default and to make withdrawals so long as a minimum balance is maintained.
The second is that, under Article 9 as it currently exists,
security interests in cybercurrency are problematic. As already mentioned,219 cybercurrency does not fall within the
definitions of money or deposit account—it is a general
intangible. This makes is unsuitable to serve as collateral if
it is held directly (i.e. rather than indirectly through an
intermediary). Moreover, in contrast to non-colluding
transferees of physical money and funds held in a deposit account, even good faith purchasers for value of general
intangibles take subject to security interests.220
This means that, once cybercurrency is subject to a security interest, it remains so subject until the secured obligation is completely satisfied (and the secured party has no
commitment to make future loans) or the secured party
releases the interest. This makes cybercurrency a very unattractive vehicle for the holding and transferring of value
because—unlike money and checks—the transferee can
never be sure of receiving clear title.
218

Actually, the facts are somewhat more complex. The debtor’s account debtors (i.e. third parties who owed money to the debtor for goods
sold or services rendered), were instructed to pay their accounts via wire
transfers directly into the deposit account in which the secured party had
a security interest.
219

See supra text at note 104.

220

See supra text at notes 105.
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As I have shown elsewhere, currently, the only way to
escape this trap, is for the debtor to agree to hold its
cybercurrency indirectly through a “securities intermediary,”221 in which case it can elect to have it treated as a
“financial asset” under Article 8.222
My conversations with certain attorneys for lenders who
are planning to take cybercurrency as collateral indicates
that they agree with my analysis and insist on debtors
transferring the cybercurrency to banks or brokers as securities intermediaries. Of course, once one reintroduces an
intermediary into the transaction, we are back in the
traditional forms and we have destroyed one of the supposed
advantages of cybercurrency—the elimination of
intermediaries.
2. Margin Loans. Investment securities have traditionally been used as collateral. One common form of these are
“margin loans” made by brokers and banks to their
customers. These are loans made for purchasing and carrying securities,223 secured by margin securities. Margin loans
by brokers, banks and other financial institutions are heavily regulated, so there is little room for discretion in
enforcement. Consequently, these loans, are likely candidates
for automation as smart contracts.
We need to take a brief tour of Article 8 of the UCC which
221

Schroeder, Bitcoin, supra note 81, at 47–48. U.C.C. § 8-102(b)(14)
provides that:
“securities intermediary” means:
(i) a clearing corporation; or
(ii) a person, including a bank or broker, that in the ordinary course of its
business maintains securities accounts for others and is acting in that
capacity.
222

U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(9) includes within the defined term “financial
asset”:
(iii) any property that is held by a securities intermediary for another person in
a securities account if the securities intermediary has expressly agreed with
the other person that the property is to be treated as a financial asset under
this Article.
223

Federal Reserve Regulations T (12 C.F.R. § 220) and U (12 C.F.R.
§ 221) regulate margin credit extended by broker-dealers and by banks
(and other non-broker-dealer lenders), respectively.

350

© 2020 Thomson Reuters E UCC Law Journal E Vol. 49May 2020

SENSE, SENSIBILITY AND SMART CONTRACTS: A VIEW FROM A CONTRACT LAWYER
governs the conveyancing of investment securities. Most
investment securities, whether in certificated or uncertificated form, are not held directly by investors. They are held
indirectly as book entries in securities accounts on ledgers
maintained by brokers, banks and other third-parties which
Article 8 calls “securities intermediates.”224 Indeed, securities
intermediaries often do not own securities directly either,
holding them indirectly through DTCC—a company formed
and owned by the brokers and banks for which it performs
securities holding and clearing services. A large percentage
of all publicly traded securities are held directly by its subsidiary, the Depository Trust Corporation through its
nominee CEDE & Co.225 This means that the ultimate investor having the economic interest and right to vote the security is typically not the record owner on the books of the issuer of the securities, and, therefore, has no direct right vis
a vis the issuer to vote or receive distributions with respect
to those securities. Within the language of Article 8, such
indirectly owned investments are not “securities” at all—a
term limited to investments held directly by record owners—
but “securities entitlements”226 with respect to “financial asset”227 held in a “securities account”228 maintained with a “securities intermediary.”229
The investor is called a beneficial owner under federal se224

U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(14).

225

The Depositary Trust and Clearing Corporation, Disclosure
Framework for Covered Clearing Agencies and Financial Market
Infrastructures 9–10 (December 2017).
226

U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(17).

227

U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(9).

228

U.C.C. § 8-501(a).

229

U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(14). Making one’s way through Article 8’s arcane
vocabulary can be daunting for the neophyte. The definition of security in
UCC § 8-102(a)(15) does not specifically refer to direct holding. However,
U.C.C. § 8-301 provides that a security can only be delivered if the
purchaser (or someone, other than a securities intermediary, acting on her
behalf) takes possession of a certificated security, if a certificated security
is registered or endorsed in the name of the purchaser (or someone, other
than a securities intermediary, acting on her behalf), or if an uncertificated
security is registered on the issuer’s books in the name of the purchaser
(or someone, other than a securities intermediary, acting on her behalf).
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curities laws230 and an “entitlement holder” under U.C.C.
§ 8-102(a)(7). A securities entitlement is a sui generis legal
interest defined purely functionally as “the rights and property interests of an entitlement holder with respect to a
financial asset specified in Part 5.”231 For most purposes,
however, a securities entitlement with respect to a specific
security held by a securities intermediary is economically
equivalent to direct ownership because, pursuant to Article 8
Part 5 and the federal securities laws, the securities
intermediary who is the record owner of the underlying security must pass all rights it has against the issuer down to
the entitlement holder. For example, when an issuer pays a
dividend on its common stock owned by a securities intermediary, the securities intermediary must pay the amount it
receives pro rata to its entitlement holders who have a securities entitlement with respect to that stock.232
It is common for securities intermediaries to make loans
to their customers secured by the securities entitlements
maintained with them in securities accounts. Federal
Reserve Bank Regulation T233 governs margin loans—i.e.
loans for the purchase or carrying of margin stock—made by
broker/dealers and Regulation U234 governs margin loans by
banks and certain other lenders. The regulations provide
margin borrower must always maintain a margin over the
loan balance and the value of eligible securities in the
portfolio securing the loan—hence their name. For over 40
years, the margin has been two-to-one for eligible securities235—that is, for every $1 in loans, there must be at least
$2 in qualified collateral.
Obviously, the value of investment securities fluctuates
over the trading day. To simplify, if the aggregate value of
the collateral dips below the margin, the lender must make
Acquisition and transfer of securities entitlements, in contrast, are
governed by Article 8 Part 5.
230

See e.g. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3.

231

U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(17).

232

U.C.C. § 8-505.

233

12 C.F.R. § 220.

234

12 C.F.R. § 221.

235

https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/regucg.htm.
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a “margin call.” That is, it must give a notice to the customer
informing her that she must either pay down the loan or
post additional collateral to restore the margin. If the debtor
does not do so, the securities intermediary is required to
liquidate a portion of the collateral to pay down the loan in
an amount that will re-establish the margin.
As this system has already been largely computerized, it is
not a stretch to think that it could be made completely so. As
we have seen in our discussion of other contracts, smart
margin contracts cannot be made completely autonomous in
that the valuation of collateral must be made by reference to
external factors. However, as least in the retail investor
context, these valuations can be based on publicly available
databases that a mechanized oracle could access.
The contract could then automatically send the debtor a
margin call. If the debtor neither pays down the debt nor
posts additional collateral in amounts to re-establish to
margin within a specified time, the contract would then commence the process to sell collateral. Although the exact
details of such a procedure would have to worked out, under
existing technology, much of the sale process could probably
be automated.
In the last year, I have spoken to a number of attorneys
and promoters who are in the process of trying to set up
lending facilities that would take bitcoin, and perhaps in the
future, other cyberproperty, as collateral. Because these assets do not fall within the definition of “margin securities,”236
technically these facilities would not seem to fall within
existing regulations. However, some are looking at traditional
margin facilities as a possible template.237 Some are also using my Article 8 structure—requiring lenders to hold their
236

Basically, margin stock is defined as publicly traded equity securities, securities convertible into and options to acquire such securities, and
securities issued by certain investment companies. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.2,
221.2.
237

See for example the margin-lending facility offered by SALT, http
s://saltlending.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/sections/115002568828-Collateral-Ma
rgin. On the other hand, one potential lender I have spoken with hopes to
avoid the margin-loan approach and, instead, protect itself from the
extreme volatility of the price of cybecurrency through a proprietary hedging technique.
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cybercurrency indirectly through securities intermediaries
so that they can be treated as financial assets. Because all
aspects of these transactions would be electronic, these
promoters believe that all, or substantially all, of the functions can be automated onto smart contracts.
D. The Automatic Stay
As Raskin has noted,238 one potential fly in the ointment
for smart security agreements is the automatic stay of Bankruptcy Act § 362(a). If a debtor were to become subject of a
bankruptcy proceeding then the debtor’s creditors are stayed
from taking any act to enforce their claims outside of the
proceedings. Among the acts stayed are:
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of
property from the estate or to exercise control over property of
the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the
debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim
that arose before the commencement of the case under this
title;

Once the stay is in effect, a secured party cannot enforce
its security interest without first petitioning the bankruptcy
court to lift it. This means that no security agreement with
respect to most types of collateral,239 no matter how smart,
could be entirely self-performing because of the possibility
that the debtor could go bankrupt. If the security party attempts to enforce the security agreement after bankruptcy,
such actions are void.
Raskin suggests that one way to deal with this is to have
the contract consult an oracle to search public filings (such
as PACER) to see if a petition has been filed with respect to
a debtor before commencing repossession. Once again,
Raskin tries to illustrate this with the example of automatic
238

Raskin, supra note 1, at 322.

239

There are numerous exceptions to the automatic stay, including for
settlements of securities contracts, commodities contracts, repos, swaps
and certain other financial contract by brokers and certain other financial
institution. The workings of these exceptions are beyond the scope of this
paper.
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ignition shutoff on a car which would become inoperative if a
petition is filed—i.e. the ability to shut-off would be shutoff.240
This, alone, would not be sufficient. To recap, although
disablement may be an alternate to physical repossession of
collateral, repossession is ordinarily not the secured party’s
Article 9 remedy. The normal remedy is commercially reasonable sale of the collateral and repossession is just (usually) necessary step in accomplishing this. Even if the
secured party were to disable the collateral before the filing
of the petition, any additional action it took after the filing—including taking physical possession of the disabled
car, let alone disposing of it, would violate the automatic
stay. Consequently, in the case of car loans, when a debtor
files for bankruptcy between the time of repossession and
the time of the foreclosure sale, upon the debtor’s request,
the current practice is for the secured creditor to redeliver
the car back to the debtor.241 Similarly, because continued
disability of the car would probably be an impermissible
exercise of control over the collateral, the smart contract
would have to be programmed to end the ignition cutoff and
allow the debtor to drive the car.
The automatic stay illustrates how smart contracts cannot
supplant the legal system. Once a bankruptcy petition is
filed with respect to a debtor secured creditor must file a
claim in the bankruptcy proceeding and, if it wishes to foreclose on its security interest, petition the judge to lift the
automatic stay—acts that require appearance by the secured
party in court.
240

Raskin states:

A bankruptcy court in Arkansas ruled that the installation of a starter interrupter, while not per se illegal, violated the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay
because it prevented the debtor from the normal use of her car. The court
noted that the creditor could have remedied the situation by “taking action to
ensure that Debtor had the correct code to operate her car each month, such as
by mailing the correct code to Debtor each month.” A line of code written that
would honor a court’s grant of an automatic stay motion by allowing the car to
operate is another potential remedy. The automatic stay, like the prohibition
on selling alcohol to minors, acts as an external condition that the smart
contract must incorporate into its terms if it is to comply with the law.

Raskin, supra note 1, at 332 (citations deleted).
241

See In re Weber, 719 F.3d 72, 69 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1168,
Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P 82484 (2d Cir. 2013).
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E. Discretion
In addition to my initial economic concern about tying up
capital, and the legal concern of the automatic stay, the biggest pragmatic roadblock to the wide use of smart selfenforcing security agreements may be that secured parties
and other creditors can be expected to want to maintain the
ability to exercise discretion concerning if, when, and how to
enforce their claims. Although, here I concentrate on security agreements, my concern about discretion can be generalized to other types of contacts.
First and foremost, secured parties do not want to foreclose on their security interests per se. They want their
secured obligation to be paid or otherwise performed. Foreclosure of a security interest is at best an imperfect means to
that end. As anyone who has represented creditors knows,
sometimes whether to foreclose or forebear upon default can
be one of the most difficult decision a creditor can face.
Indeed, enforcement of security interest is often a last
resort.242 As Karen Levy says with respect to the enforcement of contracts generally, “Strategic non enforcement—
may serve social and strategic—one bargains in the shadow
of law—this is not merely because of the high costs of going
to court avoid the “all or nothing” consequences of litigation—threat of litigation may encourage bargaining.”
The layperson’s intuition that creditors “own” their debtors is an incorrect extrapolation from their individual experience, or fears, as a consumer. In the world of finance,
however, it is often the debtor who “owns” the creditor. In
the immortal words of J. Paul Getty, “If you owe the bank
$100 that’s your problem. If you owe the bank $100 million,
that’s the bank’s problem.”243
There are a number of reasons why a secured party might
choose to forbear upon default. First, a secured party may
242

Levy, supra note 176, at 9. She, accurately in my opinion, asserts

[C]ontractual obligations are enforced through all kinds of social mechanisms
other than the legal system proper; concomitantly, contracts serve many functions that are not explicitly legal in nature, or even designed to be formally
enforced. This insight is important for understanding the real-life effects of
automated contracts.

Levy, supra note 176, at 4.
243

https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/j_paul_getty_129274.
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decide that there is a chance that it is will be able to raise
more money in the future by not foreclosing. Think of the
simple auto loan—the recurring and misleading example of
the smart security agreement in the literature. The resale
price of a used automobile is relatively low. If a secured creditor repossesses (or disables) the debtor’s car, it might negatively affect the debtor’s ability to work and earn money to
pay back the loan. A bank may decide that the present value
of its collection is likely to be greater if, rather than foreclosing and selling its collateral, it refinances and continues to
collect an income stream of perhaps smaller payments over a
longer period of time.
Even in the case where a bank has a security interest in a
deposit account that the debtor maintains with it—an arrangement that I have argued could be susceptible to be
automated in a smart contract—a bank may not want to do
so. Unless the balance of the deposit account is significantly
greater than the outstanding secured obligation, the bank
might rationally decide that forbearance might make it is
more likely to get paid.
The case of Myers v. Christensen244 illustrates why a depositary bank might not want its security interest in a bank
account to be automatically enforcing. In this case, a bank
continued to allow a debtor to make withdrawals from a deposit account in which it had a security interest after default.
The Nebraska Supreme Court noted that, in doing so, the
bank was making a conscious decision that its best chance to
receive payment in full would be for the debtor to succeed in
its business. This would require that it be able to make
withdrawals from its deposit account to pay expenses.245 The
bank’s gamble in this case did not pay off and the debtor
eventually went out of business, but this does not mean the
bank’s decision was not rational at the time it was made.246
This leads to the second, but closely related point. When a
244

Myers v. Christensen, 278 Neb. 989, 776 N.W.2d 201, 70 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 2d 577 (2009).
245

776 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Neb. 2009).

246

In this case, a second-in-time lien creditor argued that, by allowing
the withdrawals, the bank had waived its security interest. Although a
lower court found for the lien creditor, the Supreme Court correctly over-
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debtor defaults on its security interest, the universe in which
the secured party is located is no longer the two-party world
of borrower and lender, but the three party one of borrower,
lender and other creditors. If a debtor has defaulted on one
debt, it is likely to be on the brink of insolvency, if not actually insolvent. If the secured creditor seeks to enforce its security interest, it might cause of other creditors to seek to
enforce their interests. Indeed, many loan facilities have
cross-default clauses such that the secured party’s action
might automatically cause defaults under other debts causing other creditors to accelerate their debts.
In either such event, foreclosure is likely to cause the
debtor or its other creditors to file a bankruptcy petition to
impose the automatic stay. In bankruptcy, although the
secured party is entitled to the value of its collateral as of
the petition date, this does not mean that it will be made
whole. Under the rule of United Sav. v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest,247 only oversecured creditors can collect interest during the bankruptcy, and then only up to the amount of their
surplus. Undersecured creditors are not entitled to postpetition interest. Obviously, given the time-value of money,
every day without interest is an economic loss to the creditor.
Given the considerable amount of time that can pass between the filing of a petition and either the lifting of the
automatic stay or distribution of assets in a bankruptcy, it
can be economically rational for the secured creditor to try to
work things out and even renegotiate the terms of the
secured loan rather than taking enforcement action.
V. Ambiguity and Natural Language
A. The Necessity of “Natural Language”
Proponents of smart contracts explicitly or implicitly assume that ambiguity of contractual language is a significant
problem in contract performance and enforcement. They also
believe that ambiguity is a regrettable flaw of natural
ruled it. Myers, 776 N.W.2d at 205. See Carlson & Schroeder, supra note
206.
247

United Sav. Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates,
Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 108 S. Ct. 626, 98 L. Ed. 2d 740, 16 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
(CRR) 1369, 17 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1368, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P
72113 (1988).
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language. Consequently, they argue that a primary advantage of smart contracts is that the use of code will enable us
to eliminate ambiguity. In Raskin’s words:
When lawyers or the programmers they hire write contracts in
code, there is less of a chance for ambiguity than in natural
language if only for the simple fact that artificial language
must be complete and predefined, whereas natural language is
infinite. That is to say a person can walk around and verbally
recite lines of code and people can at least understand what he
is saying; a machine cannot understand human language that
it is not programmed to understand. All of this is simply to
say that the problem of ambiguity is reduced in the smart
contract context.248

DeFilippi and Wright state:
Like other software, smart contracts also provide comparable
advantages when it comes to clarity, precision, and modularity.
Despite best intentions, legal contracts routinely suffer from
poor drafting. Inconsistent terms creep into complex agreements — especially those drafted under tight timetables —
clouding the parties’ actual intent. (emphasis added)249

Sense tells me that this is incorrect both empirically and
logically. First, it is unclear whether ambiguity is a material
problem in contract performance at all, let alone one that
can be “cured” through the use of smart contracts. In the
United States mot contracts are performed in the ordinary
course—breach is the empirical exception. If this were not
the case, our market economy would not function.
248

Raskin, supra note 1, at 325.

249

DeFilippi & Wright, supra note 2, at 81 (citations omitted). They
then cite “Allan Farnsworth — one of the most renowned legal scholars on
contracts” for the proposition that probably every lawyer will agree with
that the canons of interpretations are often retroactive “rationalizations”
for judicial decisions. DeFilippi & Wright, supra note 2, at 81–82. But this
is hardly unique to contract law—it is probably true that as a general
rule, judicial opinions are intended for justifications for a decision and
may or may not accurately reflect the judge’s actual thought process.
Indeed, although this is beyond the scope of this short essay, philosophical
and psychological theory since at least Immanuel Kant question whether
we can ever know the “true” reasons for our decisions. This does not mean
that decision making is necessarily irrational or in bad faith. Rather, it is
that rationality is applied retroactively as we attempt to justify our decisions, and reject decisions that we cannot. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The
Interpreter, The Lawyer and The Scientist, in Economies of Interpretation
(Peter Goodrich & Michel Rosenfeld eds. forthcoming 2019).
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Second, so-called “ambiguity” in contracts does not result
from a flaw in natural language. Rather, linguistic, psychoanalytic and mathematical theory agree that all symbolic
(intersubjective) relations are open and dynamic as a matter
of logical necessity. That is flexibility is a characteristic of
contracts understood as the agreement between the parties,
not a flaw in the language used to memorialize the
agreement. The dream that there could be a closed, perfectly
correlative contract is imaginary—a “fantasy” in the technical psychoanalytic meaning of the term. As this is not a theoretical paper I will not discuss this literature further here.
Proponents explain that smart contracts would be unambiguous because they are a series of pre-programmed instructions in the form of “if A, then B; if B then C, etc.” In the
words of Lipshaw, who is otherwise skeptical of smart
contracts:
What makes the potential digital automation of contracts tantalizing is the fact that most contracts and contract law have a
deductive “if-then” structure that can be expressed in formal
first order logic. But many of the natural language predicates
useful in drafting contracts are capable of inclusion in formal
logic, but not sufficiently precise to be expressed in code
without some translation of continuous characteristics into
discrete units.250

However, to claim that this structure could effectuate the
agreement between the counterparties is to assume (as
Lipshaw seems to in this passage) that the legal relationships that constitute a contract are, in fact, a series of “if A,
then B” propositions. This is an unsupported empirical
assumption. All or parts of some contracts can be, and have
been, so reduced and automated—such as interest rate
swaps. Other familiar examples are algorithmic securities
trading and Google advertising contracts. Many, if not most,
others probably cannot because human relations do not follow this form, as Lipshaw elsewhere acknowledges.
Jerry Kaplan, a professor of artificial intelligence at
Stanford University, argues that the assumption that such
simple computer-type logic also characterizes human intelligence is a mis-conception that has held up the development
of artificial intelligence. Consequently, the modern approach
250

Lipshaw, supra note 4, at 7.
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of researchers is to study how rational humans actually
think and then consider if and how computers can be
programmed to replicate this process.251 Apparently, the
smart contract crowd has not yet received the memo and
believe that they can force contract parties to act like
computers.
This mis-perception that precise artificial languages are
superior to natural language has arisen repeatedly and has
been debunked, before. For example, as Abigail Shrier points
out:
Perhaps the greatest philosopher of the 20th century, Ludwig
Wittgenstein, argued in his canonical work, “Philosophical
Investigations,” that complaints about the imprecision of
language actually presuppose an accepted standard for judging it. In his day, that unnamed standard was symbolic logic,
which virtually all philosophers regarded as a perfected form
of thought and reasoning. The mistake they’d made, according
to Wittgenstein, was to assume that symbolic logic was the
251

In a recent Wall Street Journal essay, Kaplan states, the development of artificial intelligence needs to go beyond “fine-tuning” computer
readable algorithms:
For the first 30 years or so [i.e. of the history of AI research] research focused
on pushing logical reasoning (“If A then B”) to its limits in the hope that this
approach would prove the basis of human intelligence. But it has proved inadequate for many of today’s biggest practical challenges. That’s why modern
machine learning is trying to take a holistic approach, more akin to perception
than logic. How to pull that off — to achieve “artificial general intelligence” —
is the elusive holy grail of AI.

Jerry Kaplan, Why We find Self-Driving Cars So Scary, The Wall Street
Journal C.5 (June 2–3, 2018).
This does not mean, of course, that legal analysis and contract
drafting entirely eschew “If A then B” operations. For example, when I
teach my commercial law survey course, I often recommend that students
try translating unfamiliar sections of UCC into the “if A, then B” form.
This is because the UCC, generally provides operational rules for specific
fact patterns rather than setting forth basic principles of law. But this is a
starting, not an ending place—the code is not a series of algorithms that
can be mechanically applied to reach determinative results. The UCC is a
paradoxically common law code that in which generalized principles must
be induced from the specific examples. Moreover, it incorporates such
open-ended concepts such as reasonableness, good faith, etc. requiring
factual determinations that allow a judge to reach the “right” result (i.e.
both correct as well as just) if a dispute arises. Moreover, many provisions
(particularly in Article 2) are merely default rules that the drafters
thought were or should be the norm in commercial transactions, that can
be varied by the parties—suggestions rather than instructions.
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correct standard for judging human language. In fact, he
argued, language is exactly as precise as people need it to be.
Philosophers were creating the problem. (emphasis added)252

Linguist Grace Q. Zhang has made a similar point that “the
ability to use vague language is as important as, if not more
important than, the ability to use other types of language
(e.g. precise language).”253 To rephrase this, the relative flexibility or precision of language in any specific instance
represents the human relationship that the language is attempting to capture.254 Consequently, to make language more
precise may, in fact, make it a less accurate representation
of the intentions of the parties.
Despite his earlier statements as to the “it-then” structure
of contracts, Lipshaw notes
Much (if not most) of the natural language lawyers use to
draft contracts resists the complete non-ambiguity or vagueness of computer code. Professor Bayless Manning captured
this in his “law of the conservation of ambiguity”: Elaboration
in drafting does not result in reduced ambiguity. Each elaboration introduced to meet one problem of interpretation imports
with it new problems of interpretation. Replacing one bundle
of legal words with another bundle of legal words does not
extinguish debate; it only shifts the terms in which the debate
is conducted.255

Consequently, Harry Surden, a law professor and computer programmer who was a proponent of “computable
252

Is It ‘Human Error’ When a Robot Fouls Up?, The Wall Street
Journal (A 15 (June 16–17, 2018)).
253

Quoted by Lipshaw, supra note 4, at 39.

254

In Levy’s words:

Though smart contracts may serve . . . goals in some contexts, I suggest that
we should temper our enthusiasm about the transformation of modern contracting practice. This is because smart contract boosters tend to understand
contracts chiefly as technical artifacts, rather than as social resources. Under
this view, contractual agreements are bare financial transactions that can, and
should, be optimized through code; term ambiguity and enforcement costs are
understood as inefficiencies that plague the system of exchange. Understanding contracting practices within their broader social and relational contexts, by
contrast, reveals that contracts are in fact much more than this: they “work” in
a multitude of ways and accomplish a multitude of aims that are unaccounted
for by the smart contract framework.

Levy, supra note176, at 2.
255

Lipshaw, supra note 4, at 31.

362

© 2020 Thomson Reuters E UCC Law Journal E Vol. 49May 2020

SENSE, SENSIBILITY AND SMART CONTRACTS: A VIEW FROM A CONTRACT LAWYER
contracts” even before the recent interest in blockchainsupported smart contracts, is very sensitive to their
limitations. He states:
Parties often draft contracts with terms deliberately specified
at varying levels of discretion, open-endedness, or abstraction
to allow flexibility given future uncertainty. Computer-based
assessment in such scenarios appears problematic. People are
able to respond reasonably in contexts involving judgment,
abstraction, or uncertainty by employing sophisticated cognitive processes. By contrast, while contemporary computer
systems can perform feats of apparent analytical sophistication in certain scenarios, as of yet, they are unable to act in
cognitively demanding contexts at levels anywhere comparable to, for example, trained attorneys.256

In my experience as a counselor, so long as the counterparties are relatively satisfied in on-going legal relationships,
they tend to use contractual language as guidance—looking
to its spirit. What engineers would call the imprecision of
language, is the flexibility that allows the parties to work
things our and continue to do business. When the counterparties start asking the lawyers to parse contractual language,
it is often a sign that the relationship is trouble for other
reasons.257 That is, it is not so much that the ambiguity of
language causes disputes, but that disputes leads to argu256

Surden, supra note 51, at 633–34 (citations deleted). See also

But until computer programs can exhibit general artificial intelligence, they
will lack judgment. They will not, for example, be able to determine whether
vague contract provisions have been satisfied. Cryptocurrencies cannot solve
the problem of incomplete contracts, and as long as contracts are incomplete,
humans will need to resolve ambiguities.

Abramowicz, supra note 65, at 362 (citing Robert Scott, A Theory of
Self-enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 Calum. L. Rev. 1641 (2003), for
the proposition that contract parties often deliberately leave contracts
incomplete).
257

Lipshaw makes a very similar observation;

In short, such merchants may want their relationships to be governed primarily by non-legal norms under which the same antecedents could generate different outcomes. Our natural language, with all its elasticity, allows for that
flexibility. But they still do not want their contracts to replicate the entirety of
a complex business relationship. They want a relatively simple backup set of
unambiguous rights to which they can turn formalistically when the relationship breaks down.

Lipshaw, supra note 4, at 418. See also
Law, it turns out, works through all kinds of avenues other than formal
adjudication. Contracting, in particular, is a deeply social practice in which
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ments about language as ex post facto justifications for their
positions.
Despite this, DeFilippi and Wright assert that “For
decades, scholars have recognized that symbolic logic, like
software, can decrease contractual ambiguity by turning
promises into objectively verifiable technical units,” citing
one law review article from the 1950’s.258 They say this despite the fact that they acknowledge that many contractual
terms (such as standards of good faith) are not susceptible to
codification in logic and that parties to contract intentionally
leave some contract terms open, particularly in long-term
“relational” contracts.259 I would suggest that there are good
practical reasons why lawyers have not adopted the decades
old suggestion other than the fact that many lawyers are
math-phobic. If this were a superior or more efficient way of
drafting contracts, the code-savvy minority of attorneys
would have used this as a competitive advantage. Indeed,
Lipshaw shows that even though many or most contracts
can be expressed in symbolic logic, this does not mean that
they can they can be reduced to digital code.260
James Grimmelmann goes further. He argues not merely
that contracts cannot be reduced to code, but that even if
they could that would not eliminate ambiguity because code
is itself ambiguous. “Smart contracts do not eliminate ambiguity, they hide it.”261 To paraphrase his highly technical
argument, code is a language and, as such, is as socially
parties engage for all sorts of purposes, and the effects of contract negotiation
reverberate outside of the four corners’, or a formal agreement, in both time
and space.

Chaffee, Securities Regulation in Virtual Space, 74 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
1387. See also Blockchain Challenges Traditional Contract Law: Just How
Smart Are Smart Contracts?, 19 Wyo. L. Rev. 87 (2019).
258

DeFilippi & Wright, supra note 2, at 81.

259

DeFilippi & Wright supra note 2, at 76–77, 84.

260

Lipshaw, supra note 4, at 35.

261

Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 2.
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contingent, and as dependent on, and limited by, syntax as
any natural language.262
Even if one does not accept the proposition that legal
relationships and, therefore, language is open-ended as a
logical matter, so-called ambiguity is often a practical or
empirical necessity. For example, it is impossible, or impractical, to anticipate all future contingencies and, therefore, to
draft language to cover them.263 Moreover, long term interrelations like joint ventures and other relational contracts
can be expected to evolve change over time.264 Mik, supra
note 21, at 12. A “smart” contract that automatically and
predictably executed certain actions would not be precise in
the sense that it would not reflect the intentions of the
parties. Or as Werbach and Cornell say “Humans can interrupt . . . execution at any point. But with a smart contract,
complete execution of the agreement, including any transfer
of value, occurs without any such opportunity to interrupt.”265
As Raskin himself admits “a computer program cannot rec262

Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 10–14. He gives as an example of
ambiguity, the notorious DAO contract, discussed infra in text at notes
270–76.
263

In Mik’s words “It is, however, practically impossible to create an
exhaustive list of events that could affect the operation of a smart
contract.” Mik, supra note 21, at 12. See also Abramowicz, supra note 65,
at 362.
264

Mik continues:

A tamper-proof self-enforcing smart contract would continue to operate irrespective of any change in circumstances, which could lead to a situation where
it became commercially absurd or even illegal. On a broader level, technical
writings fail to appreciate that contractual relationships are usually flexible
and dynamic — even in those instances when they are based on fixed legal
language recorded in formal documents. In traditional contracts, it is common
to amend certain provisions to adapt to external circumstances, such changes
in the regulatory or commercial landscape. It is also common to tolerate certain
deviations from the agreed performance without formally amending the
contract. It could thus be argued that smart contracts are rigid and can become
easily disconnected from the transactional reality in which they operate because
no such adjustments are technically possible.
265

Werbach & Cornell, supra note 3, at 332. Nevertheless, DeFilippi
and Wright argue that:
Smart contracts also are more dynamic than traditional paper-based contracts,
because they can be constructed to adjust performance obligation during the
term of an agreement by using a trusted third-party source — commonly
referred to by programmers as an oracle. . . . With oracles, smart contracts
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ognize — outcome[s] that were not contemplated and specified by the parties,” discretion is often part of contracts.266
That is, the supposed lack of ambiguity of smart contracts is
an illusion—a false precision. In contract, as in investing
and economics, “it is better to be roughly right than exactly
wrong.”267
Some contract term are “ambiguous” because execution
requires judgment which, as Immanuel Kant correctly noted,
cannot be taught in the sense that it cannot be reduced to
rules.268 In the words of Werbach and Cornell:
Even without bugs, there are reasons to doubt smart contracts
will always operate as desired. First, they require reduction of
human-readable language to machine-readable code. This
limits their scope to those subjects and activities that can
readily be specified . . . some contractual terms simply cannot
be expressed through formal logic, because they imply human
judgment. A machine has no precise way to assess whether a
party used “best efforts”.269

Similarly, other provisions, such as representations and warranties and covenants that reference “material adverse
can respond to changing conditions in near real time. Parties to a contract can
reference an oracle to modify payment flows or alter encoded rights and obligations according to newly received information. Oracles also make it possible to
determine or update specific performance obligations based on the subjective
and arbitrary judgment of individuals. In this way, parties can rely on the
deterministic and guaranteed execution of smart contracts for objective
promises are readily translatable into code. At the same time, they can assign
to a human-based oracle the task of assessing promises that cannot easily be
encoded into a smart contract, either because they are too ambiguous or because
they require a subjective assessment of real-world events.

DeFilippi & Wright, supra note 2, at 75.
I find this proposition odd because, of course, contract parties can
and do adjust their contract terms in real time in light of changes in circumstances. Having to program this ability into a smart contract and
resort to third parties makes this harder, not easier.
266

Raskin, supra note 1, at 326.

267

Although this thought is often associated with Warren Buffet or
John Meynard Keynes “[a] version of those words came from an 18th
century author named Carveth Read in a book on logic and reasoning.”
Jeff Sauro, Better to Be Approximately Right Than Exactly Wrong (April
12, 2016), available at https://measuringu.com/approx-right.
268

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A133, B172 (trans. & ed.
Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood 1998).
269

Werbach & Cornell, supra note 3, at 365.
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change,” “reasonable grounds for insecurity” and the like
cannot be reduced to code.270 Once could program quantitative tests for materiality, but often qualitative materiality
might be more important.
Often parties intentionally leave some aspects of contracts
unresolved. One might think that a contract lawyer’s duties
are to negotiate terms and draft language that reflects her
client’s intent. But, in my experience, one of the most
important services a contract lawyer serves for her client is
to help it (and its counterparty) discover what their intent
is. That is, the attorney generates hypotheticals and interrogates her client precisely to determine whether there is,
and/or to create, a meeting of minds. To what extent one can
cover all contingencies is subject to practical limitations.
Sometimes, the parties do not have the time and money to
hash out all contingencies. Sometimes putting too much
emphasis on what can go wrong in a deal, can be
counterproductive. Lawyers who over-emphasize the trees of
unlikely contingencies rather than concentrating on the forest of mutually shared goals, are rightfully condemned as
deal breakers, rather than deal makers. The degree of precision to negotiate and draft in a contract is itself a matter of
judgment.
Consequently, it is rational for parties either to expressly
or implicitly agree to leave some points unresolved with the
understanding that they will have deal with them if and
when problems arise. I have had some clients who have
required that the contract set forth formal procedures for
resolving potential future contingencies and disputes. Others have decided that, just as one cannot predict what
contingencies might arise, one can also not predict the best
270

DeFilippi & Wright, supra note 2, at 77. One might be tempted to
argue that one could come up with an “objective” definition of “materiality.” This is true, but why would one want to? Lawyers and accountants
have often tried to argue, for example, that materiality for securities laws
purposes should be pegged to 5% of some measure, such as an issuer’s
revenues or net worth. The SEC and courts rejected such black-and-white
tests because a misstatement or omission may be qualitatively material,
even if not quantitatively so. See e.g. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, Release No. SAR-99 (1999);
Litwin v. Blackstone Group, L.P., 634 F.3d 706, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P
96033 (2d Cir. 2011).
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procedure to be adopted. Once again there is no right
answer—which approach is superior is a matter of judgment.
B. The DAO as Object Lesson
This is not to deny that there are many contracts that are
truly ambiguous because they are poorly drafted. Contract
drafting is an art, not a science. This is one reason why,
when a lawyer drafts complex financial contracts she starts,
if at all possible, with a standard form or precedent (i.e.
boiler plate) so that one does not try to reinvent the wheel.
But this will be the case with respect to smart contracts
written in code as well contracts that are truly ambiguous
because they are poorly drafted. Contract drafting is an art,
not a science. This is one reason why, when a lawyer drafts
complex financial contracts she starts, if at all possible, with
a standard form or precedent (i.e. boiler plate) so that one
does not try to reinvent the wheel. But this will be the case
with respect to smart contracts written in code as well.
This can be seen in the reaction of some blockchain
enthusiasts who objected to Ethereum’s reversal of the
notorious hacking of the DAO in 2016. This event is wellknown and I will only discuss this briefly.271
The DAO, a decentralized autonomous organization, was
271

For an extensive discussion of the DAO debacle see the SEC DAO
Report, supra note 9. Applying the Howey test (S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293, 66 S. Ct. 1100, 90 L. Ed. 1244, 163 A.L.R. 1043 (1946)), the
SEC concluded that the DAO tokens constituted investment contracts
and, therefore, securities for the purposes of federal securities law, that
the unregistered offer and sale of tokens violated Securities Act § 5 (15
U.S.C.A. § 77e), and that trading in the tokens would have violated the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Nevertheless, it declined to bring further
enforcement action against the promoters or any other party.
For both positive and negative discussions of the DAO debacle see
also Fenwick et al., supra note 6, at 20–24; Jean Bacon, Johan David
Michels, Christopher Millard, & Jatinder Singh, Blockchain Demystified;
An Introduction to Blockchain Technology and its Legal Implications,
Queen Mary University of London, School of Law Legal Studies Research
Paper no. 268/2017 at 35; O’Shields, supra note 4, at 185–86; Kolber,
Not-So-Smart Blockchain Contracts and Artificial Responsibility, 21 Stan.
Tech. L. Rev. 198, 214–18, 222–25 (2018); Raskin supra note 1, at 33;
Werbach & Cornell, supra note 3, at 350–52; Usha R. Rodriguez, Law and
the Blockchain, University of Georgia Research Paper Series, Paper No.
2018-07 (Feb. 2018) at 24–38, abstract available at https;://ssrn.com/abstr
act=3127782; Reyes, Nizan Gelevich Packin & Benjamin P. Edwards,
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an investment vehicle in the form of a smart contract on the
Ethereum platform. It was supposed to allow all investment
decisions to be made jointly by the investors without a
central authority like an investment manager or board of
directors.272 It quickly crowdfunded investments valued at
approximately $150 million in “ether.” Notoriously, the first
day the DAO went online some person or persons used an
exploit in the program to withdraw ether from the DAO
valued at approximately $50 million. The Ethereum Foundation created a “hard fork” that effectively reversed the transaction, returning the ether to the DAO, which subsequently
disbanded, returning all of its funds to its investors.
A significant and vocal portion of the blockchain community objected to this on two related grounds. First, one of
the most important features of a blockchain to many
proponents is precisely that all transactions are permanently,
immutably and irrevocably inscribed on the blockchain.
Indeed, as David Gerard notes in scathing account of the
DAO incident, the promoters emphasized the irreversibility
of transactions in the promotional materials.273 If the DAO
Distributed Governance, 59 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. Online 1, 2–4,17 (2017);
Levy, supra note 176, at 5; Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 18–19; Rodriguez, Law and the Blockchain, 104 Iowa L. Rev. 680 (2019); Reyes, If
Rockefeller Were a Coder, 87 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 374 (2019) (suggesting
that future DAO’s might be organized as business trusts, reviving an old
form of organization).
272

Although promoted as a revolutionary new form of investment vehicle, it, in fact, largely replicates in digital form of a Lloyd’s company—a
sui generis business organization formed under the U.K’s Lloyd’s Act for
the purpose of investing in reinsurance contracts on the Lloyds of London
market. Although each investor, known as a name, invests a stated amount
into the syndicate, and a manager will identify potential contracts for the
syndicate to buy, the syndicate will not make the acquisition unless the
names approve. One difference between a Lloyd’s company and The DAO
is that, the DAO would have made an investment proposed by its “curators” if the holders of a requisite majority of the value of the investments
approved it, whereas in a Lloyd’s company, any name could elect that her
portion of the syndicate’s assets not be used to make the investment. My
understanding, however, is that a practical matter names accept the
recommendations of the syndicate managers.
273

Specifically, the promoters described the DAO as “operating solely
with the steadfast iron will of unstoppable code.” (emphasis in the original) Gerard, supra note 16, at 108.
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(or its investors and creditors) wanted to recover from the
hackers, the proper remedy would have been to find them
and sue them. This would be difficult, if not impracticable,
because although Ethereum transactions are not truly anonymous, they are pseudonymous. Although the identities of
parties are often discoverable through various forensic
techniques, these may often be too expensive for use by
private litigants.
But, the most extreme proponents made a second
argument. There should be no “remedy” at all because there
had been no theft. In a smart contract there is no external
standard of right or wrong, only the program itself. That is,
the hackers merely found and exploited a feature of the
program itself. Any other investor in the DAO could have
done so, the “hacker” is just the clever, or lucky, investor
who did so first. He or she is entitled to keep the profits of
their hard work or luck.274
The DAO debacle teaches a number of lessons. First, the
autonomous nature of smart contracts is as much a curse as
a blessing. Two, the supposed lack of ambiguity of smart
contracts in an illusion—the exploit that the hackers used
was a hole in the program that the creators and promoters
did not intend. Third, blockchain transactions are not
immutable. The only reason why the minority of DAO investors could argue against the hard fork was precisely because
hard forks are in fact possible.
That is, the hard-core DAO minority are, in fact, not making an argument that code is objective. They are making a
normative argument because, in fact, it is subjective. Although they purport to claim that blockchains are immutable, the only reason they can argue that should not be
changed is because they are in fact “mutable.” They want to
claim that the code is the law, while forgetting that all laws/
contracts/codes incorporate and are subject to their own meta
274

As Raskin pus it:

Strictly speaking, however, the hacker did not “hack” the code in a malicious
way, but rather used the terms of the existing smart contracts to accomplish
something others later found objectionable, i.e. the diversion of their money.
Consider this using a legal loophole to effect a result that was clearly within
the letter of the law, but not within its spirit (citations omitted).

Raskin, supra note 1, at 337.
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law/contract/code provision that governs how they can be
amended. Laws usually can be changed by the requisite vote
of the legislature or the people, contracts by the consent, and
sometimes by the actions of the parties, and blockchains by
hard forks. If the DAO exploiters want to argue that the majority cannot complain about their exploiting an unanticipated ambiguity in the code, then they cannot complain that
when the majority exploits the forking option.275
Fourth, blockchains do not do away with the necessity for
trust.276 The promoters of the DAO implicitly, or unconsciously, trusted that their investors would not seek exploit
opportunities that would immediately destroy the DAO, and
the other investors trusted that the promoters and the
Ethereum Foundation would protect them through a hard
fork.
As Grimmelmann states (using, as I do, the DAO as an
object lesson):
Natural languages are embedded in communities of people
who use and understand those languages. This introduces ambiguity and uncertainty, because people may use and understand the same words in different ways. But it also provides a
backstop on how badly natural-language contracts can fail. In
many cases, the meaning of a contract is clear to a large fraction of people in the relevant linguistic community. If a
contract isn’t worth the paper it’s printed on, it is because of
corruption or enforcement problems, not because of ambiguity.
Programming languages appear to reduce linguistic
275

Kolber makes a similar point:

Broadly construed, however, “the code” is all the programming used to run
TheDAO as well as the entire Ethereum ecosystem that hosted it. And part of
the code underlying the Ethereum ecosystem is the architecture to enable and
resolve hard forks. From this perspective, hard forking is not precluded by the
code . . . Has forking was just as much a part of the code — again, broadly
construed — as the TheDAO exploit was.

Kolber, supra note 270, at 222–23.
276

A factor strangely omitted from discussions of the DAO is that, as is
so often the case with respect to new technology, the promoters mistakenly
presume that because the technology is novel, this means that existing
law does not already govern it. In this case, if U.S. law applied, the DAO
would have almost certainly been a general partnership (as Rodriguez
similarly points out, Rodriguez, supra note 270, at 36–37) in which case
the exploiters actions would have violated their fiduciary duty to the other
investors.
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ambiguity. In many cases, they do. Relative to a given
implementation, a computer program’s meaning is far more
definite than a typical natural-language term’s. Indeed, the
very process of reducing a term to a formal-language expression requires a degree of precision from its drafters that can
itself force them to understand and express their intentions
more clearly. But because programming languages are formal,
constructed systems, when the bottom drops out, it can really
drop out.277

VI. Conclusion: Sensibility?
The fact that most contracts cannot be made purely
automated and that smart contracts are unlikely to radically
upend contract law or practice in the near future does not
mean that blockchain technology won’t have significant legal
affects. Large parts of contracts can, already are, and will
continue to automated.278 Blockchain technology holds out
great hope to make these contracts, as well as payments and
clearing of financial arrangements somewhat more efficient.
However, as contracts today function fairly well, sense
tells us that smart contracts are highly unlikely to radically
change legal practice or business practices. And yet, and yet,
sensibility still beckons. Blockchains seem to hold out the
hope of something big—it is just not clear as to what that
might be.
277

Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 20.

278

See e.g. Surden, supra note 51, at 695.
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Bringing Drafts Into the Digital Age
Eric Marcus*
Drafts are a form of negotiable instrument that are commonly used to settle transactions for the sale of commercial
goods. In the United States, the legal framework governing
drafts is set out in Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC”), which covers all forms of negotiable instruments.
Currently, Article 3 contemplates that drafts will be in writing, on paper and will be transferred by the transferor
endorsing the original draft and physically delivering it to
the transferee. As more and more commercial contracts have
moved from paper to electronic format, drafts have been left
behind, because the laws that enable electronic contracting
generally (primarily the Electronic Signatures in Global and
National Commerce Act (“E-Sign”)1 at the federal level and
the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (“UETA”) at the
state level) do not cover drafts. In connection with the current project organized by the American Law Institute and
the Uniform Law Commission to update the UCC to accommodate emerging technology, amendments should be made
to Article 3 expressly authorizing drafts in electronic form
(“e-drafts”).
I. Introduction to Drafts
The term “negotiable instrument” is defined in UCC Section 3-104 as “an unconditional promise or order to pay a
fixed amount of money, . . . if it: (1) is payable to bearer or
to order . . .; (2) is payable on demand or at a definite time;
and (3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction
by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act
*The author is a retired partner of Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer
LLP. He specialized in the areas of asset securitization and supply chain
finance. He is currently an observer to the Joint Study Committee on the
Uniform Commercial Code and Emerging Technologies.
1

15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7001 to 7031.
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in addition to the payment of money . . .”2 A draft is a negotiable instrument in the form of an order (rather than a
promise), and “order” is defined in UCC Section 3-103(8) as
“a written instruction to pay money signed by the person
giving the instruction.”3
Switching from the legal language to a practical example,
consider a draft arising out of the sale of commercial goods.
Assume that the seller and the buyer have agreed that the
purchase price will be $100 and will be paid on May 31,
2020.4 The draft would be prepared by the seller, and would
provide, in its simplest form, as follows: “On May 31, 2020
pay to the order of Seller US$100.00 (One Hundred US Dollars and no Cents).” The draft would be signed by the seller
and delivered to the buyer for its acceptance. If the buyer
agreed with the terms, the buyer would sign the draft below
the word “Accepted” and return the original draft to the
seller.5 Such acceptance creates the buyer’s liability to pay
the draft.
Although the UCC uses the terminology “draft,” the same
legal instrument is often referred to as a bill of exchange.6
Many foreign countries have a legal concept that is very sim2

Unless otherwise indicated, all references herein to Article 3 of the
UCC are to the Revised Version dated 1990 as amended by the 2002
Amendments. Most, but not all, states have adopted the 1990 Revised
Version.
3

A check is a particular form of draft that is either “payable on
demand and drawn on a bank or. . . a cashier’s check or teller’s check.”
U.C.C. § 3-104(f). The focus of this article is on drafts used in trade
finance and supply chain finance facilities, in which there is significant
market pressure to use e-drafts, but the drafts used in such facilities are
not checks. Therefore, and because the collection and processing of checks
is subject to extensive federal and state law and regulation in addition to
Article 3 of the UCC, the author believes that the case as set forth herein
for amending Article 3 to authorize e-drafts should be limited to drafts
other than checks.
4

Drafts may be payable at a fixed future date, as in this example, or
on demand or at sight. See U.C.C. §§ 3-104, 3-108.
5

Certain other terms are commonly included in a draft but are not
required. Examples are a designation of the place of payment (usually a
bank) and a statement that the draft evidences payment obligations of
buyer arising under a specific identified contract.
6

See Official Comment 4 to U.C.C. § 3-104.
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ilar to a draft, but they use the term bill of exchange.7
Because of the prevalence of bills of exchange in international
trade, the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law has prepared a Convention on International Bills
of Exchange and International Promissory Notes. However,
at this time the Convention has not been approved by either
the United States or the minimum required number of nations, and it therefore has not yet taken effect.8 In any event,
the Convention does not contemplate electronic instruments;
it deals only with tangible instruments in writing that can
be transferred by delivery.
II. Settling Sales of Goods by Accounts or Drafts
In many sale transactions, the buyer does not pay for the
goods concurrently with delivery but instead pays on 30-day,
60-day or even longer terms. The buyer’s obligation to pay is
often an “open account” that is evidenced solely by an invoice.
Such an open account is classified as an “account” under
Article 9 of the UCC. However, the parties may also agree
that the buyer’s payment obligation be represented by a
draft. An impetus for this method of settlement has been a
push in recent years by many buyers with bargaining power
for payment terms longer than the traditional 30 or 60 days.
Although the longer payment terms are helpful for the
buyer’s cash flow, they are quite harmful for the cash flow of
the seller, who has incurred expenses to buy raw materials
and manufacture and sell the goods, all without receiving
any payment for the goods. In order to manage their own
cash flow, sellers have turned to banks and other financial
institutions to monetize the obligations due from their buyers by borrowing against or selling these obligations. Such
monetization programs are generally referred to as trade
finance or supply chain finance facilities and have been the
subject of significant growth in the last 10 years. As will be
further detailed below, sellers are able to obtain significantly
7

Examples are the Canadian Bills of Exchange Act and the U.K.
Bills of Exchange Act of 1882.
8

Although the Convention was proposed in 1988, it has only been
adopted by five countries, with the most recent adoption occurring in
2005. Since a minimum of 10 adopting countries is required for the
Convention to enter into force, prospects for the effectiveness of the
Convention do not bode well.
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greater rates of funding under these programs if the obligations are in the form of drafts, rather than accounts.
If a seller holds payment obligations in the form of accounts, it may obtain immediate cash by either selling the
accounts or assigning the accounts as collateral for a loan. A
financial institution funding the accounts will generally
prefer to buy the accounts, rather than lend against them,
because in the event of a bankruptcy of the seller, sold accounts will not be part of the seller’s bankruptcy estate and
the financial institution will not be prevented from collecting
the accounts by the automatic stay in bankruptcy. However,
even with a sale of accounts, the funder will still be subject
to several risks which it must protect itself against. A significant risk is dilution—the possibility that the buyer may not
pay the full amount of the account based on a dispute that
the purchased goods were defective or did not otherwise
conform to the contract or because the buyer has other claims
or offsets against the seller. An agreement for the sale of accounts will provide that the seller has recourse for any dilution, but depending on the seller’s creditworthiness and the
expected amount of dilution, the agreement may also provide
for a dilution reserve. In such a case, the funder would
reduce the purchase price of the accounts by a dilution
reserve, and when the actual dilution was determined, the
funder would pay the seller an amount equal to any excess
of the dilution reserve over the actual dilution. This issue is
not a concern if the funder purchases drafts, rather than accounts, because the buyer has agreed in the draft to pay an
amount equal to the full amount of the invoice. Furthermore,
if the funder purchases the drafts in such a way that it
becomes a holder in due course,9 the funder will take the
drafts free of all claims and defenses (including dilution)
other than certain very limited defenses, such as incapacity
of any party to the draft (e.g. infancy or insanity), illegality
and discharge in bankruptcy. Nearly all draft programs are
structured with the intention that the funder will be a holder
in due course.
9

The requirements to become a holder in due course are set forth in
UCC § 3-302(a) and include, among other conditions, that the holder take
the instrument for value, in good faith, and without notice of certain
specified claims and defenses.
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Another risk to the funder purchasing accounts is that although the account may arise under an invoice having 30- or
60-day terms, the invoice terms have traditionally not been
viewed as providing an absolute fixed maturity date. Such
accounts are routinely paid within a few business days of
the applicable term without any penalty. In order to mitigate
this risk, an agreement for the sale of accounts will typically
include a buffer period (approximating the historical delay
in buyer payments) in the calculation of the purchase price
for the accounts. Note again that this issue is not a concern
for a funder purchasing drafts, because the draft contains a
fixed maturity date.10 As indicated by the foregoing discussion, the purchase price for a draft should be solely a function of the buyer’s creditworthiness and the term of the draft,
whereas the purchase price for an account must also consider
expected dilution and expected payment delay. As a result,
the seller should obtain more favorable funding if it is able
to sell drafts rather than accounts.
Another distinction between the sale of accounts and drafts
is that sales of accounts are subject to Article 9 of the UCC,
whereas sales of drafts are not.11 Accordingly, a purchaser of
accounts must make a UCC filing against the seller in order
to perfect its interest in the accounts, and a purchaser of accounts will want to confirm the priority of its interest by
reviewing a UCC search against the seller. After making its
UCC filing, a purchaser of accounts is required to amend the
UCC filing or refile if the seller changes its name or jurisdiction of organization, and it must also periodically (usually
every five years) file continuation statements to preserve its
interest. These UCC perfection requirements result in additional administrative expenses, which are not applicable to
a purchaser of drafts.12
A purchaser of drafts may also have the benefit of certain
expedited remedies which are not available to the purchaser
10

The draft may also include a provision for interest on late payments.
11

U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3). Of course, a security interest in a draft,
granted as security for an obligation, is subject to Article 9.
12

A purchaser of drafts will rely on its holder in due course status to
assure its priority. See U.C.C. §§ 9-330(d), 9-331.
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of accounts. For example, in New York an expedited collection procedure, known as a motion for summary judgment in
lieu of complaint, is available when the action is based on
“an instrument for the payment of money only.”13
III. Paper Drafts vs. E-Drafts
Although draft purchase programs have many advantages
over account purchase programs as described above, draft
purchase programs also have some downsides. A particularly
cumbersome issue is the creation and transfer of the draft.
In order to create and transfer a paper draft, the draft must
be circulated to the seller and the buyer for signature and
then endorsed and delivered to the funder. In today’s commercial world, the three parties are unlikely to be located in
the same city, and may not even be located in the same
country. Circulating a paper draft to the parties requires
several business days at a minimum, as well as close monitoring by administrative staff, and the vagaries of delivery
services and weather can result in some uncertainty as to
the timing of when the fully signed original draft will be
delivered to the funder, which in turn affects the date of
funding. Although some techniques have been developed to
ameliorate this issue, 14 additional documentation and
negotiation is needed, which increases the complexity of setting up and funding a draft purchase program.
A second cumbersome issue is that the draft purchaser
must safely store and maintain the original paper drafts. A
single supply chain finance program may generate hundreds
of drafts annually, and since the financial institutions providing these facilities are likely to have numerous separate
programs, the amount of storage space and administrative
expense associated with the physical drafts can be daunting.
Neither of the foregoing problems would arise if the drafts
were in electronic form, rather than on paper.
IV. E-Drafts and Existing Laws
The current version of Article 3 was promulgated in 1990,
13

N.Y. Civ. P Law & Rules 3213.

14

One party may grant a power of attorney to another party to execute drafts, or one party or a trustee may hold pre-signed signature pages
which it is authorized to assemble upon instruction.
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which was well before laws dealing with electronic signatures
and electronic documents were adopted.15 Therefore, it is no
surprise that the drafters of Article 3 contemplated that negotiable instruments would exist solely as physical writings.
As noted above, one of the requirements of a draft is that it
is a “written instruction,”16 and Official Comment 1 to U.C.C.
§ 3-104 states that a negotiable instrument “is limited to a
signed writing.” The terms “writing” and “written” are
defined in U.C.C. § 1-201 and require a “reduction to tangible
form.” Accordingly, a draft in electronic form does not satisfy
the definitional requirements of a “draft” under Article 3.
Moreover, the transfer by negotiation of a draft requires
transfer of possession, which in turn requires physical
delivery to the new holder (or an agent of the new holder).17
Since an e-draft cannot be physically delivered, Article 3
does not provide a method for it to be negotiated by a seller
to a funder. Furthermore, since negotiation is a condition to
a funder becoming a holder in due course, a funder of e-drafts
would not be able to become a holder in due course.
In the case of certain other types of documents where
electronic versions are currently used, the UCC was amended
to specifically allow electronic documentation. For example,
electronic chattel paper was added to Article 9 as part of the
revision to Article 9 in 2000, and electronic documents of
title were authorized in 2003 pursuant to a revised version
of Article 7 (with conforming amendments to Article 1). In
order to allow commercial law and practices to continue to
develop and utilize the latest technology, it is time for Article
3 to be amended to permit the use of drafts in electronic
form.
Other laws, such as E-Sign and UETA, providing for the
general recognition of electronic contracts and electronic
signatures are not helpful with regard to e-drafts. Both
E-Sign and UETA exclude from coverage contracts and records governed by the UCC (other than Articles 2 and 2A)
15

E-Sign became effective in 2000, and UETA was finalized by the
Uniform Law Commission and recommended for enactment by the states
in 1999.
16

U.C.C. § 3-103(8).

17

U.C.C. §§ 3-201, 3-203(a).
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but then provide a special form of coverage for “transferable
records” that constitute notes under U.C.C. Article 3.18 The
special provisions for notes are needed, because as noted
above, Article 3 does not provide a method for transferring
and negotiating notes that are not in tangible form. Both
E-Sign and UETA provide that a person having control of a
transferable record is the holder, describe a system for
providing control of a transferable record and provide that a
holder having control has the same rights and defenses as a
holder in due course of a note under Article 3, without any
requirement of delivery, possession and endorsement. Although these provisions provide a firm basis for the creation
and enforcement of electronic notes, drafts are a separate
category of instrument under Article 319 and are outside the
coverage provisions of E-Sign and UETA.
UETA has been adopted in 47 of the 50 states and in the
District of Columbia. The three exceptions are Illinois, New
York and Washington, each of which has adopted its own
statute with respect to electronic signatures and electronic
records. Washington State’s statute, known as the Electronic
Authentication Act, conflicted with E-Sign by requiring
electronic signatures to be in the form of a digital signature,
which is a special type of coded electronic signature that is
created using a key and is verifiable by the recipient, also
using a key. Partly due to federal preemption concerns, the
Washington statute was repealed in 2019. As a result,
transactions governed by Washington State law are now
subject to E-Sign, as supplemented by a Washington State
statute that applies solely to electronic transactions with
governmental entities.20 The New York statute, known as the
Electronic Signatures and Records Act, allows for the creation of electronic negotiable instruments generally (i.e. unlike E-Sign and UETA, it is not limited to notes), provided
there is “only one unique, identifiable and unalterable version which cannot be copied except in a form that is readily
18

15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7003(a)(3) and 7021 (E-Sign) and UETA Sections
3(b)(2) and 16.
19

U.C.C. § 3-104(e).

20

Title 19, Section 360 of the Revised Code of Washington. This statute does not contain any provisions dealing with electronic notes or drafts.
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identifiable as a copy.”21 However, the New York statute does
not include any provisions comparable to those in E-Sign
and UETA granting the holder of an electronic instrument
status as a holder in due course. This is a very significant
omission, which makes use of the New York statute as a
basis for e-drafts questionable. Likewise, the Illinois statute,
known as the Electronic Commerce Security Act, allows for
the creation of electronic negotiable instruments generally22
but does not contain provisions detailing how the holder of
such an instrument becomes a holder in due course. Accordingly, none of the state statutes provides a comprehensive
basis for recognizing e-drafts and according the holders of
e-drafts the same rights as the holders of paper drafts.
Even if the New York and Illinois statutes provided a clear
method for the holder of an electronic negotiable instrument
to become a holder in due course, it would still be risky for
funders of e-drafts to rely on these statutes because of choice
of law issues. For example, in a contest between the holder
of an e-draft and another creditor of the seller or the buyer,
the other creditor would have a strong incentive to assert
that the law applicable to the e-draft was that of a state
other than New York or Illinois, thereby causing the holder
to lose the benefits of holder in due course status. Article 3
does not contain a choice of law provision, and it is customary not to include a choice of law provision or a forum selection provision in a negotiable instrument, because of
concerns that such provisions might be regarded as an “other
undertaking or instruction” which is not authorized by
U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(3) and therefore renders the instrument
not negotiable. In the absence of a statutory rule or an enforceable contractual provision, the law applicable to an
21

N.Y. State Tech. Law § 307.2. This is similar, but not identical, to
certain provisions in E-Sign and UETA authorizing a framework for
transferable records.
22

The requirements for an electronic instrument under the Illinois
statute are more detailed than in the New York statute. Ill. Comp. Stat.
Ann. § 5-120(c)(3) requires that the electronic version of the instrument
must be “created, stored, and transferred in a manner that allows for the
existence of only one unique, identifiable, and unalterable original with
the functional attributes of an equivalent physical instrument, that can be
possessed by only one person, and which cannot be copied except in a form
that is readily identifiable as a copy.”
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e-draft would be determined by an analysis that looked at
the location of the parties, the place of execution, the place
of payment, the place of negotiation and possibly the location of the server where the e-draft was stored.23 Because the
parties to an e-draft are likely to be located in multiple states
(or countries), there may well be several different jurisdictions that bear a relationship to the e-draft transaction and
whose law would be appropriate to apply.24 Different substantive results may arise depending on which jurisdiction’s law
is applied;25 this unpredictability increases transaction costs
and should be eliminated in any proposed UCC amendments.
This could be done by modifying U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(3) to
specify that a negotiable instrument may contain a choice of
law provision and a forum selection clause. Furthermore, a
default choice of law provision could be added to Article 3.26
Because drafts and bills of exchange are frequently used
in connection with cross-border trade transactions, several
international industry groups have been working on proposals to facilitate the use of electronic negotiable instruments.
In 2017, the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (known as UNCITRAL) proposed a Model Law on
23

Restatement 2d, Conflict of Laws § 216 provides that the law of the
state where the negotiable instrument was at the time of transfer
determines (1) the validity of the transfer as between persons who are not
both parties to the transfer and (2) whether the transferee is a holder in
due course. This Restatement was issued in 1971, and the comments to
Section 216 make clear that the rule set forth therein is based on a negotiable instrument being a tangible thing with a readily ascertainable
location. It is unclear whether or how this rule should be applied to an
electronic negotiable instrument.
24

The general choice of law rule in U.C.C. § 1-301(b) of the does not
help to narrow the possible jurisdictions in this situation, inasmuch as it
provides only that in the absence of an effective contractual choice of law
clause, the law of any particular state may be applied “to transactions
bearing an appropriate relation” to such state.
25

In addition to differences that arise as a result of the recognition of
e-drafts in some jurisdictions, but not in others, there are some states,
such as New York, that have not adopted the 1990 Revised Version of
Article 3. Furthermore, New York and some other states have made nonstandard revisions to Article 3, which may cause different substantive
outcomes in certain situations.
26

Other UCC Articles include choice of law provisions. See U.C.C.
§§ 1-301, 4A-507, 5-116, 8-110, and 9-301 to 9-307.
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Electronic Transferable Records (“MLETR”),27 which provides
for recognition of electronic transferable records and provides
further that control (and transfer of control) of an electronic
transferable record is equivalent to possession (and transfer
of possession) of a physical transferable record. The International Chamber of Commerce (known as ICC) has been working to draft a Uniform Rules for Digital Trade Transactions,
which would permit parties to contractually agree to certain
rules for electronic instruments. Additionally, in April 2019 a
working group of BAFT (The Banking Association for
Finance and Trade) proposed for comment a set of Business
Best Practices and related technical specifications for
implementing an electronic promise to pay arising out of a
trade transaction.28 Unlike the MLETR and the ICC rules,
which are neutral as to the technology employed, the BAFT
proposal is intended for use on a digital ledger network.
There have been recent press reports of pilot trade finance
programs conducted on blockchain platforms, including
Marco Polo and we.trade.29
The COVID-19 virus pandemic that has triggered a global
health and economic crisis in 2020 has also disrupted the
ability of banks around the world to process trade finance
transactions, which often require bank personnel to review
paper documents in their offices. In recognition of these
operational problems, the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) issued a memo in early April, 2020 calling for
emergency action by all governments “to enable banks to
process trade finance transactions utilising electronic trade
27

https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/ecommerce/modellaw/electronic_tran
sferable_records. The MLETR has been enacted in Bahrain.
28

https://baft.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/baft-dl
pc-business-best-practices-(proposed-specifications-for-trial-use)-final-520-19.pdf?sfvrsn=2; https://baft.org/docs/default-source/default-document-l
ibrary/baft-dlpc-business-best-practices-(proposed-specifications-for-trial-u
se)-final-5-20-19.pdf?sfvrsn=2.
29

https://www.gtreview.com/news/fintech/first-live-trade-finance-pilot
s-completed-on-marco-polo-blockchain-platform/; https://www.gtreview.co
m/news/fintech/exclusive-hsbc-becomes-first-bank-to-complete-financing-tr
ansaction-on-we-trade-blockchain-platform/. The Marco Polo pilot
programs have been completed, and the platform was released to
participants in March, 2020. https://www.marcopolo.finance/payment-com
mitment/.
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documents - removing the need for any documentation to be
presented in hard-copy.’’30 The ICC expressly included negotiable instruments, such as bills of exchange and promissory
notes, in the list of trade documents that should be capable
of being presented electronically. The ICC further urged
countries to adopt MLETR “to ensure trade finance can be
conducted in a paperless manner with a workforce workingfrom-home.” Also in April, 2020, the International Trade and
Forfaiting Association (“ITFA”) announced a Digital Negotiable Instruments Initiative.31 ITFA has been lobbying the UK
government to revise English law so as to make electronic
negotiable instruments legally valid and concurrently has
proposed a contract law solution to enable suppliers, buyers
and banks to utilize electronic bills of exchange and promissory notes governed by English law. It is very clear that significant commercial pressure is building for a legally certain
electronic instrument solution.
Amendments to Article 3 that authorize e-drafts (including procedures to negotiate e-drafts and attain holder in due
course status) and provide more certainty regarding the law
that would be applied to e-drafts that have a relationship
with multiple jurisdictions will go a long way toward aligning Article 3 with current technology, current commercial
practices and needs and future demands.
30

https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2020/04/icc-memo-on-esse
ntial-steps-to-safeguard-trade-finance-operations.pdf.
31

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/itfa-fintechs-joining-forces-digitise-n
egotiable-using-casterman/.
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